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Abstract 
An important issue for transport policy is whether more investment should be devoted 
to rail schemes and less to road schemes and vice versa. This raises the problem of 
comparing the returns from investments in the two modes currently assessed on a 
different basis - road schemes are appraised on a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) basis, 
whereas rail schemes are assessed on a Financial Analysis (FA). 
This study is a step in the direction of identifying the difference between the two 
techniques (CBA and FA) of appraisal in general and in case of rail investment in 
particular, and examining the implications of the use of the two different techniques in 
assessing the investment in road and rail. In addition, the study develops a 
methodology for assessing rail investment schemes that could be consistent with the 
cost benefit analysis being used in assessing road investment projects. 
The differences between CBA and FA are identified. The current practice of assessing 
road and rail investment schemes is examined and the weaknesses are outlined. The 
potential implications of assessing road and rail investment on different criteria are 
explored. Previous rail investment studies where both CBA and FA were undertaken 
are reviewed and discussed to explore how the task of CBA were carried out to rail 
schemes and to show the difference with the current study approach. 
The study framework of rail scheme appraisal is identified to include four elements of 
impacts. These are; financial impacts to the rail operator (producer surplus), rail user 
benefits (consumer surplus), non-user benefits, and other impacts on other bodies in 
the society (tax adjustments). Non-user benefits concerned by the study are road 
congestion time, noise, air pollution, accidents, and vehicle operating costs. Road 
congestion time, noise and air pollution are identified as externalities, while accidents 
and vehicle operating costs are dealt with as cases of cost misperception. 
The five items of non-user benefits are measured at the margin in a process to identify 
the Marginal Social Cost (MSC) of travel as a function of the road type alternative. 
Eight types of road are identified for the study to represent the entire UK road 
network. The measurement process of non-user benefits incorporates the variation in 
I 
traffic over time and place. This is carried out by incorporating four traffic 
distributions in the calculation process. The distributions of traffic reflect traffic 
variations from hour to another (24 hours) throughout the day, from day to another (7 
days) throughout the week, from month to another (12 months) throughout the year 
and from location to another throughout the UK entire road network. 
The implications of the study findings are explored. Three undesirable implications 
are identified. These are welfare losses to the society, lower share for rail travel, and 
investment bias towards roads. Three policy options are put as a solution. These are, 
pricing road and rail services according to the MSC, subsidising public transport, and 
applying a consistent appraisal method for road and rail investment. The contribution 
of these options towards achieving a sustainable balance between road and rail as well 
as their applicability in practice are examined. At the end some improvements and 
attached areas of further research are suggested. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Transport is a keystone of civilisation. The spread of production, trade and ideas and the 
economic ascendancy of mankind all depend upon movement. Personal mobility is one 
of democracy's most valued freedoms, and a surprisingly high proportion of our income 
is devoted to our movement and to the movement of the goods that we buy. 
The transport sector is one of the largest in any advanced economy. In developing 
countries, transport has a vital role to play in achieving the targets of the development 
process. As incomes rise, for both developed and underdeveloping economies, an 
increasing share of consumers' expenditure is devoted to travel, a large amount of it is 
spent on private car purchase and operation. In consequence, governments spend large 
sums on the provision of the road infrastructure. At the same time , they spend 
large 
sums on the subsidisation of public transport services to maintain a proper balance 
between public and private provision of transport services. 
In transport as in some other fields, the volume of public expenditure is only a partial 
guide to the importance of the decisions made by government. Direct public expenditure 
on road safety, for example, runs at only a few million pounds a year, but the total costs 
which safety measures impose on transport users and the benefits they bring, may be of 
the order of a hundred times as much. On a wider level, the nature of the transport 
system available has important implications for industrial and agriculture growth, urban 
development, the quality of environment and the enjoyment of leisure. Thus, in terms of 
both size and complexity the transport sector merits the attention it has attracted from 
analysts of various disciplines. 
United Kingdom traffic forecasts indicate that by the year 2025 an increase in vehicle 
miles of between 83 and 142% is expected (Department of Transport, 1989). Average 
travel speeds in central London have altered very little since the turn of the century 
(Mogridge, 1990). Average peak traffic speeds in central London fell from 20.7 km/h in 
1972 to 17.6 km/h in 1990 (Church, 1992). Americans spend about two billion man 
hours per year stuck in traffic jams and by the year 2000 there will probably be one car 
for every person aged 20 - 64 (Economist, 1992). The annual rate of growth in vehicle 
numbers in Germany exceeds the growth rate for world population (Holzapfel, 1992). 
The UK road construction and widening programme over the next ten years will cost £20 
billion and add 5% to total road space. These trends draw everyone's intention to the 
necessity of finding a solution to the problem of increasing the use of private cars and 
congestion on the roads. The simple and first solution one can think of is to adapt the 
right balance between public and private transport, so that public means of transport can 
perform the relevant rule within the whole transport sector. 
1.2 Transport Investment Analysis 
The importance of investment analysis is obviously critical in transport economics, for 
the investments are usually long lived and commonly exercise a decisive influence on the 
way in which communities live and grow. The essence of such analysis is the comparison 
of a future stream of receipts from a project with the future pattern of costs, so that a 
decision can be made on which of several projects is financially most attractive or 
whether indeed society may prefer to reject all the projects in favour of expenditure 
elsewhere. Whether the investment is undertaken privately by an individual, company, 
firm or employs public funds, it involves the fundamental issue of choosing allocations 
for scarce funds. 
1.3 Investment Appraisal 
At the most general level, we may view the objective of any investment as being an 
increase in the real income of the community. The purpose of investment appraisal is to 
identify the ways in which and the extent to which alternative projects may contribute to 
increasing community welfare and to compare alternatives on this basis. 
If the price mechanism could be relied upon as a good indicator of social values, both in 
product and factor markets, and perfect competition prevailed in these markets, we could 
be sure that the increase of profit accruing to the entrepreneur as the outcome of an 
investment was a reliable indicator of the real increase in welfare obtaining. For, in such 
circumstances, the individual firm would be a price taker. In the short run, any reduction 
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in the real costs of production would accrue to the firm as increased profits. In the long 
run, other firms would copy cost reducing innovation and by price reductions compete 
with the original innovator. The benefits would then be predominantly passed on to the 
consumer with only enough "profit" remaining (the normal profit of classical economic 
theory), to justify the devotion of investment funds to this purpose. But, even with 
redistribution of benefits, the profit potential acts not only as a stimulant of investment 
but also as a proxy for the social welfare improvements which are its justification. Figure 
1.1 presents this case. 
price 
SRMCI 
SRMC2 
B 
A Demand= MR=AR 
Producer surplus before=AE C 
C Producer surplus after=AD 
E Change in producer surplus C 
=change in social benefits 
0 
Q1 Q2 Quantity 
Figure 1.1 Short Run Equilibrium Under Pure Competitions 
There are many areas within the transport sector where the preconditions broadly obtain, 
and where, therefore, a commercial criterion is a perfectly adequate proxy for the total 
social welfare improvement which is the ultimate community objective. 
In other cases, however, the revenue accruing to a particular project will not adequately 
measure the benefits attributable to that project. Three important cases may be set out, 
these are: 
1.3.1 Consumer Surplus 
Under conditions of imperfect competition or monopoly, benefits will accrue even in the 
short run to consumers, as well as to producers (unless a complete price discrimination is 
possible), and the consumer surplus needs to be taken into account in assessing the social 
benefits of the project. Figure 1.2 presents this case. MCI and MC2 indicate to marginal 
cost before and after the investment assuming that the investment will shift marginal cost 
BDE 
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curve uniformly downward. And as it can be seen from figure 1.2, the absence of pure 
competition creates an area of consumer surplus which has to be considered in measuring 
investment benefits. 
ri 
I 
F 
Producer surplus before = P1 ABC 
Producer surplus after=P2EFG 
Consumer surplus before= DAM 
Consumer surplus after=DEP2 
change in social welfare= change in 
producer surplus+ change in consu 
surplus 
Qi Q2 
anti 
Figure 1.2 The existence of consumer surplus when pure competition is absent 
1.3.2 Pricing Distortion 
Where no prices are charged for the use of facilities " e. g. roads", or where the prices 
charged bear scant relationship to the benefits deemed to be gained by users "e. g. public 
transport in rural areas", the revenue cannot stand as a proxy for the social benefits of 
the project. 
1.3.3 Externalities 
1.3.3.1 A definition of Externalities 
Although the concept of external effects is widely used in economics, there is no 
consensus on its exact definition and interpretation. However, it is commonly recognised 
that externalities are an important source of market failure. Their existence leads to a 
deviation from the neo-classical world in which the price mechanism takes care of 
socially optimal resource allocation (Pareto efficiency). The following definition relies 
on those given by Mishan (1971, p. 2) and Baumol and Oates (1988, p. 17) 
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An external effect exists when an actor's (the receptor's) utility (or profit) function 
contains a real variable whose actual value depends on the behaviour of another 
actor (the supplier), who does not take these effects of his behaviour into account 
in his decision making process 
Figure 1.3 shows the optimal workings of the market mechanism in absence of external 
effects. Adam Smith's invisible hand secures social welfare maximisation at the market 
equilibrium Qp where marginal private cost (MPC) equals marginal private benefits 
(MPB). The existence of marginal external costs (MEC) (see figure 1.4) drives a wedge 
between marginal social cost (MSC) and marginal private cost. The market outcome Qo, 
where private welfare is maximised is not optimal from a social point of view. Social 
welfare maximisation requires the activity to be restricted to a level of Q*, where the 
marginal social cost is equal to the marginal benefits and the dead-weight welfare loss C 
is avoided. This optimum can for instance be accomplished by means of a quantitative 
restriction (Q) or tax (T). 
Costs benefits 
PO 
Costs , benefits 
Qo Q 
Figure 1.3: Normal case 
1.3.3.2 Transport Externalities 
t 
Q* Q0 
MSC=MPC+MEC 
Figure 1.4: External cost 
Where the project has external effects, benefits or costs are created in other sectors of the 
economy, or in other parts of the transport sector, and these need to be taken into 
account. One such case arises where the project has an impact on the production of 
goods for which no prices are charged. A clear example of this is the environmental 
Q 
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impacts of a transport service. Although there is no market in environmental effects, the 
benefits of reductions in noise, smoke, etc. are real. A second case in where the project 
affects the demand for other goods, the production of which takes place under non- 
constant returns to scale. For example, the principal beneficiaries of the Victoria Line 
investment were the road users who benefited from reduction in congestion (Harrison 
and Mackie 1973). 
It is quiet clear from our everyday experience, that there are external costs associated 
with transport that are not directly borne by those generating them. Air travellers impose 
noise costs on those living below aircraft flight paths, road travellers inflict dirt and 
vibration on those living adjacent to major trunk routes. Maritime transport frequently 
pollute bathing beaches with their oil discharges. 
These are external costs generated by transport users and inflicted on the non - travelling 
public. Formally, externalities exist when the activities of one group (either consumers 
or producers) affect the welfare of another group without any payment or compensation 
being made. They may be thought of as a relationships other than those between a buyer 
and a seller, and do not normally fall within the measuring rod of money. 
There are also external benefits as well as costs although these are generally thought less 
important in the transport sector. For example, wide streets may act as fire breaks, in 
addition to serving as transport arteries, this may be thought of as an external benefit 
associated with urban motorways. 
The following table shows the range and the magnitude of the environmental impacts of 
transport modes. 
Table 1.1 Range and magnitude of the environmental impacts of transport modes 
Air pollution Noise Health and 
Safety 
Water 
pollution 
Road very significant very significant very significant insignificant 
Rail significant significant significant - 
Inland Waterways - - - significant 
Sea insignificant - - - 
Air significant very significant significant - 
Source: This table is adapted from Verhoef (1994) and Nijkamp (1994) 
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1.3.3.3 External Costs of Road Transport 
The existence of external costs of road transport is in fact beyond dispute. Road transport 
is responsible for a wide range of impacts on the users of the roads as well as non-users 
which in turn impose external costs on both categories. Figure 1.5 presents the range of 
the external costs of roads and table 1.2 shows the external costs of road transport in 
Britain for 1991 prices and estimates. These costs are not reflected in the pricing system 
of using roads, and then are not paid for by road users. 
External costs of road 
transport 
Direct costs 
/ Air pollution, traffic 
noise, accidents, 
congestion time, driver 
stress, pedestrian amenity 
Indirect costs 
vibration, visual 
intrusion, water 
pollution, congestion on 
parking, use of space, 
disruption due to 
construction 
Figure 1.5 External costs of road transport 
Table 1.2 The external costs of road transport (1991 estimates and prices) 
Costs (£ billions) 
" Congestion 13.5 
" Damage 1.3 
" Pollution 2.8 
" Noise 0.6 
" Accidents 4.7 to 7.5 
" Total 22.9 to 25.7 
Source: Pearce 1993 
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1.4 Research Area 
Since resources are always in a scarce, a case which imposes an obligation to maximise 
the use of what is available of it. In other words, to try the best to allocate it in a away 
such that to bring the maximum benefits to the community. 
It is the concern of this research to look at and investigate the ways and methods of 
allocating investment funds within transport sector and between the modes. A matter 
which of great importance for the economy at large and for the transport sector to serve 
the rest of the economy in the best way possible. The main focus of the study will be on 
road and rail appraisal methods. 
1.5 The Scope of the Problem 
The simple economic rule for the allocation of resources between different competing 
uses is: invest until returns are equal at all margins. The problem at issue is simply 
stated: if different agencies - nationalised industries, government departments, or other 
bodies - invest and price their products according to different economic criteria, some 
financial, some non-financial, how shall this rule be applied ? Should the rates of return 
from each be regarded as directly comparable and the rule applied straightforward, or 
should some modification be introduced, to make them comparable, and if so what 
modification ? 
Within the transport sector, in the UK, some investments are appraised on a financial 
basis, [railway schemes, buses, road haulage], while some are appraised on a cost benefit 
basis, [roads]. 
In the case of British Railway (BR), schemes are, at the time of writing, required to earn 
an 8% real rate of return in order to process (This was raised from 7% in 1989 as part of 
a general increase in public sector discount rates). Such an appraisal considers only 
savings in operating costs and increases in revenue as the two sources of benefit to the 
railway operator from the project. 
On the other hand, road schemes are evaluated against costs and benefits using the 
Department of Transport's (DTp) computerised cost benefit analysis (COBA). COBA 
program compares the costs of road schemes with the benefits derived by road users, and 
express the results in terms of a monetary valuation e. g. Net Present Value, (NPV). 
The fact raises the following questions: 
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a) How should a central authority faced with demands for money for projects 
appraised in the cost benefit sector and projects appraised financially decide how to 
allocate its funds ? 
b) Can rates of return or net present values calculated financially be compared directly 
with the results of a cost benefit analysis ? 
c) If they differ, is this: 
" because of different coverage of implications of projects. 
" or because they measure different things. 
" or because they perform the same task but with varying degrees of reliability. 
d) Can a rate of exchange between financial rate of return and cost benefit rate of 
return be found? 
There has been a long debate on whether the use of social cost benefit analysis for the 
appraisal of trunk roads schemes and financial criteria for rail leads to a misallocation of 
resources. The Leitch Committee Report on Trunk Road Appraisal (Leitch, 1977) 
concludes that " in general social cost benefit rates of return exceed financial returns, and 
that there was, therefore, potential for resource misallocation in the use of different 
criteria in the two sectors". It recommended that: "Where direct alternatives arise 
between road and rail schemes the competing solutions should be compared using cost 
benefit analysis" and also "Strategic or policy studies conducted to compare the rates of 
return from investment in road and rail should be conducted on the basis of cost benefit 
analysis, rather than financial analysis. 
The number of schemes which have been appraised using both cost benefit and financial 
appraisal techniques is small, but the Department of Transport has produced evidence 
from a study on the provision of a public transport link to Heathrow Airport and the 
Railway Board has produced assessments for two signalling schemes in the southern 
region and has additionally drawn our attention to two French comparisons. This 
evidence is set out in the following table: 
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Table 1.3 Comparison of cost benefit and financial returns 
Case Financial return Cost Benefit Ratio of cost 
return benefit to 
financial returns 
1. Heathrow Airport 1 3.65 3.56: 1 
Piccadilly Line extension 1 
2. BR Feltham resignalling 13 18 1.39: 1 
3. BR London Bridge 14 23 1.65: 1 
resignalling 2 
4. SNCF new route (Paris- 11.1 34.75 3.13: 1 
North) 2 
5. SNCF improvements 1.5 28 18.7: 1 
Paris-Clermont)2 
Source: (Leitch 1977) 
1= 
returns are calculated as a net present value over cost 
2= internal rate of return is calculated 
More recent studies have been carried out using both cost benefit and financial 
techniques, and the conclusions were supporting the earlier results (see Department of 
Transport 1984 and Midland Main Line Consortium 1992). 
1.6 Purpose of the Research 
The aim of the research is to develop a methodology for appraising rail schemes which 
could be consistent with the cost benefit techniques used to appraise road schemes. The 
methodology to be developed is not meant to be for a certain rail scheme. It is rather a 
general one, that deals with and has the answer to, different circumstances of rail 
investments. The circumstances considered here are the type of the road that can be a 
direct alternative to the railway line to be improved or invested in. The types of roads 
considered are: 
1. Motorways 
2. Major urban central roads 
3. Major urban non-central roads 
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4. Major rural single carriageways 
5. Major rural dual carriageways 
6. Minor urban central roads 
7. Minor urban non-central roads 
8. Minor rural roads 
1.7 Research Objectives 
Having stated the research problem, and the purpose of the study, it is the turn now to 
set the objectives of the research. These are as follows: 
1.7.1 Main Objectives 
The main objectives are: 
1. To identify different appraisal techniques used for assessing the investment in 
transport sector, in particular cost benefit analysis and financial analysis. In 
addition a detailed comparison between the two techniques and implications of 
resource allocation. 
2. To identify the difference between cost benefit analysis and financial analysis in the 
case of rail investment. 
3. To identify the factors that influence the divergence between the returns on the 
investment of the two techniques. 
4. To identify the means by which the difference may be incorporated into the 
framework of investment appraisal. 
1.7.2 Sub-objectives 
In addition to the main objectives outlined above, the following sub-objectives are 
targeted and meant to serve in achieving some of the main objectives. 
a) To identify user benefits of rail investment (consumer surplus), and investigate to 
what extent it does exist and define how pricing policy and cost and demand 
elasticity may affect the magnitude of the consumer surplus.. 
b) To identify and quantify non-user benefits of rail investment at the margin as a 
function of the road alternative, these are: 
" Congestion benefits on road 
9 Accident benefits on roads (Misperception) 
11 
Road vehicle operating cost benefits (Misperception) 
" Environmental benefits (noise and air pollution) 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
Figure 1.6 shows the structure of the thesis. 
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analysis Appraisal Techniques analysis 
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Figure 1.6 The structure of the thesis 
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1.9 Chapter Summary 
The above sections showed the importance of investment analysis in the transport sector. 
The problem of allocating funds between projects assessed on a different basis has been 
outlined. The purpose of the study has been formulated as a development of an appraisal 
framework for rail investments to be consistent with road appraisal method. In achieving 
that aim a set of objectives have been defined in details. The chapter ends by 
demonstrating the structure of the whole study and a brief outline of the contents of each 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Appraisal Techniques (Theory) 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter formulates the first section of the theoretical part of the study, it also 
serves in achieving the first objective of the research outlined in the first chapter 
above. It is devoted to examining and investigating theoretically the evaluation 
methods of transport investment. In particular cost benefit and financial analysis. How 
the two techniques differ in the coverage of investment benefits, and how and why 
they might lead to a different returns on the investment. 
The chapter starts by reviewing the appraisal techniques in general. Then a detailed 
comparison between Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and Financial analysis (FA) is 
made. After that it turns to investigate the possibility and magnitude of a divergence 
between CBA returns and FA returns. Finally it highlights the fact that CBA returns 
are most likely to be higher than the FA returns and a chance of resource 
missallocation might occur when the two techniques are used to allocate funds. The 
chapter ends by a summary of its different sections. 
introduction 
Appraisal 
Techniques 
CBA and FA 
compared 
summary 
Figure 2.1 Chapter structure 
2.2 Appraisal Techniques 
financial 
analysis 
cost benefit 
analysis 
multi-criteria 
techniques 
main characteristics 
financial and 
1 economic benefits 
financial and 
economic returns 
At the most general level, the methods of assessing projects in the transport sector 
may be identified as follows: 
16 
1. Financial Analysis (FA) 
2. Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
3. Multi-criteria decision-making techniques, such as: 
  Planning Balance Sheet Analysis (PBSA) 
  Goals Achievement Analysis (GAA) 
On one hand, these methods are not completely different, and in fact some of them 
have their roots from the other, especially the multi-criteria methods. On the other 
hand, one may define some other tools of project evaluation, such as Cost - Revenue 
Analysis (CRA), and Cost - Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). But again these methods 
are all related and find their original roots from each other. 
In the following paragraphs, a general definition of these methods outlined above will 
be highlighted. 
2.2.1 Financial Analysis (FA) 
Financial analysis, (sometimes called cash flow analysis), is a method by which the 
effects of an investment on a particular industry or a firm can be measured. It is 
frequently used in the private sector as a method for estimating the money rate of 
return on any investment. 
FA considers only the direct impacts of the project on the entrepreneur in a cash 
basis. Any other direct or indirect impacts on other parties in the society are not 
included. 
This is one facet of FA, the second facet is regard to the valuation of revenue and 
costs. FA accepts prices in the market as it is. Cash flows are determined by market 
conditions, whether competitive or imperfect. So FA may be summarised as follows: 
A method by which only the effects of a project on the entrepreneur are measured on 
cash basis and using the prices it finds in the market at the time of evaluation, while 
the questions of external impacts of the project on the rest of the society or direct 
impacts on the consumers and adjustments for resource costs (shadow pricing), are all 
irrelevant in financial analysis framework. 
In the transport sector however, many investments have the characteristics that those 
who use them do not pay directly for their use. This is particularly so of the road 
system. This is a sort of price distortion as mentioned in chapter 1, and is not relevant 
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or allowed for on FA framework. In addition, many investments have impacts other 
than that on the undertaking such as benefits to users (consumer surplus) and benefits 
or costs to the rest of the society (externalities) . These 
impacts are not included in the 
FA framework. 
Financial criteria are, therefore, of limited use in the appraisal of transport policy 
since the change in profit of a transport undertaking neither reflects the net 
movements benefits to people or goods nor considers the externalities that might exist. 
2.2.2 Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
Cost benefit analysis is one of a family of evaluation techniques used for assessing 
alternative investment projects by technique based on economic efficiency (social 
surplus maximisation) and is defined as "a practical way of assessing the desirability 
of projects, where it is important to take a long view (in the sense of looking at 
repercussions in the further as well as the nearer future) and a wide view (in the sense 
of allowing for side effects of many kinds on many persons, industries, regions, etc. ), 
that is, it implies the enumeration and evaluation of all the relevant costs and benefits" 
(Prest and Turvey 1965). Ideally, items that enter a CBA calculation are to include all 
those that affect the welfare of any individual in that particular society. 
In other words, CBA is a particular kind of economic appraisal, and briefly it is the 
usual method for testing the "soundness" of proposed activities. It involves a 
calculation of the value of the resources to be employed in them " the costs" which 
are compared with the value of the goods or services to be produced " the benefits". 
In the contrast with financial analysis, CBA is a method by which the effects of an 
investment to the society as a whole are measured. 
CBA then is a comprehensive framework measures the actual or expected real impacts 
of a project on a society. These real impacts may be direct (i. e. revenue or profit to 
the undertaking) or indirect (i. e. benefits or costs to users or non-users, e. g. consumer 
surplus and externalities), tangible (i. e. measurable) or intangible. Social costs and 
benefits in CBA are measured at the real economic prices where possible (resource 
costs). Shadow pricing may be required for adjusting the market prices. 
So not only the cost benefit type of analysis more comprehensive in terms of the items 
considered, but also redefines many of the items retained from commercial criteria 
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(FA). For example, the costs of imported raw materials used in a potential road 
construction project in a third world country would be valued at market prices if a 
commercial undertaking were responsible for road investment decisions. If a public 
body undertakes road investment using wider social criteria (CBA), then it would look 
beyond the immediate financial indicators and at the shadow prices of imports so that 
the scarcity of foreign exchange and the limitations of adequate finance for imports is 
reflected in the decision making. 
In some investments use is made of formerly unemployed factor services, for 
instance, unemployed labour where the opportunity cost for employment in a transport 
scheme is zero. A commercial concern would cost such imputes at the wages that have 
to be paid, but in a CBA study they may not be considered a cost at all or, more 
probably, would be costed so that genuine resource costs are incorporated in the 
calculations. 
Another example of resource cost adjustments incorporated in the CBA framework is 
the sales and other indirect taxes. The tax on gasoline, for example, is a financial cost 
to those who pay the tax, but it does not necessarily reflect economic costs to the 
country as a whole, for an increase in the tax does not mean that more economic 
resources are required to produce a given volume of gasoline. Similarly, licence fees 
and import duties will be excluded from the calculation of economic costs in a CBA 
framework. 
A further very important distinction between social efficiency approach (CBA) and the 
commercial approach (FA) is that the former takes cognisance of distributional effect 
of the investment. This is often difficult to do in reality although various schemes for 
weighting costs and benefits have been advanced by theoreticians (for example, 
McGuire and Gain 1969). In practice there is a tendency to employ rather crude 
methods, often, as in the case of planning balance sheet approach used in several 
urban infrastructure investment appraisals (Lichfield and Chapman, 1968), involving 
the simple setting out in tabular form the impacts of a scheme on the different user 
and non-user groups affected or, as with inter-urban road appraisal in the United 
Kingdom (Department of Transport, 1978), carrying out a partial CBA with no 
allowance for distributional effects and subjecting the results of this to further debate 
at public enquiry. 
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Another area of distinction between the social and commercial approaches is the issue 
of transfer payments. A financial analyst will include any cash receipts regardless of 
their sources or origin. A scheme which brings a ; Elm revenue to a transport operator 
and reduces the tax revenue by the same amount will appear in the positive side of the 
operator balance sheet, but if a CBA approach is carried out this revenue will be 
considered as a transfer payments and does not mean a real benefit to the society and 
then will not be included at all. 
Last but not least is the subject of perception . In the transport sector as in other 
sectors there is a possibility of individuals misperceive the actual benefits of an 
improvement to the service or fail to take account of the full costs. There are many 
reasons of misperception, examples of which are: limited information available to 
them, the change in the transport service is extremely small, the costs may be so small 
that it is not worthwhile to take account of, some costs which are, in fact, variables 
may be regarded as fixed costs. e. g. vehicle depreciation, the individual may be 
genuinely unaware of the existence of a connection between what he does and the 
costs involved. 
A financial analysis approach will not allow any corrections to be made for the 
misperceived costs or benefits, while a comprehensive social approach will make an 
allowance for the potential misperception of any cost and benefit elements. 
2.2.3 Multi-criteria Decision-making Techniques 
Multi-criteria decision-making techniques move away from the idea of utility 
maximising which underlies CBA, and are more akin to the management theories of 
satisfying. Rather than attempt to seek optimum solutions which, for practical 
reasons, are likely to be unobtainable, the decision maker selects actions complying 
with a range of criteria which describe minimally satisfactory alternatives. 
The Planning Balance Sheet Analysis (PBSA) initially developed by Lichfield 
(Lichfield, 1956) for town planning purposes is similar to CBA in that all costs and 
benefits are included and that distributional considerations are not neglected, but it 
represents a movement in the direction of multi-criteria analysis in that not all the 
effects of the various schemes are translated into monetary terms. It has subsequently 
been developed and employed in the evaluation of urban transport and airport 
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investment proposals. Where evaluation is difficult, the PBSA approach employs 
physical values and when quantification is impossible, ordinal indices or scales may 
be used. A socio-economic account is drawn up setting out the full effects of each 
course of action and indicating the extent to which various groups in the community 
will be affected. A modified version of this type of approach, the project impact 
matrix, has recently gained the favour of the Leitch Committee (Department of 
Transport, 1978). 
Critics of the PBSA methodology point to the need to develop ordinal ranking criteria 
to permit the various items of the PBSA account to be set against various planning 
goals instead to reflect community preferences. The ranking process has to reflect 
social preferences which are themselves difficult to ascertain and, even if a consensus 
is possible, the ordinal nature of the ranking suggests a loss of efficiency in the 
techniques (Button and Pearman, 1983). Peters (1968), for instance, argues that 
PBSA only offers 
a bombardment of monetary measures, quantitative measures and qualitative 
judgements in confusing array, without a single indicator, with a danger of 
double counting and an embarrassing degree of circularity. 
The critics, although partially valid, tend to contrast PBSA with an idealised 
conventional CBA framework rather than the pragmatic CBA approach adopted in 
practice. 
The PBSA attempt to extend CBA into a multidimensional framework, however, 
requires substantial data imputes and only offers a partial solution to the problem of 
making interpersonal comparisons. Despite this and although PBSA does not avoid the 
problem of making value judgements, the technique has the merit that, unlike the pure 
CBA model, these normative judgements are made explicit rather than hidden in a 
final, single net present social value calculation. 
The PBSA method falls somewhere between the traditional CBA approach and true 
multi-criteria decision making techniques. It contains elements of the maximisation 
principles which underlie CBA, but without the exclusive reliance on monetary 
evaluation of all the investment's impacts. 
Multi-criteria decision making techniques, which have been extensively developed at 
the theoretical level in the context of regional impact analysis generally involve 
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introducing weights to reflect the relative priorities attached to the various outcomes 
associated with different courses of action (Pearman, 1978). They have not yet been 
applied in the transport field but are attracting the attention of many concerned with 
the inherent limitations of the CBA approach. A number of multi-criteria approaches 
have been devised, each attempting to achieve a multidimensional compromise 
between the wide diversity of goals and costs which are embodied in public sector 
choice. The approaches differ in their method of presentation, the level of 
mathematical sophistication involved and the amount of data impute required. In 
general, however, these particular techniques tend to be rather specialised in their 
nature and are only of practical use in certain specific circumstances. Of more 
practical value in the transport field are some of the simpler weighting techniques 
which already enjoy a degree of acceptance and for which the theory is comparatively 
well advanced (Button and Pearman, 1983). 
The introduction of weightings permits the effects of a projected action to be reduced 
to a single, summary figure. The Goals Achievement Matrix approach, which has 
been used in urban transport planning (Hill, 1968), for example, offers an explicit 
treatment of various goals and applies a set of predetermined weights to them so that 
each option can be assessed in terms of goal achievement. To facilitate this, the goals 
are related to physical measures to reflect the extent to which they have been 
achieved. The final goal achievement account employs the weighted index of goal 
achievement to determine the preferred course of action. 
2.2.4 Summary 
At the most general level, one may define the appraisal techniques theoretically as 
financial analysis (commercial approach) and cost benefit analysis (social approach). 
Multi-criteria decision making techniques are an extended versions of cost benefit 
analysis CBA. They represent a movement in the direction of multi-criteria analysis in 
that not all the effects of the various schemes are translated into monetary terms. They 
contain elements of the maximisation principles which underlie CBA, but without the 
exclusive reliance on monetary evaluation of all an investment's impacts. 
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2.3 Cost Benefit Analysis and Financial Analysis Compared 
After defining the general appraisal methods, this section will go one step further. It 
summarises the main dimensions of comparison between the two main methods, CBA 
and FA, in order to present a picture of the similarities and differences between them. 
In addition, it shows how the outcome of each of them, in terms of returns on the 
investment, may differ and how pricing policy operated may affect that difference. It 
also shows the factors that determine the divergence between CBA return and FA 
return and how it might be difficult to obtain a single relationship between the two 
returns. 
2.3.1 Main Characteristics 
Table 2.1 summarises the main dimensions of comparison for the CBA and FA 
perspectives.. 
Table 2.1 Main dimensions of comparison between CBA and FA 
Financial Analysis Cost Benefit Analysis 
1. Goal Determination of financial net Determination of social net 
present value (FNPV) present value (SNPV) 
2. Financial statement Accounting entity's income Community's social balance 
statement(cash receipts-cash sheet (social benefits-social 
disbursements) on a cash basis costs) on a social valuation basis 
3. Inclusion rule for gains and 100 percent of cash flows 100 percent of social impacts 
losses (direct and indirect tangible and 
intangible) 
4. Positive sign variables Annual cash receipts of the Social benefits of the project 
project defined as the sum of consumers 
willingness to pay for enjoying 
the expected benefits of the 
scheme 
5. Negative sign variables Annual cash disbursements and Social opportunity cost of 
initial investment resources used up annually for 
carrying out the project and 
initial investment 
6. Valuations of gains and Current prices under existing Competitive shadow prices 
losses market conditions (accepts estimated for ideal market 
prices it finds in the market) conditions (shadow prices are 
required) 
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Table 2.1 Continued 
7. Discounting procedure Calculated cost of invested A variety of theoretically 
funds (usually the value of defensible options including the 
interest rate of borrowing and government bond rate, private 
lending in the capital market) return on investment, private 
rate of time preference, social 
rate of time preference, and 
weighted average of applicable 
rates 
8. Distributive equity Irrelevant to a private firm but Politically determined weights 
often considered in public or constraints are widely used 
pricing 
9. Transfer payments All payments are included Adjustments are made to correct 
regardless of their origin and for transfer payments 
destination 
10. Perception Irrelevant to a private operator Corrections are made for the 
(no allowance is given to cases misperceived items (costs or 
of misperception) benefits) 
Source: adapted from Harlow and Windsor (1988). 
As we can notice from the table, CBA measures social net present value (SNPV) as 
equation 2.1 illustrates, 
SNP V =SB - SOC = WTP - SOC (2.1) 
While FA tends to measure financial net present value (FNPV) as equation 2.2 
presents. 
FNPV = ACR - ACD - IN (2.2) 
Where: 
SB= discounted social benefits expected from the project 
SOC = discounted social opportunity costs for carrying out the project 
(understood in terms of the sum of such benefits foregone by not 
selecting the next best use of the resources employed) 
WTP= consumers willingness to pay for enjoying the expected benefits form 
the entire life of the project 
ACR = discounted annual cash receipts from the project 
ACD = discounted annual cash disbursements for the project 
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IN = original capital investment cost 
One might identify the main theoretical and methodological difference between CBA 
and FA as that, the first, CBA, is conducted from Net Social Welfare (NSW) 
orientation while the latter, FA, is conducted from a business type Return On 
Investment (ROI) orientation. To clarify this point more, the following explains how 
projects are looked at commercially and socially. 
2.3.1.1 Commercial Approach 
The commercial firm will, in the absence of a budget constraints, accept investments 
when the financial net present value is positive, this is: 
NPVf =j_ 
nn 
(2.3) 
n=l (1+r) 
Where: 
NPV f= financial net present value 
Pn = revenue that would be earned in year n from the investment 
Cn = financial cost of the investment in year n 
r= rate of interest reflecting the cost of capital to the undertaking 
k= the anticipated life of the investment 
The private sector will usually obtain the value of (r) as the value of interest rate of 
borrowing and lending in the capital market. A positive NPVf, therefore, tells the 
businessman that it is worthwhile undertaking an initial investment. This is when he 
only has one alternative to invest in. But when he has more than one option, the 
comparison will be between NPVs for all options. The alternative that has the highest 
NPVf will be preferred. 
2.3.1.2 Social Approach 
In contrast, economic efficiency is assessed using some form of cost benefit analysis, 
which again in the absence of a budget constraint, suggested schemes with a positive 
social net present value should be chosen, and if there are more than one option, the 
option that achieves the highest NPV socially will be processed. The following shows 
the calculation of social net present value. 
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B - RC NPV 
S= 
(2.4) 
-, 
(1 + i) 
Where: 
NPVs= social net present value 
Bn = the probable social benefits to be enjoyed by the society in year n as a 
result of the investment's completion 
RCn = the probable social costs to be sacrificed by the society in year n as a 
result of the investment's completion 
i= is the relevant social discount rate, reflecting the relative social weight 
attached to a cost or benefit accruing in a given year. 
k= is the anticipated life of the investment 
It is worth mentioning that Net Present Value (NPV) is only one method of looking at 
investment benefits and comparing projects together. There are other methods, these 
are: 
1. The Benefit Cost Ratio (B/C), where the measured benefits of the project are 
compared with the costs of carrying out the project. On financial basis the ratio 
will be R/C, where R is the revenue that would be earned from the scheme and C 
is the financial cost of the scheme. On CBA basis, the ratio would be B/RC, 
where B and RC are the probable social benefits and costs of the investment. 
2. Internal Rate of Return (IRR), the internal rate of return is defined as the rate of 
discount which will bring the net benefits of the scheme to zero. The following 
expression shows how it is estimated. 
ýn 
Where: 
C= capital cost of the scheme 
Bn = net scheme benefits in year n 
k= anticipated scheme life period 
(2.5) 
s= discount rate that brings benefits Bn into equality with capital costs of the 
scheme C (internal rate of return) 
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3. Pay back period, the pay back period is defined as that period of time in which the 
commulative sum of the expected net benefits from a project equals the initial 
capital expenditure. In general the shorter the pay back period the more 
favourably the project will be regarded. 
Each of these methods has some advantages and disadvantages as they arise in their 
practical application within the transport sector, and then each of them will have a 
certain circumstances within which it is appropriate to be used as a measure. 
2.3.2 Economic and Financial Benefits of Investment 
As illustrated in the earlier paragraphs, CBA is a comprehensive assessment of the 
investment effects into the economy as a whole, while FA only considers the effects 
of the investment into the firm or the industry on question. Having known that, the 
benefits of an investment measured in a cost benefit basis will probably differ from 
that measured on a financial basis. 
Consider a simple case, figure (2.2) shows the demand curve DD, marginal revenue 
curve MR, and marginal cost curves before and after the investment MC 1, MC2 for a 
firm. Assuming that the objective of the firm is profit maximisation, the level of 
production and price will be OQ 1, OPI before any improvement to the service. After 
the investment, the level of production and price would be OQ2, OP2. The producer 
surplus would be the area P1ACF and area P2BED for before and after situations. In 
addition to this producer surplus, however there is an area of consumer surplus DAP1 
and DBP2 for before and after situations respectively. This area represents the fact 
that some consumers would have been prepared to pay more than ON and OP2 for 
before and after situations to use the facility produced, and may therefore be said to 
derive benefits in excess of ON and OP2. 
A cost benefit appraisal, attempting as it does to measure benefit wherever they 
accrue, would seek to include both the producer surplus and the consumer surplus 
elements in the benefits of the project. On the other hand, a financial appraisal, 
attempting to measure benefits accrue only to the firm or industry in question, would 
include only the producer surplus as the benefits of the project. 
For this case, the financial analysis approach will consider only the change in 
producer surplus (area P2BED-area P1ACF), as the investment benefits. On the other 
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hand a CBA approach will include both the change in producer and consumer surplus 
in measuring the investment benefits, (area P2BED-area P1ACF + area P1ABP2). 
D 
Price 
Cost 
P1 
P2 
F 
D 
0 Q1 Q2 
Quantity 
Figure 2.2 Financial and cost benefit measures of benefits 
In the above case with a linear demand curve and a single profit maximising producer, 
the benefits measured on CBA basis would be greater than that measured on FA basis 
by a very considerable margin. 
The question that may be raised here is : can a ratio of consumer surplus to producer 
surplus be found. In other words can a rate of exchange between the measured 
benefits under CBA and that under FA be found. The answer to that question does not 
seem to be simple. In the above example, the only fact that can be confirmed is the 
existence of consumer surplus. The factors that have been found to influence the ratio 
of the financial benefit to the CBA benefits include (Harrison and Mackie, 1973): 
1. The shape of the cost curves with and without the investment. Here a variety of 
shapes can be identified: linear, non-linear, etc. Also whether the cost is an 
increasing, decreasing or constant as production increases. The cost elasticity will 
be playing an important rule in the magnitude of consumer surplus, and the 
elasticity will be very much related to the shape of the cost curves. 
2. The shape of the demand schedule. As with cost, there are different possibilities 
for the shape of demand curve, which will have its implications on the elasticity of 
demand and in turn on the consumer surplus. 
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3. The pricing policy operated and the consistency with which it is persuaded. The 
three known possibilities of pricing theoretically are: 
" Profit maximisation pricing 
" Welfare maximisation pricing (marginal cost pricing) 
" Output maximisation pricing (average cost pricing) 
Each of these will have a different implications on the existence and the magnitude of 
the consumer surplus. Practically, there might be a variety of pricing policies, which 
may also add to the difficulty of having a relationship between consumer and producer 
surplus. In addition, it may be argued that the undertaking might consider different 
pricing policy before and after the investment. This will have its own implications in 
the determination of consumer surplus. 
4. The magnitude of any external effects to the project 
5. The extent of price discrimination 
In summary, if one is to pursue the issue of finding or formulating a relationship 
between financial and cost benefit returns, one probably has to consider so many 
combinations of demand, cost, pricing and elasticity. Each of these combination will 
end up with a relationship different from the others. 
This section will illustrate how it is possible to have a variety of relationships between 
economic and financial benefits. 
2.3.2.1 Assumptions 
1. Demand Function 
Demand function is assumed to be linear and specifically as follows: 
Q=a-bp (2.6) 
Where: 
Q= travel demand (no. of trips, no. of passengers per period of time, day, week, 
year) 
a= constant 
b= slope of demand curve 
p= price of travel (£/tripe, or £/passenger km) 
From equation (2.6), the price and elasticity functions can be derived as follows: 
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a-Q (2.7) 
and 
-bp E= (2.8) 
Q 
Where : 
E= elasticity of travel demand 
2. Total Revenue 
Total revenue is the total amount of money obtained by selling a certain level of 
output. It is the quantity produced times the selling price. In here it is the number of 
trips multiplied by the price of the trip, specifically, 
a-Q aQ-OZ TR = PQ =Q= (2.9) 
Marginal revenue is the increase in total revenue by selling one more unit of 
production and calculated by taking the first derivative of total revenue function. 
MR = 
°ýR 
= 
b(a-2Q) 
= 
a-2Q 
Ctl) b2 b 
Where: 
TR= total revenue 
MR = marginal revenue 
3. Cost Functions 
(2.10) 
Marginal cost function (firm supply function) 
Marginal cost function is assumed to be an increasing function of output. In other 
words, it is assumed a decreasing returns to scale production function. Equations 2.11 
and 2.12 show marginal cost functions before and after the investment assuming that 
the investment will shift cost function uniformly downward indicating cost savings. 
MC, = C, +dQ (2.11) 
MCz = Cz + dQ (2.12) 
Where: 
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MC 1= marginal cost before the investment 
MC2 = marginal cost after the investment 
d= slope of marginal cost curves 
Cl, C2= are constants (C2 <C 1) 
Total Cost 
Total cost function shows the total cost of producing different levels of output. It is 
found by integrating the marginal cost function. 
TC1 =f MC, o'Q=CiQ+2 Q2 (2.13) 
TC2 = 
$MCIC2Q+_dQ2 
(2.14) 
2 
Where: 
TCI, TC2= total cost before and after the investment respectively 
4. Profit (producer surplus) 
Producer surplus is the net profit, and estimated by subtracting total cost from total 
revenue. 
PS1 = TR, - TC, (2.15) 
PS2 = TR2 - TC2 (2.16) 
Where: 
PSI= producer surplus before the investment 
PS2 = producer surplus after the investment 
TRI, TR2= total revenue before and after investment 
5. Consumer Surplus 
Consumer surplus is defined as the amount that a person would be willing to pay for 
any given quantity of an item purchased minus the amount the market requires him to 
pay. It is ordinarily measured as the total area under the demand curve up to the 
designated quantity minus what the consumer must actually pay for that quantity. 
Specifically, 
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Q* 
cs =f P(Q)2 - P*Q+ 
0 
ra_p. Q. Jo 
= 
b[aQ 
_ QZ _ p`Q* (2.17) 
Where: 
CS = consumer surplus 
p *, Q* = the equilibrium price and volume of travel 
6. Economic Benefits 
Is the total benefits of an activity accrues to whatever gains the benefits and measured 
as the sum of consumer and producer surplus. Specifically, 
SW = CS + PS (2.18) 
Where: 
SW= economic benefits (measured on CBA basis) 
2.3.2.2 Results: 
Using the assumptions of demand and cost curves outlined above and assuming a 
profit maximisation pricing policy, the following table summarises the results: 
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Table 2.2 Financial and economic benefits of investment in case of profit 
maximisation 
Before investment After investment Change 
Consumer (a - c1b)Z (a - czb)z (c, -c2)[2a - b(c, +c2)] lus sur p 2b(bd + 2)2 2b(bd + 2)2 2(bd + 2)2 
Producer (a 
- c, 
b)2 (a 
- c2b)2 (c, - c2 
)lI 2a 
- 
b(c, + c2)I 
surplus 
(financial 
2b(bd + 2) 2b(bd + 2) 2(bd + 2) 
J 
benefits) 
Economic 
benefits -- (a -c b)2 (bd + 3) ' 
(a - cZb)2 (bd + 3) (bd + 3)[(a - c2b) 2- (a - c, b) 2 consumer 
surplus + s 
2b(bd + 2)2 2b(bd + 2)2 2b(bd + 2)2 
producer 
surplus 
Using the results in table 2.2, it is possible to formulate a factor linking the economic 
benefits to financial benefits as follows: 
R_OSW_bd+3>1 
APS bd+2 
b, d>0 
Where: 
ASW = economic benefits of investment 
APS = financial benefits of investment 
(2.19) 
Equation 2.19 shows that the ratio of economic to financial benefits R is more than 
one (subject to b, d> 0) . That means the economic 
benefits will always be more than 
the financial benefits. The deviation of the value of R form 1 will be a function of the 
value of demand and cost slopes, b and d. In other words, will be very much related 
to demand and cost elasticity. 
2.3.3 Economic and Financial Rates of Return 
Having demonstrated that CBA yields more benefits than FA , it can be possible to 
demonstrate that financial returns on the investment will be always lower than the 
CBA returns. In other words, for a certain project with capital cost C, the economic 
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benefits are more than the financial benefits. Consequently, the benefit cost ratio or 
internal rate of return will be higher on CBA basis. Specifically, 
k 
C=1- 
1W 
(2.20) 
nl + 
( RE) 
k APS' 
C-(1+Rf)" (2.21) 
n=i 
Where: 
ASWn= economic benefits of investment in year n (consumer and producer 
surplus) 
APSn = financial benefits of investment in year n (producer surplus) 
C= capital cost of scheme 
RE= cost benefit internal rate of return (%), discount rate that brings the 
economic benefits to be equal the scheme capital cost assuming no scrap 
value of the project at the end 
R f= financial rate of return (%), discount rate that brings the economic benefits 
to be equal the scheme capital cost assuming no scrap value for the project 
at the end 
Since ASW will always be more than APS at any period of investment life, the value 
of RE that brings the sum of the right hand side and the lift hand side in equation 
2.20 to equality will be higher than the value of Rf that does the same thing for 
equation 2.21. The conclusion is that the existence of consumer surplus will make a 
divergence between CBA return and FA return and the latter will be lower than the 
former. One should notice that, in the above example it is assumed the investment has 
no externalities, and that the capital cost C is the same on both CBA and FA basis. 
2.3.4 Interaction Between Appraisal Techniques and Pricing Policy 
As sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 demonstrated, there is a chance of divergence between 
CBA and FA rates of return. The largeness of that divergence will vary from case to 
another according to the assumptions, such as pricing policy, demand and cost 
functions, etc. The example presented above assumed a profit maximisation firm and 
linear demand and cost schedules, beside a consistency of pricing policy operated 
before and after. A relaxation of any of these assumptions will lead to a different 
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relationship between CBA and FA rates of return. The following section considers the 
impact of pricing policy as well as the interaction between appraisal techniques and 
pricing policy on the measured benefits of the investment. 
Using the assumptions of section 2.3.2.1 and pursuing two pricing polices, profit 
maximisation and marginal cost pricing, six cases can be identified: 
APS(PM) b2d2+ 2bd +1 
OPS(IWM) b2d2+ 2bd (2.22) 
ASW(PM) 
= 
bd +3$ (2 23) 
APS(PM) bd +21 
ASW(WM) 
_ 
bd +2 
$1 APS(PM) bd +1 
(2.24) 
ASW(PM) 
- 
bad 3+ 5b2d 2+ 7bd +3#1 (2.25) 
OPS(WM) b3d3 +4b2d2 +4bd 
ASW(WM) 
_ 
bd +1 
$1 
APS(WM) bd 
(2.26) 
ASW(WM) 
_ 
b2J2 + 4bd +41 (2.27) 
ASW(PM) b2d2 +4bd+3 
Where : 
APS(PM), ASW(PM)= financial and economic benefits of an investment 
assuming profit maximisation pricing policy 
APS(WM), OSW(WM)= financial and economic benefits of an investment 
assuming marginal cost pricing 
Looking at the six equations above, 2.22-2.27, the following can be concluded: 
1. For the same pricing policy, there will be always a divergence between financial 
and cost benefit returns, unless demand elasticity is infinity. The type of pricing 
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policy operated will have a significant impact on the magnitude of that divergence 
as equations 2.23 and 2.26 illustrate. 
2. There will be a divergence between financial rates of return measured under 
different assumptions of pricing policy. Similarly, different pricing policies will 
bring different CBA returns as equations 2.22 and 2.27 show. 
3. Equations 2.24 and 2.25 present two cases of interaction between evaluation and 
pricing. Each illustrate the ratio between cost benefit and financial returns under 
inconsistent pricing policy. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter identifies the evaluation methodologies of transport investment under 
three headings, financial analysis, cost benefit analysis and multi-criteria decision 
making techniques. It demonstrates a detailed comparison between the two main 
techniques, CBA and FA. It shows that FA by definition is concerned only with the 
financial effects in terms of extra net revenue accruing to the agency carrying out the 
scheme concerned. CBA measure is concerned with a larger framework; all transport 
users or society at large. This has three important consequences: first, as far as the 
FA is concerned, the discussion of resource cost adjustments is irrelevant, FA accepts 
the prices it finds. Second, there are elements of consumer benefit which a CBA 
would measure but which a FA would not, e. g. those areas of consumer surplus 
which, because of the relative crudity of most pricing policies, the financially based 
organisation cannot tap. Third, if there are effects external to the transport sector, 
these will in principle enter into the CBA but not into the FA, unless arrangements 
exists for internalising them, e. g. through compensation mechanism. 
The chapter then turn to illustrate how the two techniques may result in different 
returns on the investment and ends by exploring the factors affecting the divergence 
between the outcome of the two measures in particular pricing policy operated. 
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Chapter 3 
Transport Project Appraisal Techniques (Practice) 
3.1 Introduction 
There has been a long-running debate among British transport planners about what 
appraisal techniques are appropriate for road and rail investment schemes. A 
particular feature of the argument relates to whether the procedures currently adopted 
unduly favour investment in highway schemes relative to rail schemes. This issue has 
become even more central since the Department of Transport (DTp) issued revised 
guidelines in 1989 on the eligibility of public transport investment schemes, in 
England and Wales, for grant under Section 56 of the 1968 Transport Act. This 
chapter briefly summarising current British practice for assessing transport investment 
schemes. Then it presents a summary of the weaknesses in current appraisal 
techniques. The following diagram shows the structure of the chapter. 
Introduction 
Current Practice 
Summary of 
current practice 
Perceived 
weaknesses of 
current 
appraisal 
methods 
Road investment appraisal practice 
Rail investment appraisal practice 
Economic evaluation 
Financial evaluation 
Section 56 grant evaluation 
General criticism 
Specific road criticism 
Public transport (rail) 
Figure 3.1 Structure of the chapter 
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3.2 Current Practice of Transport Investment Appraisal 
3.2.1 Road Investment Appraisal 
3.2.1.1 Introduction 
The method used to appraise new trunk road schemes in the UK is the Leitch 
Framework (DTp 1979), which is explained in detail in COBA manual (DTp, 1981). 
The objectives of the framework appraisal are to ensure that all the relevant impacts 
of a scheme or proposal on people and the environment are considered; to provide the 
DTp with a balanced presentation of a set of comparative data; to show that the DTp 
has considered the effects of the available options prior to reaching a decision and to 
enable the public to give their view in the knowledge of the implications of the 
various alternatives. The various alternative options put forward are assessed against a 
do-nothing situation in which congestion worsens as traffic grows, or a do-minimum 
situation in which account is taken of proposed small scale improvements to the 
network. 
The appraisal of new road schemes using the Leitch Framework is based on a social 
cost benefit analysis and an environmental impact assessment. The effects included 
under these separate evaluations are assessed in relation to the following appraisal 
groups: travellers, occupiers of property, users of facilities, policies for conserving 
and enhancing the area, policies for development and transport and financial effects. 
3.2.1.2 Social Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
The basic comparison involved in the economic appraisal of road investment is the 
trade-off of capital and maintenance expenditure against benefits to existing and 
potential users of the new road in the form of time savings, accident savings and 
changes in vehicle operating costs each valued in monetary terms. On average around 
80% of the benefits of a scheme evaluated by COBA (the DTp's programme for 
calculating the user benefits of a project option) take the form of time and operating 
cost savings (split equally between business and private users) 20% are reduced 
accident costs (Nash et al 1991a). 
Time savings are divided into working time savings, which are based on the hourly 
wage rate of the workers in question, plus a margin for overhead costs, and leisure 
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time savings, which are valued at rates based primarily on stated preference studies of 
what users are willing to pay to save time. Accident cost savings reflect the loss of 
output of those injured, which is valued at the wage rate, together with damage to 
property, medical expenses etc. In addition a value is placed upon the pain, grief and 
suffering associated with the loss of life. These values have recently been revised, in 
accordance with stated preference results on the willingness to pay to reduce the risk 
of death so that now a life is valued at £744057 in 1991 prices (DTp 1993). 
The net present value of a scheme is calculated by taking the costs and benefits of a 
scheme expressed in monetary terms discounted over 30 years at a discount rate, 
currently set by the Treasury at 8% (Nash et al 1991b). 
3.2.1.3 Environmental Impacts 
The environmental impact assessment of new road transport schemes is based upon 
the DTp's Manual of Environmental Appraisal (MEA) (Department of Transport 
1983). This composes both the environmental effects resulting from traffic as well as 
land loss and damage to sites as a result of new construction. The MEA includes the 
impact of a project upon a list of attributes as well as policies for enhancing and 
conserving the area. The attributes are traffic noise, visual impact, air pollution, 
severance, effects on agriculture, heritage and conservation areas (including 
demolition of property), ecology, construction disruption and pedestrians and cyclists. 
No consideration is given to the cumulative effects of individual projects upon 
environmental systems, for example global warming. Each impact category is 
measured in different ways and valued in non-monetary terms, although by including 
such effects in the Leitch Framework alongside time savings, accident savings and 
changes in vehicle operating costs, they receive an implicit monetary valuation in the 
final decision. 
3.2.2 British Rail Investment Procedure 
3.2.2.1 Financial Appraisal 
In the case of British Rail schemes are generally submitted solely to a financial 
appraisal, as opposed to social cost benefit analysis. Schemes are currently required to 
earn an 8% real rate of return in order to proceed (Nash et al 1991b). Schemes are 
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always sponsored by one of the British Rail sectors, which does the outline appraisal; 
they are then fully appraised by the British Rail corporate investment analysts before 
going to British Rail Investment Committee for approval. Finally, major schemes 
(over £10 in require DTp approval before going ahead and may be "called in" by DTp 
for a full examination of the appraisal. A summary of British Rail investment 
proposals is produced annually in the British Rail Corporate Plan. 
Such an appraisal obviously considers savings in operating cost and increases in 
revenue as the only two sources of benefit to the railway from the project. No 
considerations are given to the benefits that users of rail service may obtain from the 
scheme on the assumption that these benefits are all recouped from the fare box. Of 
these, it appears that savings in operating cost are generally regarded as the safest 
basis on which to put forward proposals (Nash et al 1991a). 
A full range of options must always be considered to ensure that the project selected is 
not just a good one but is the best for the route in question. This should include a "do 
nothing " base where feasible, a "do minimum" investment option and two or more 
major alternatives. In the case of grant aided services, bus substitution is usually one 
of the options. Benefits and costs are discounted over 30 years (scheme period) at 8% 
discount rate. The option with the highest NPV will normally be selected. 
3.2.2.2 Government Grant 
Grants under Section 56 of the 1968 Transport Act may be paid by Central 
Government to local authorities for the support of rail investment projects where there 
are adequate external benefits. Such grants are for projects of regional significance, 
normally costing at least £5m, and generally cover 50% of the net cost of the scheme. 
The remaining 50% is normally expected to be found by the local authority. 
The grant is assessed as 50% of capital expenditure after deducting contributions from 
other sources. These might include borrowings, where the project will yield a surplus 
that can serve part of the capital cost, private or developer contributions or European 
Regional Development Fund Grants. 
Where schemes are eligible for Section 56 grants, a social cost benefit analysis is 
called for. During 1988 DTp issued new guidance on Applications for Section 56 
grants for rail and light rail schemes. This made it clear that only external benefits 
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(i. e. reduced congestion, environmental and where these could not be recovered as 
developer contributions, developmental benefits) were seen as a justification for grant 
aid. Benefits to public transport users were to be excluded from the analysis; on the 
grounds that these should be recovered by the operator in the form of increased fares 
revenue. Private contributions from developers are also to be sought wherever 
possible. By contrast, Transport Supplementary Grant, which is paid to local 
authorities for highway schemes is much more generous, is paid for schemes above £1 
m and justified largely on this basis of user benefits (May et al 1991). 
The paradox of the new regime regarding Section 56 grants is that the most readily 
measured item, user benefits, are disallowed. As a result enormous effort has to be 
put in to measuring smaller, more obscure effects, as well as investigating the 
possibilities for private finance. As a result, developing a Section 56 grant application 
is much more expensive and time consuming than applying for Transport 
Supplementary Grant, and there can be a time lag of many years between initial 
application and receiving the grant. 
3.2.2.3 Environmental Impacts 
There are no formal procedures for valuing the environmental impacts or benefits 
which arise from railway project investment. In the past various ad-hoc approaches 
have been used where major projects have been appraised e. g. East Coast Main Line 
electrification. More recently the introduction of new legislation on Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) requires that major new rail projects require an EIA e. g. 
Manchester Light Rapid Transit. In many respects this requirement covers many of 
the same issues where relevant as are laid out in the MEA for roads. Such an 
appraisal would generally be concerned with assessing the negative impacts of rail 
transport on the environment rather than comparing the relative impact of rail vs. road 
investment or including the environmental benefits from modal switching, as the 
current study suggests. 
3.3 Summary of the Current Practice 
This section summarises the current practice of transport investment appraisal in the 
UK. 
43 
3.3.1 Economic Evaluation 
Economic evaluation is used by the DTp and the Scottish Office for the assessment of 
trunk roads and this is normally undertaken using the COBA program except in 
Scotland where the, broadly similar, NESA package is used. The main benefits 
included in the evaluation are time savings for car users, car operating cost savings 
and reductions in road accidents. Major local authority highway schemes are also 
normally subject to economic evaluation and this is expected for schemes submitted to 
the DTp for Transport Supplementary Grant (Vaughan et al 1992). 
3.3.2 Financial Evaluation 
British rail projects are usually assessed using financial evaluation but the DTp has 
indicated that it is prepared, under certain circumstances, to consider wider economic 
benefits in the case of Regional Railways and Network South East projects. A recent 
example where economic evaluation was used during evaluation of the Cross-rail 
scheme in London (Vaughan et al 1992). 
3.3.3 Section 56 Grant 
Section 56 Grant is available for major public transport schemes, promoted by local 
authorities and private sector bodies. Under current DTp guidelines (DTp 1989), 
applications for this grant are assessed using a hybrid evaluation. The main assessment 
is financial, but economic evaluation is used to include non-user benefits that cannot 
be captured financially. 
3.4 Perceived Weaknesses of Current Appraisal Practice 
3.4.1 Introduction 
This part presents a summary of the weaknesses in the current appraisal techniques. 
In section 3.4.2 the general criticism of the current appraisal methodology is 
presented whilst sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 detail weaknesses specific to highway and 
public transport appraisal respectively. Lastly section 3.4.5 summarises this part. 
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3.4.2 General 
The main general criticism of current urban transport appraisal one can think of is its 
failure to provide a consistent framework in which all possible transport responses to 
urban policy objectives may be judged. Social CBA is considered to be acceptable as a 
methodology for this purpose but must be applied to all transport improvements 
consistently with amendments and corrections as suggested in this study. In short the 
appraisal method should present all the relevant costs and benefits clearly and 
concisely. It should also enable testing of alternative transport policies involving 
parking control, public transport subsidy, and company car measures. The end aim is 
to allow policy makers to take informed decisions and for those affected to see the 
rationale behind and consequences of these choices (May et al 1991) 
3.4.3 Specific Road Weaknesses 
3.4.3.1 Road Funding 
For public funding purposes roads may be divided into three groups: trunk roads 
which are the responsibility of the DTp and centrally funded, non-trunk roads which 
are eligible for the centrally funded Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG) , and those 
roads which are wholly financed from local funds. There are identifiable biases in the 
present system of grant allocation which favour larger scale, capital intensive highway 
schemes which are eligible for central funds regardless of the benefit to cost ratios 
(B/C). The allocation of the transport supplementary grant for local road building 
concentrates on projects with a high total Net Present Value rather than those with 
high benefit/cost ratios. In addition local government might be persuaded to undertake 
TSG funded road building rather than smaller schemes involving road building or, for 
example, traffic calming which are funded from local budgets. These observations 
imply that the present methodology does not apply a consistent or common appraisal 
technique to the different highway based measures which may be used to address a 
potential transport problem (May et al 1991). 
3.4.3.2 Treatment of Externalities 
The appraisal of trunk road investment normally has two components: the running of 
the COBA programme and an environmental assessment using the Manual of 
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Environmental Appraisal (MEA). The COBA programme estimates the scheme 
benefits in the form of accident reductions and the time and operating costs savings to 
all road users. It discounts these benefits and costs to give a measure in current 
monetary terms of the project's value (NPV). The MEA is a non-monetary assessment 
of the environmental effects of the highway scheme. 
It is often argued that the externalities resulting from highway schemes are either 
under-weighted, as with the environmental effects, or simply not measured, as with 
the effects on the economic development of an area. 
As regards the environmental effects, it appears that these are mainly taken into 
account at the stage of selecting which option to pursue for a particular scheme. More 
strategic decisions are based almost entirely on the relative NPV's of different 
schemes, and these of course take no account of environmental factors (Nash et al, 
1991b). 
The treatment of development effects has been a matter of much controversy. To the 
extent which they can be predicted, it is correct, of course, to base the traffic 
forecasts on such predictions, and therefore some attempt needs to be made to 
consider the impact of new infrastructure on the development of the immediate and 
wider areas. Annex B submissions for TSG may " if appropriate" include information 
on "new industrial and commercial development or redevelopment which is associated 
directly with the scheme" (DTp 1991a). However, there is no indication of the weight 
to be placed on such information the assessment process. 
3.4.3.3 The Impacts on Pedestrian and Cyclist 
The effects of highway schemes on the journey times of Pedestrian and Cyclist are not 
currently estimated. In the urban context the value of these costs and benefits may be 
significant to the extent of altering the acceptability of a scheme if they were 
incorporated. 
3.4.3.4 Distribution Effects 
These are largely ignored under the present system of appraisal. Cost Benefit Analysis 
assumes that £1 of cost or benefit is worth the same whoever gains or losses it. Just 
like a commercial appraisal. The marginal utility of money is assumed to be equal and 
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constant between individuals. This introduces a bias in favour of the wealthier 
members of a society who have a lower marginal utility of money and can afford to 
pay more for a given level of benefit. A scheme which gave £5 of benefit to a rich 
man and extracted a cost of £4 from a poor person would yield a positive net benefit 
under the current practice. This is not to say that CBA is an inappropriate appraisal 
technique, merely, that to be used to best advantage the underlying assumptions must 
be made clear. 
COBA contains a standard value of leisure time, regardless of the incomes of those 
affected. A value based on willingness to pay would bias investment in favour of 
wealthier areas. However, there is also a problem with the equity value which gives a 
greater value to poorer individuals than they actually possess, relative to, say, money 
savings. The danger is this could result in investments taking place justified on these 
figures which the true value is negative to those affected by it. 
3.4.3.5 Scope of the Appraisal 
The definition of a study area to capture the full effects of a highway investment is an 
important step in the appraisal process. The Traffic Appraisal Manual for trunk road 
assessment section 3.3.1 defines the study area as being the area "within which the 
construction of the scheme or rout improvement would significantly affect the traffic 
flows" (DTp 1981b). The provision of new highway infrastructure may have 
consequences for the road network beyond the immediate confines of the planned 
improvement. To the extent that this happens a scheme cannot be viewed in isolation 
and the wider impacts of the scheme need to be appraised. 
The same argument may be advanced for the environmental and development effects 
described above. It is likely that the scheme will have impact beyond the immediate 
area and may indeed have city wide implications. 
3.4.3.6 Fixed Trip Matrix Assumptions 
Because COBA programme was originally developed to appraise inter-urban highway 
investments, it is argued that in this context highway investments do not give rise to 
changes in trip distribution, modal split, and generation (DTp 1981a). Therefore the 
programme operates under the assumption of a fixed trip matrix which simplifies the 
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calculation of benefits. This assumption becomes more questionable when COBA is 
used in the appraisal of urban highway investments, where congestion normally 
prevails. Consider the situation typical of urban areas where the before investment and 
after investment highway conditions are congested . 
Under a fixed matrix assumption 
the investment secures time savings for present road users and reduced congestion. 
However when the assumption is relaxed trips will be attracted to highway mode - as 
a result of improving travel conditions- raising congestion levels, link times, and 
eroding the benefits to existing users calculated using a fixed matrix. Under such 
circumstances the fixed matrix assumption cases an overestimate of the time savings 
from the investment. 
The previous paragraph covered three facets of the fixed trip matrix assumption- 
distribution, modal split and the generation of new trips. A fourth facet concerns the 
effect of a scheme on peak spreading. A change in the cost of highway travel in one 
time period will cause some movement of trips between time periods. For example the 
reduction of congestion in the peak will persuade some highway travellers in the off- 
peak to change their travel time. The fixed matrix assumption in a situation of 
highway congestion will, as explained above, lead to the overestimation of benefits. 
While there is provision within COBA for departure from the fixed matrix where a 
scheme impacts on a heavily congested urban area, this provision is rarely used in 
practice. The vast majority of COBA assessments are run on the fixed matrix 
assumption (May et al 1991). 
Goodwin (1994) questioned the COBA assumption of a fixed trip matrix. He stated 
that, although whether the road improvement generates extra traffic or not is 
ultimately an empirical question. Goodwin carried on to conclude that: 
The amount of extra traffic must of course be dependent on the specific 
circumstances, but an appropriate average rule of thumb is that each 10% 
improvement in traffic speed would cause about 5% more traffic in the short 
term and up to 10% more traffic in the longer term. 
What is more important is, as congestion prevails, there is a high chance of 
extra traffic as road gets improved, and the fixed trip matrix assumption, should 
always relaxed in such situations, otherwise, the probability of miss-estimation 
of benefits will highly exist and a distortion is likely to occur. 
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3.4.3.7 Monitoring Projected Benefits 
The DTp has recently invested resources in comparing the forecast and actual benefits 
of highway schemes attempting to judge the accuracy of highway appraisals. This is a 
welcome development because of the existing emphasis placed on the provision of 
convincing forecasts rather than assessing the achievement of specific results. For 
most highway schemes there is no systematic monitoring of the project performance 
and this is seen as a weakness. 
3.4.3.8 The Treatment of Risk and Uncertainty 
Benefits based on forecast traffic volumes, costs and benefits over a 30 year time scale 
are subject to uncertainty and risk. Current DTp practice is to take high and low 
growth assumptions and weight the outcomes in order to allow for uncertainty. 
Doubts were raised as to the adequacy of this procedure. 
3.4.3.9 Further Weaknesses 
Highway appraisal does not consider the energy implications of a scheme. Although 
energy conservation awareness varies with oil prices there is a greater concern over 
the use of non-renewable resources which has its expression in the desire for more 
energy efficient transportation. This should be a component of the appraisal. 
Concern was also given to the current treatment of freight movements, the effects on 
public transport, and the influence of different pricing and subsidy regimes. Highway 
appraisal gives insufficient attention to the effects of a scheme on the costs and 
environmental effects of freight movement. Highway schemes will possibly change 
public transport trip levels and costs (bus). The existence and magnitude of such 
consequences needs to be measured. Finally the appraisal does not adequately deal 
with pricing and subsidy issues such as company car and parking subsidies (Nash et al 
1991a). 
3.4.3.10 Annex B and Highway Appraisal 
In the assessment of local roads for TSG support under the Annex B guidelines (DTp 
1991a) a COBA assessment of the economic benefits may be supplemented by 
evidence on road safety, the environment, the local community and local industry and 
commerce. The latest guidelines have been revised in the light of a report by 
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Transport Planing Associates for the Department of Transport on local scheme 
appraisal (Transport Planning Associates , 1991). The type of information required in 
these areas is clarified, for example the Manual of Environmental Appraisal should be 
used to examine impacts on the environment and on the community, while road safety 
benefits may be expressed in terms of reduced accident rates and changes in the 
number of expected personnel injury accident per year. However, coverage of these 
issues remains largely descriptive with no clear indication of how such impacts should 
be weighted against those with a monetary value. 
3.4.4 Public Transport 
3.4.4.1 Current Appraisal Methods of Public Transport Investment 
As stated before (section 3.2.2.2), Section 56 grants may be given for certain public 
transport projects of regional import and of significant cost; generally only projects 
with a cost in excess of £5 million are considered (DTp 1989). Under the current 
practice potential benefits of rail schemes come in the form of increased revenue or 
reduced operating costs. May (1991) argues that it is usually easier to justify 
investment on the basis of the latter because revenue is more difficult to forecast. 
Under Section 56 guidelines grants may be given for certain public transport projects 
of regional significance such as the Manchester LRT system. An authority must 
conduct a form of CBA and also appraise the environmental effects of a scheme. 
However section 56 rules prevent the inclusion of benefits accruing to the users (new 
and existing) of the affected mode when doing the CBA. In effect the application for 
grant must be justified on the basis of its external benefits in the form of road de- 
congestion and development impetus. The DTp assumes that any user benefits will 
contribute to the cost of the scheme through increased fares. In addition where there is 
a possibility of gain to commercial organisations - e. g. developers - they should be 
made to contribute as far as is practicable. Added complexity is given to the appraisal 
by the need to study in detail the prospects for private funding. 
Investment by bus operators is solely based on commercial criteria with a consequent 
failure to consider externalities or consumer surplus (user benefits) except where it 
may be converted into revenue by fares increases. Public funding may be obtained 
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through the tendering process for uncommercial routes. It has been argued that 
investment in bus services has been depressed by the uncertainties created by this 
procedure. At the same time, the inability to fund improvements in services or 
reductions in fares on commercially viable routes is a major constraint on transport 
policy (May et al 1991). 
3.4.4.2 The Potential Implications of Public Transport Appraisal Methods 
Several of the weaknesses detailed and discussed under road appraisal method are 
applicable also to public transport. External impacts are not usually considered in 
British Rail appraisals at all, although the recent Central London Rail Study (DTp, 
1990) includes both benefits to passengers and congestion relief on the roads in the 
CBA. An environmental impact study was also carried out, and there is some 
discussion of wider impacts such as regeneration. 
Under Section 56 grant external effects are assessed and there is an emphasis on 
estimating any benefit to developers. However, there is no established procedure for 
valuing either environmental effects or development benefits in money terms, which 
makes assessment of value for money from section 56 grants difficult. 
Similar weaknesses about the scope of the appraisal in assessing all the effects of the 
scheme, and the effects of rail congestion on peak spreading also apply. These 
represent minor problems in comparison with the basic methodological inconsistency 
between appraisal techniques. 
In the case of bus companies, it is argued that effects other than any change in the 
cost of tendered services should be ignored, as these form part of the commercial 
sector of the industry. However, changes in bus service profitability lead to changes 
in fares and service levels, with consequent costs or benefits for their users. In a full 
cost-benefit analysis these user costs or benefits should be assessed together with any 
second-round effects on third parties such as other road users. 
The treatment of accidents under section 56 is very curious and not completely clear, 
indeed grant applicants are not required to consider accidents at all. If accidents are 
assessed : 
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"average net output loss plus medical cost should be assumed at 7.5 % of the 
overall value given there for a fatal accident. The results may then be applied to 
fatalities avoided by those projected to switch to the new mode" (DTp 1991b). 
The section 56 guidelines require that new public transport investments should be 
funded as far as possible through user contributions, fares. Revenue maximisation will 
have adverse implications for distribution. No public transport operator can price 
discriminate perfectly; therefore there will be a loss of scheme benefits as some 
potential users are priced off. Those priced off will be those who value their trips least 
in money terms. Low income users are likely to be those most affected as they are 
least able to pay. These low income users are also unlikely to have access to private 
transport. Thus, a perverse result emerges whereby an improvement to public 
transport may result in a loss of mobility for low income users. 
3.4.4.3 A Misallocation of Funds in Favour of Road Solutions 
In cases where given objectives may be achieved through alternative combinations of 
private and public transport this inconsistency between road and public transport in 
methods of appraisal and allocating investment funds is likely to lead to a 
misallocation of resources in favour of highway schemes. For British Rail the use of 
financial criteria tends to give a lower benefit to cost ratio than would have resulted 
using CBA. Benefits resulting from external effects such as road de-congestion are 
omitted and benefits to users are only included to the extent to which they may be 
recouped by fare increases. 
For the Section 56 grant the most measurable form of societal gain (user benefit) is 
disallowed and instead benefits to road users and developers must be estimated. These 
effects are much more difficult and expensive to measure resulting in very long and 
expensive applications. Bates and Lowe (1989) demonstrate how the different criteria 
of highway and public transport appraisal undermine the net returns of public 
transport schemes. In an example they show how the external de-congestion benefits 
of a rail scheme are eroded when fare increases are used to capture all user benefits 
(Bates and Lowe, 1989). Indeed the ability of most fare systems to do this is 
questionable given their coarse nature. In short the inconsistencies in evaluation 
techniques between modes is the major weakness in current appraisal methodology 
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leading as it does to resource misallocation in the light of all the relevant costs and 
benefits. 
3.4.5 Summary 
This part has examined the weaknesses of the current methodology for transport 
investment appraisal in the UK. The major points may be summarised as follows: 
3.4.5.1 Road Appraisal 
A) The reliance on Net Present Value (NPV) as a measure to the scheme benefits, 
combined with grant eligibility rules, leads to bias in favour of large scale, capital 
intensive schemes. 
B) External impacts such as those on the environment are treated descriptively, with 
no clear weight placed on these impacts. There is thus a danger that they will be 
undervalued relative to those factors included in the NPV. 
C) Some factors are excluded from appraisal framework include impacts of energy 
consumption, public transport trip levels and costs (bus) 
D) Some other factors are inadequately dealt with include pricing and subsidy issues 
relating to public transport, company cars and parking. 
E) The reliance on a fixed trip matrix for traffic forecasts may lead to distortions (in 
terms of under or over estimation of benefits), particularly in congested networks. 
F) Results are presented in aggregate form, making distributional impacts difficult to 
assess. 
3.4.5.2 Railways 
The emphasis is on financial rate of return, without considering the wider social costs 
and benefits of schemes. 
3.4.5.3 Buses 
Bus operators assess services on commercial criteria, omitting any consideration of 
user benefits or externalities except where they may be converted to revenue through 
far changes. 
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3.4.5.4 Section 56 Grant 
A) Revenue extraction of user benefits may reduce total benefits by limiting 
patronage. Also those priced off are likely to be low income users, who are least 
likely to have access to private transport. There may be a loss of mobility for low 
income users. 
B) Accidents avoided by users are valued at a fraction of the normal values applied in 
COBA. 
C) The appraisal omits any valuation of benefits to users aside from that extracted in 
fares revenue. 
3.4.5.5 Conclusion 
The lack of a consistent appraisal framework and funding method across all modes in 
general and between road and rail in particular is seen as a major weakness of the 
current appraisal approach in evaluating transport schemes in urban areas. This fact 
together with the main conclusions of chapter 2, that cost benefit returns are likely to 
be higher than the financial returns, as a result, a systematic bias towards highway 
investment is likely to occur. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlines the current British practice of transport investment appraisal. It 
shows that road investments are currently appraised on a pragmatic cost benefit basis 
using the DTp's COBA program. The appraisal framework does not value the 
environmental impacts in monetary terms. On the other hand, rail schemes are 
assessed on financial basis. Grants are given for rail projects of regional importance, 
that have enough non-user benefits to justify grants, while the main benefits of rail 
schemes (user benefits) are not included. 
The weaknesses of the current appraisal practice are detailed and the major wakens is 
the lack of a consistent comprehensive appraisal framework for all modes. This 
inconsistency allows for potential undesirable implications concern the allocation of 
resources and distortions to the decision of investment. These implications are to be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Implications of the Inconsistency of Appraisal Techniques Between 
Road and Rail 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 identified the main methodologies of assessing the investment projects in 
the transport sector. It demonstrated the differences between cost benefit and financial 
analysis, and concluded the possible existence of a divergence between cost benefit 
and financial returns, and that the divergence is a function, of both demand and cost 
elasticity as well as the pricing policy operated. 
Chapter 3, explored the practice of investment appraisal in transport modes in the 
United Kingdom. It showed that road investment is being assessed on a pragmatic cost 
benefit analysis basis, while rail investment projects are evaluated on financial basis. 
The main weakness of the current practice is the lack of a consistent framework for 
assessing the investment and allocating funds between all modes of transport in 
general and between road and rail in particular. 
This chapter illustrates how the findings of chapter 2 and the situation presented in 
chapter 3 may lead to misallocation of investment funds between road and rail and 
then result in welfare losses to the society at large. It also considers different 
alternative solution to the inconsistency of appraisal methods and the possible 
contribution each alternative may provide and the applicability of them in practice. 
4.2 The Decision to Invest 
Whether or not to invest in new physical capital, such as machinery, equipment 
factories, stores, railway line and roads, depends in part upon whether the expected 
rate of profit or rate of surplus on the new investment is greater or less than the 
interest rate that must be paid on funds that need to be borrowed to acquire these 
assets. Even if the funds were readily at hand, a decision would have to be made 
between the alternative of using the funds to purchase the new physical asset or of 
lending the funds to someone else at the existing market rate of 
interest. A moment's 
reflection confirms the fact that these two decisions are one and are 
the same. 
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Whether the funds are available or must be borrowed makes no difference; the asset 
should be bought if its expected rate of return exceeds the market rate of interest. 
The rate of return on new investment is generally known as the Marginal Efficiency 
of Capital (MEC) and sometimes as the expected rate of return over cost on the new 
investment (Dernburg and McDougall 1976). Economic theory suggests that the 
profitability of new investments decreases as the investment level rise. This would be 
because of some or all of the following reasons: 
1. as the investment level grows, the demand and then the price of the factor services 
increase and then the cost of carrying out the project increases. 
2. as the investment level rises the supply of goods produced rises and a fall in sale 
prices are inevitable, which reduces the expected revenues or people willingness to 
pay for the goods or services. 
4.3 Cost Benefit and Financial Marginal Efficiency of Capital 
Chapter 2 showed that the cost benefit rate of return is most likely to be higher than 
the financial rate of return, in other words, the cost benefit MEC is most likely to be 
higher than the financial MEC. This fact, if it is translated into investment decisions, 
will have some implications in determining the investment levels for both road and 
rail and in consequence will have some undesirable welfare implications. 
4.3.1 Investment Level 
Figure 4.1 depicts a situation for a hypothetical firm. The horizontal line shows 
different levels of investment, while the vertical axis presents the levels of 
profitability (MEC) for each level of investment. As can be seen the social 
profitability curve (CBA) is above the commercial profitability curve (FA) reflecting 
the fact that CBA returns are higher than financial returns. 
If this firm were a railway organisation, assessing the profitability of new investments 
on commercial basis, and if the market rate of interest is (X), the level of investment 
that is worth undertaking will be Olf , where the 
MEC is equal to the interest rate. 
But if the railway organisation were to use a wider cost benefit analysis in assessing 
the investment profitability, the level of investment to be worth carrying out would 
have been OIE. The difference between the investment level justified financially and 
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that justified on cost benefit grounds will depend upon the divergence between the 
commercial and social rate of returns and the shape of MEC curves. The main fact 
that can be captured here is that the difference between IE and If will present a missing 
opportunity for the society and then will imply a general welfare losses. 
Marginal 
Efficiency 
of Capital x 
% 
:t rate °o 
Investment Level (£) 
Figure 4.1 Cost Benefit and Financial Marginal Efficiency of Capital 
4.3.2 Implications on Investment Timings 
If one agrees that cost benefit returns are higher than financial returns, and the two 
measures are used for assessing investment in road and rail respectively, one might 
argue that the case will cause a delay in rail investments or speed up investments in 
roads. 
The argument was first raised by Foster who concluded: 
If the rate of interest which equilibrates the demand and supply of loanable funds is X 
%, then if one makes the classical assumption of diminishing returns to capital, one 
would expect investment. funds to go only into marginal projects. Thus in a classical 
economy, it would at first appear that projects would always be invested in earlier if 
a social criterion rather than a financial criterion were used, which is another way of 
saying that the social return for any given investment would seem higher (Foster 
1973). 
In reality the profitability of rail investments will rise from one year to another, this 
is 
because of two reasons: 
I. increasing traffic on roads over time worsens the road condition and 
leads to a 
potential increase in public transport patronage. 
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2. the general growth in the economy will lead to higher demands for both road and 
public transport services. 
In fact when discussing the impact of time on the profitability of rail investments, one 
has to distinguish between different types of investments. For example, rail schemes 
may be categorized as follows: 
1. Pure expansion schemes (e. g. new railway line) 
2. Replacement schemes (e. g. rolling stock replacement) 
3. Improving service quality schemes (electrification) 
The categorization of rail schemes can vary according to the purpose of classification. 
In addition, for a given classification, such as the above one, some schemes may fall 
in more than one category. 
The change in scheme profitability over time may depend in part on the type of the 
scheme. For a pure expansion investments (e. g. new rail line), one might assume to a 
degree that the scheme profitability will rise from one year to another. This is because 
of the growth in road traffic, which will worsen road travel conditions and then more 
demand for rail will be expected. In addition, the general growth in the economy may 
mean more travel demand for the new rail line. 
What is said about the pure expansion schemes might be true to some extent for the 
schemes that improve the quality of rail service. For example, if an electrification 
proposal or a rolling stock replacement is going to improve travel conditions, faster 
trains, more comfortable trains, less noise while on board, one might assume to a 
reasonable degree of confidence that the profitability of such schemes is increasing 
from one year to another (unless some improvements are carried out on road at the 
same time). 
On the other side, when talking about a rail scheme that only lead to savings to the 
operator cost (cost reducing schemes), the argument of changing profitability over 
time is not clear. 
Further more, the issue of changing rail investment profitability over time may vary 
according to the method of which the investment profitability is measured. For 
example, a new rail line links two main cities might not have an increasing returns to 
the rail operator from year to another one. However, the social profitability of the line 
may rise from one year to another. This may lead to conclude that not only financial 
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and social returns are different for a given scheme, but also their behaviour over time 
may be different. 
So if the expected returns on some rail projects are increasing function of time, that is 
to say the returns on the investment are increasing from year to another. In 
consequence, this will have some implications in determining the timing of an 
investment. For example, a rail project that was rejected last year because it was not 
financially viable, and proved to be viable financially this year, if a wider CBA were 
used to assess the social benefits of that project , 
it might have been selected last year. 
So financially assessed projects might always have to wait for sometime to be viable, 
while on CBA grounds, they might have been selected earlier. The flowing section 
illustrates how a delay might occur. 
Assuming that cost benefit return is higher than the financial return, that is to say: 
ER = FR xX (4.1) 
Where: 
ER= cost benefit rate of return for a given project in year n (%) 
FR= financial rate of return for a given project in year n (%) 
X= rate of exchange between cost benefit and financial rate of return 
If as mentioned above, rates of return, (social and financial), are increasing function 
of time, that is to say: 
ER = ER xT (4.2) 
Where: 
ER+ 1= cost benefit rerun on year n+1 
T= factor determines the change of investment returns over time 
Solving equations 4.1 and 4.2 in ER,,, the following relationship can be obtained: 
ERn = FRn+, xx (4.3) 
Equation 4.3 indicates that the cost benefit return this year (year n) is equal to the 
financial return in the next year (year n+l), tunes the ratio of X over T. The 
following can be concluded: 
1. if X=T, the socially appraised investments have to wait one year to achieve a 
financial return equal to their cost benefit return now. 
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2. if X>T, that means the socially appraised investments will wait more than one 
year to achieve a financial return equal to their cost benefit return now. 
3. if X <T, that means the socially appraised projects will wait less than a year to 
achieve a financial return equal to its cost benefit return now. 
In conclusion, as far as the ratio of cost benefit to financial returns X, is more than 
one, which is probably the case, as chapter 2 concluded, and the returns on the 
investment rise over time, there will be an opportunity of good schemes failing to go 
ahead not for any reason, but because they are subject to a commercial assessment. 
4.3.3 Implications on the Allocation of Resources Between Road And Rail 
What are the allocation conditions that have to be met if units of any given resource 
are to make their maximum contribution to welfare?. In general terms the requirement 
is that the value of marginal product (MP) of the resource in any one of its uses be the 
same as its value of marginal product in all of its other uses. 
Suppose, for example, that a machine used on agriculture purpose contributes at the 
margin £1000 worth of agriculture products annually to the output of the economy, 
and that machine can be used for construction purposes and can contribute a yearly 
£2000 worth of products. If the machine were switched from the agriculture sector to 
the construction sector, there would be a net gain to consumers of £1000 worth of 
product. In this case some consumers will be made better off without making anyone 
worse off. So, transfers of resources from lower value of marginal product uses to 
higher value of marginal product uses always yield a welfare increase to the society as 
a whole. The maximum welfare will be achieved when these transfers have been 
carried to the point at which the value of marginal product for each resource is the 
same in all its alternative uses. 
The above example can be generalised, whether the resource is a machine, labour 
force, money, and even a piece of land, or any combination of two or all of them 
together. The Marginal Product (MP), can be estimated in any case, and resources 
have to be allocated accordingly till all the MPs are equal at all margins. 
Investing in a new railway line or in building a road is a clear example of allocating 
resources to improve the transport sector. Whether the investment is worth 
undertaking will be determined by valuing the costs and benefits of the proposed 
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schemes in order to rank them in terms of their net present value or internal rates of 
return. The measured NPVs or internal rates of return is the reflection of the marginal 
product of the resources employed in the proposed schemes. So the choice of these 
schemes in fact will be determined by their marginal products. Given an amount of 
resources, and if the maximum social welfare is to be achieved, resources have to be 
used between the alternatives up to the point where the returns or NPVs are all equal 
at all margins. 
The problem at issue is how can this rule be applied in the transport sector and 
especially, how can the funds of investment be allocated between road and rail 
investments, the first being assessed on cost benefit basis, and the latter is assessed on 
commercial criterion. 
If both road and rail investment were assessed on a social basis (comprehensive 
CBA), funds would have been allocated between them such that the social welfare 
would have been maximized. But the situation in hand might imply welfare losses to 
the economy. 
Figure 4.2 presents the case. The horizontal axes presents the total investment funds 
available to be allocated for road and rail investments in one period of time (year for 
example). Moving from left to right on the axes means more investments allocated for 
rail and less funds for road. In the contrast, moving from right to left means more 
funds to be given to road and less for rail. The left and right horizontal axes, present 
the expected rates of return (MEC) from different levels of investment for both road 
and rail. As can be seen, the figure presents the financial and cost benefit marginal 
efficiency of capital schedules for road and rail. 
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Figure 4.2 Welfare losses of appraisal inconsistency between road and rail 
Point A on the figure presents the optimum position for resource allocation, where the 
social return on the investment for rail and road are equal, which achieves the 
economic rule for resource allocation. The optimum level of investment would be 
01I1 and 0211 for rail and road respectively. This point will achieve the maximum 
social welfare can be obtained from road and rail investments. 
The situation in hand, where road investment is appraised on social basis and rail 
investment assessed on financial grounds, would suggest that point B is the allocation 
of funds between the two modes. The level 0112 will be allocated to rail and 0212 will 
be allocated to road. Comparing the positions A and B, rail would loss an amount of 
funds equal to I1I2, which will be allocated to road instead. In other words, there will 
be over investment in road and under investment in rail sector. 
Since social welfare of the investment is defined as the total area under the social 
marginal efficiency curves, choosing point B instead of the optimum point A, will 
imply a welfare losses measured by the area BEA, and this undesirable welfare 
impacts are mainly caused by the inconsistency of the evaluation methodologies 
between road and rail. 
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4.4 Downs-Thomson Paradox and the Equilibrium between Rail and Private 
Transport 
If the inconsistency of appraisal methods between road and rail leads to favour road 
investments on the account of rail investments, this might have a reverse reaction for 
the two modes given that they are operating in congested condition. In other words, 
allowing for more roads to be built or more widening will worsen the congestion on 
roads and can lead to a deterioration to public transport in general and rail in 
particular. These consequences are based on the assumption that public transport in 
general and rail in particular are services produced with a downward-sloping cost 
curve, while roads have an upward-sloping cost curve. The following paragraphs 
show how this reverse reaction may happen. 
Lardner was the first to recognise that railways have such a downward-sloping cost 
curve, or the existence of economies of scale in railway operation (Lardner, 1850). 
The argument was also raised by Joy in 1973 and 1989, who admits that a very high 
proportion of railway costs were fixed and the marginal cost of the extra flow or 
volume will be lower than the average cost. He used this argument as a justification 
for a subsidisation to railways (Joy, 1973 and 1989). Lang and Soberman in 1966 
give an analysis of urban rail transit systems in the USA. This analysis suggests that 
there are indeed economies of scale in such operations, and therefore that marginal 
costs are below average costs (Lang and Soberman, 1966). Mohring in 1972 gave a 
detailed analysis of the average and marginal costs of operating the Minneapolis-St 
Pauls (Twin Cities) bus system. His analysis and conclusions supported the 
assumption that public transport services are produced with a downward-sloping cost 
curve (Mohring, 1972). 
Downs in 1962 seems to have been the first to argue through the consequences for 
the allocation of the space of the city between car users and public transport users. He 
argues, that where roads had an upward-sloping cost curve, and public transport had a 
downward-sloping cost curve, an equilibrium between car and public transport costs 
would be established. At this point, there would be travellers who would have the 
same costs by road as by public transport, and who would be indifferent as to which 
of the two methods of travel they should use. Then he went on to speculate on what 
must happen if there is such an equilibrium between public and private transport 
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costs. He then admits that if road capacity is increased, by the construction of a radial 
expressway, when the alternative is a segregated-track rail service, and a very large 
number of persons shift from segregated track transit to automobiles, the cost of such 
transit per passenger may rise so that its attractiveness is drastically reduced. In such a 
case, congestion on the highways may have to become slightly worse than it was 
before the expressway was opened before automobile travel becomes just as 
undesirable as segregated track transit travel. Then he stated the paradoxical 
conclusion that : 
the opening of an expressway could conceivably cause traffic congestion to become 
worse instead of better, and automobile commuting times to rise instead of fall 
(Downs, 1962). 
Thomson is conjoined to the paradox because he also recognised the phenomenon. In 
his book Great Cities and their Traffic (Thomson, 1977), defined his paradox as the 
following: 
Unhappily, attempts to improve traffic conditions by providing more capacity on ( the 
roads) can lead to a deterioration in public transport, if by drawing paying customers 
away from the latter, they force an increase in fares and a reduction in service. In 
this case, the balance of traffic may shift from public to private transport until a new 
equilibrium is reached where each system is of lower quality than before. 
If we retrieve the impact of allocating funds to road and railways on different basis, to 
be building, widening, and improving more roads on the account of rail improvement 
schemes, we might argue, bearing the reverse reaction of transport system operating 
on congestion condition discussed above in mind, that the consequences will probably 
be higher costs for rail users and more congestion on the road network. In fact, 
Downs and Thomson argument were basically for a case of cities, but there is still a 
possibility that the reverse reaction could also happen for the case of building a new 
motorway or widening an existing one that has a railway line on barrel, or even a 
single bypass while a railway line is a direct alternative. Globally, this might lead to a 
situation where road building and widening continue, and the result is more 
congestion on the roads and higher costs or fares for using railways, because more 
and more people will be shifting from public transport to the door to door most 
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favourable private transport. The main conclusions of this argument may be 
summarised as follows: 
1. The existence mix of appraisal methods between road and public transport 
(especially railway) - given that public transport is a downward-sloping cost curve 
will depress the relative competitiveness of public transport compared to private 
transport. 
2. The wakens of public transport relative competitiveness, may probably in turn 
make it less attractive for more investments (unless it receives subsidisation). This 
is because, given that public transport is running commercially, the financial 
profitability of the investments will probably be wakened. 
4.5 Alternative Solutions 
The general conclusion to be drawn from the theoretical discussion in chapter 2, is 
that the notation of a single rate of exchange between the cost benefit and financial 
returns is a chimera. A large number of relationships may exist between returns 
calculated by the two main sets of criteria and there cannot even be a general 
presumption that the financial criteria always understates the true benefits of 
investment. Given that difficulty and considering the undesirable implications 
mentioned above as a result of having two different methods for assessing road and 
rail schemes, it is worthwhile considering other approaches or solutions to the 
problem. The following sections will highlight some of these solutions proposed as a 
contribution towards the problem of comparability between returns assessed on 
different basis. 
1. Appraise each project submitted in the financial sector according to the most 
comprehensive CBA criteria available and accept or reject accordingly. This solution 
was put forward by Harrison and Mackie (Harrison and Mackie, 1973). They stated 
that this solution has two-fold difficulties. The first is, even where the right 
institutional framework exists, it would be very time-consuming and expensive to re- 
appraise on quite different criteria, all the projects submitted by the financially based 
sector. The second, is there would be potential conflict over those schemes which lay 
below the financial minimum but which could be justified by reference to other 
benefits. For obvious reasons the enterprise concerned would be reluctant to submit 
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such projects, and it would blur management objectives, they stated. However, 
Harrison and Mackie concluded that this solution may be suitable in some areas, e. g. 
conurbations, where comprehensive transportation studies are in any case carried out. 
2. Modify the cost benefit criterion by omitting some benefits. This solution has 
been proposed by Wohl and Hendrickson (Wohl and Hendrickson, 1984), this is, to 
omit from the cost benefit criterion certain sources of benefit. They stated, "because 
of the non-comparability that would result between public and private sectors of the 
economy, the latter of which does not include consumer surplus in the assessment of 
alternative investments, and because of the indeterminate nature of consumer surplus 
measurement, it is our view that consumer surplus should not be included in any users 
trip-making benefit calculations to be used on assessing the economy of public 
projects. 
In fact this does not seem to be the best method by which to proceed. This for two 
reasons, first is it is based on the assumption that the benefits omitted by the financial 
criterion can be approximated by omission of certain sources of benefits from the cost 
benefit framework. There is no guarantee that this omission will compensate correctly 
for the unestimated benefits of the financially assessed schemes. Second, it would 
seem attractive to use a social cost benefit approach as a base for all schemes, since it 
serves to achieve the maximum social welfare, which is probably an ultimate goal to 
be achieved from the available resources. 
3. As a solution to the dilemma, an argument might be raised as follows:, since 
expected cost benefit returns are likely to be above the financial returns, this can be 
corrected for by raising the required cost benefit returns for road schemes and lower 
the required financial returns for rail investment, or in other words, raise the discount 
rates used for calculating the social net present value in case of road schemes and 
lower it when calculating the financial net present value for rail projects. This will 
give railways more chance to have more projects go ahead and might correct for the 
distortion of the inconsistency of appraisal methods. In fact this argument might be 
correct theoretically, but there will be a difficulty when it comes to practice. The 
difficulties will arise from the need to answer the following question: on what basis 
the required rates of return on (or the discount rate to be used for) road and rail 
scheme will be determined?, and if they are determined, will this correct the full 
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distortion caused by the use of two different appraisal methods?. In other words will 
the use of different required rates of returns (or different discount rates) on road and 
rail schemes lead to point A on figure 4.2? 
In fact this solution, although it has a theoretical background to support, its practical 
use does not seem to be supportive. Partly because of the questions raised above, and 
partly from the fact that the ratio of cost benefit to financial returns is not a straight- 
forward one as illustrated in chapter 2. The only fact one may be sure of is the 
existence of a divergence between the two measures. How much is the divergence is a 
matter of empirical evidence. In addition one might expect different ratio between 
cost benefit and financial return for different rail schemes. This will add to the 
difficulty of applying the above solution. This because, for each case the required 
rates of returns on the investment or the discount rates to be used, will have to be 
different to suit and correct for the ratio of cost benefit and financial returns for the 
scheme concerned, which seem to be impracticable. 
4. The second argument that probably be brought, as a solution of the 
inconsistency of appraisal methods between the two modes is the application of 
financial criteria for both modes. Although, theoretically this solution might be 
appealing, practically it has two shortcomings, these are: 
A) applying financial analysis for both road and rail will mean being at point C in 
figure 4.2. This point is not necessary the optimum one from resource allocation 
point of view and will imply a losses in social welfare measured by the area AFG. 
Comparing point C with point B, point C implies less welfare losses, but it still 
does not achieve the maximum social welfare. In fact, whether point C achieves 
welfare maximization or not will depend upon the relationship between cost 
benefit and financial returns for both modes. In other words, if the area between 
CBA marginal efficiency of capital curve and its financial counterpart is the same 
for road and rail, point C will be exactly as point A, and will achieve the 
maximum welfare, otherwise, point C will still not the optimum point from the 
welfare point of view. On the other side, it is to difficult to predict whether these 
areas will be the same for both modes, and there is no reason they should be the 
same. 
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B) the second shortcoming comes from the practical difficulty of applying a financial 
criteria for road investments, two main points may be raised here. The first is that 
pricing distortion that might occur in measuring the financial streams of a road 
investment. This is because of the fact that road users do not normally pay the full 
cost - if they pay at all- of using the road. So on either cases, there will not be a 
guarantee that the revenue collected reflects the actual cost and then the actual 
benefit of using the road. The second is that roads have long been understood as 
being a public good, that is accessible for all member of society without paying 
for it. And even if road pricing is applicable, it will not be easy to apply it for 
each single stretch of road in the country, in addition to the issue of the cost of 
applying the road pricing policy itself, which deemed to be not insignificant. 
5. Having discussed the possibility and difficulties of other solutions to the 
problem at issue, probably the most appealing way of correction for the distortion and 
avoiding the undesirable welfare implication of the inconsistency of appraisal methods 
between road and rail is to make these methods consistent in a way such that they can 
easily be applied for both modes without practical difficulties. This will only happen. 
if a comprehensive social cost benefit approach - as suggested in this study-is used for 
both road and rail. In this case, it follows: 
A) more railway schemes will probably be justified on the social grounds and then 
more investment will be directed to railways such that a potential right balance 
between private and public transport will have a chance to exist and congestion on 
roads will probably be improved gradually. 
B) having realised that railways are more environmentally friendly compared with 
roads (TEST, 1991), achieving the right balance between private and public 
transport will definitely benefit the environment and improve the quality of life 
accordingly. 
Achieving this desirable consistency between road and rail will require two main 
tasks, these are: 
A) finding the comprehensive social appraisal framework that measures all the 
relevant costs and benefits of schemes accurately and precisely as developed in this 
study. 
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B) applying that framework to rail schemes. Here, a straight-forward application of 
social CBA to rail investments-given the current organizational structure of 
railways- might not be possible. As a result some administration instruments may 
be required in order to bring the consistency between the two modes. These 
administration tolls have to be designed to make over and match exactly the 
difference between the cost benefit and the financial returns. In this case the 
results of the current study may be used as a basis for designing these tolls. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter illustrates the implications of the inconsistency of appraisal methods 
between road and rail. It showed how this inconsistency might lead to a chance of 
resource misallocation and welfare losses to the society. The chapter also draws 
attention to the possibility that the current appraisal practice of road and rail projects 
might help in setting the right climate so that a reverse reaction to the two modes 
might occur (Downs-Thomson Paradox). If this happens, then a deterioration to 
railway services will follow and road congestion will be worsened. The chapter ends 
by demonstrating some alternative options and their suitability for the problem of 
inconsistency. 
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Chapter 5 
Literature Review and Previous Studies 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to show how the problem of comparability between cost benefit 
and financial rates of return and the allocation of funds between projects assessed by 
different criteria have been examined before. In addition, it reviews the previous rail 
investment studies, where both financial and cost benefit methods were used and reveals 
and examines how the sources of benefits and costs that are not included in the financial 
framework have been incorporated within the cost benefit framework. The chapter ends 
by showing the main features of this study and the main differences with the previous 
studies. 
5.2 Comparability of Returns Measured on Different Basis 
1. The problem of comparability between rate of return on an investment of a 
private firm with the rate of return on an investment on a nationalised industry or public 
corporation has been considered by Foster 1960 (Foster, 1960), who concluded that: 
A) It would make sense to compare rates of return in private and nationalised industries 
only if nationalised industries had the same policy as private enterprise, that is 
generally profit maximisation. 
B) It makes no sense, for example, to compare the rate of return in the electricity 
industry with that in British Railways, since the former, being in surplus, has a policy 
of passing on some of its profits in lower prices while the latter is not. 
C) For example, suppose that the British Rail makes profit after it has paid its capital 
charges. If this were the case, many would argue that prosperity should be passed on 
to the consumer rather than go as a dividend to the Treasury. Let use suppose that 
this advice prevails and that the average rate per passenger mile is reduced from 3 to 
2. By intention this is less than the railways could get from their services. In other 
words they are paying a subsidy of a penny a mile. In this situation it would be 
ridiculous to compare the rate of return on the railways capital with that earned by 
private firm which did try to maximise its profits. 
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2. In an essay about financing transport investment , 
Sadove and Fromm, in 1965 
concluded the following (Sadove and Fromm 1965): 
"The conclusions of economic and financial analysis of projects can conflict and 
conclusions based solely on either economic rates of return or financial analysis 
should not determine investment priorities. A combined approach should be 
utilized. " 
3. Analytic discussion of the comparability problem appears to have considered with 
an unpublished paper by J. L. Carr of the Treasury Economic Section, the gist of which 
was published in 1967, (Carr, 1967), which used a simple model of a tolled and un-tolled 
road. This is shown in the following diagram: 
E 
Price 
C 
0A volume of trips 
Figure 5.1 Exchange rate between economic and financial surplus 
A straight line demand curve is assumed and no running costs. Based on these 
assumptions, certain propositions readily follow in Carr's analysis: 
First, that the revenue maximizing toll receipts will be represented by the area OABC, 
second that this area is one half of the total area under the demand curve, and third, 
that the area above and to the right of the revenue area are equal to each other and to 
one half of this area. Thus when a toll is charged, a surplus of 50% (i. e. area CBE) 
above revenue paid is enjoyed - which suggests that the " Rate of Exchange" between 
social and financial returns should be 1.5: 1. That is to say- in Carr's opinion- a social 
rate of return on an investment can be obtained by multiplying its financial return by a 
factor of 1.5. In fact this might be true only if Carr's assumptions hold. The analysis 
of the current study, as shown in chapter 2, concluded that the social rate of return 
might be above the financial rate of return. In addition, the analysis of chapter 2 also 
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showed that the consideration of different assumptions of demand, cost and pricing 
makes the pre-assumption of a single rate of exchange between the two measures of 
investment efficiency a chimera. 
4. The comparability problem has been looked at by Harrison and Mackie in 
1973 (Harrison and Mackie, 1973). They consider the problem faced by a central 
government department responsible for the investment program of a number of 
sectors, in applying the rule of equating marginal returns, when the returns are 
measured by financial criteria in some sectors (e. g. railways), and cost benefit criteria 
in others (e. g. roads). A possible solution suggested by J. L Can is put forward and 
they accepted that Can is correct in proposing that cost benefit returns would be 50% 
higher than financial returns at the margin in the conditions he posits. 
They have examined the implications of relaxing a number of Carr's assumptions. 
The summary of their discussion was that the ratio between cost benefit and financial 
returns varies according to the assumptions of demand and cost curves and pricing 
policy operated. This is consistent with the analysis of chapter 2, where different 
assumptions of pricing policy gave different exchange rates between cost benefit and 
financial returns. 
The general conclusions of Harrison and Mackie's analyses are: 
(1) No single rate of exchange between financial and cost benefit appraisal can be 
found. 
(2) A number of different rates may be required, according to the conditions in each 
sector and case. 
(3) Because the theoretical analysis does not offer a definite solution, more empirical 
work is required. 
Harrison and Mackie at the end of their analysis stated that: 
Because of the unlikelihood of finding satisfactory rates of exchange, other 
solutions to the problem of getting the right balance between different sectors, 
investments may have to be pursued more energetically e. g.: the internalising 
through direct subsidy, of external effects, or when possible, the pricing 
viability rules may themselves have to be amended. 
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In fact this conclusion is consistent with the current study discussion, in chapter 4, of 
using some administration tolls to correct for the inconsistency of using different 
appraisal criteria for road and rail investment. 
5. The problem of the division of the available funds between areas using 
different investment criteria in the transport sector have been looked at by Peaker 
(Peaker, 1974). The usual dichotomy being between road investment (assessed by cost 
savings plus user benefit) and railway investment (assessed against a financial 
criterion). 
Peaker has declared that it is necessary for the central government agency to divide 
the available funds in some, preferably rational, manner between these competing 
modes of transport. One way which has been mooted is by application of a simple 
"Conversion Factor" which would enable a direct comparison to be drawn between 
financial rates of return and those including allowance for cost saving and user 
benefits; (referred to as surplus rates of return, reflecting the fact that they include 
both producer and consumer surplus). 
Peaker discussed the existence and applicability of such a conversion factor, he has 
declared that it is possible to show the same conversion factor of 1.5, linking surplus 
and financial returns- which Carr has declared before -. It is valid when considering 
incremental investments by a profit maximizing organisation, provided two 
assumptions are valid. These are: 
A) that the demand curves before and after the investment are straight: though 
demand may shift due (e. g. ) to the impact of a new and modern image on the 
public eye, and: 
B) that, both before and after the investment is undertaken, the facility is operating 
under capacity, and that the marginal cost is constant from zero traffic flow to the 
observed flows: though (again) the level of costs may shift (e. g. the investment 
may reduce marginal cost at all output/traffic flow levels below capacity). 
Using a mathematical approach , Peaker has arrived to the same results which 
has 
been found and declared by Carr. This is shown in the following equation: 
ACS + AR = 1.5 x AR (5.1) 
Where: 
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ACS = the increase in consumer surplus resulting from the investment 
AR = is the increased financial net revenue following from the investment (producer 
surplus) 
In fact, although Peaker's analysis allows a shift in demand curve because of the 
investment, he reached the same results as found by Carr, that is a 50% difference 
between cost benefit and financial returns. 
peaker argued that, in the general case, neither of the key assumptions he posits 
would be valid, and it is possible to show by simple geometry, how their relaxation 
would have an a priori unpredictable effect (even as to direction) on the factor value 
of 1.5. One example of a case where the factor 1.5 is inapplicable is when the 
marginal cost curve is upward sloping: as older and less efficient, rolling stock must 
be used to carry higher passenger flows, more over time must be worked by the 
railmen, and track and signalling are increasingly extended: and the curve turns up 
sharply when capacity is reached. In such a case like that it is not clear a priori 
whether one should multiply the financial return by (e. g. ) 1.2 or 1.8 before 
comparing it to the surplus return on a road project which competes for limited 
investment funds. The ratio of the surplus to the financial return cannot therefore even 
be determined as to direction because it depends on the exact shape of the marginal 
cost curves. 
There is one further, and major, constraint on the applicability of Peaker's conversion 
factor arising from the fact that, in generating it, he assumed that there were no 
externalities (e. g. pollution) or network effects (e. g. traffic congestion). In the 
assessment of investment projects (road and rail) for urban and built-up areas such 
assumptions are patently unjustified. For such areas, the conversion factor is an 
inappropriate means of comparing the return to investment in financially appraised 
projects (e. g. rail) and surplus evaluated ones (e. g. road). 
6. Nash (1976) considers that, the separate planning of inter-urban road and rail 
facilities, using on the one hand cost benefit and on the other 
hand commercial 
criteria, can hardly fail to distort resource allocation. The Independent 
Commission on 
Transport (1974) exemplified similar arguments by suggesting that 
if time savings 
resulting from remodelling the rail layout at Peterborough were evaluated 
in the same 
manner as road schemes (that is COBA), the first year rate of return 
for 1978 would 
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be some 57% higher than the estimated commercial rate of return. This empirical 
piece of evidence suggests that social returns are likely to be higher than financial 
returns, and this is consistent with the conclusions of the analysis in chapter 2. 
7. The question of comparability between CBA and FA rates of return was 
considered by the Leitch Committee in 1977, which recommended a single framework 
which it considered would allow greater comparability between road and rail 
investment appraisals by including wider issues relevant to decisions on the overall 
allocation of resources. The Committee in their report (Department of Transport, 
1977,1979), concluded: 
Current methods of appraising trunk roads based on cost benefit analysis do 
not provide a basis for comparison with the results of appraisals used for 
alternative modes of transport which are based on financial analysis. 
The Committee felt that there should be no insuperable difficulty in appraising rail 
schemes using cost benefit techniques within the overall assessment framework which 
they had proposed for trunk roads. They recommended that: 
A) where direct alternatives arise between road and rail schemes, the competing 
options should be compared using a comprehensive cost benefit analysis 
framework. 
B) strategic or policy studies conducted to compare the rates of return from 
investment in road and rail should be carried out on the basis of cost benefit 
analysis within the framework, rather than financial appraisal. 
Although these recommendations are theoretically sound, applying them in practice is 
not that easy. This is due to the commercial objectives of railways, in particular the 
inter-city sector. It follows that another solution is required to bring the balance 
between the two modes. 
8. Starkie in (1979), raised the issue of the allocation of investment to inter-urban 
road and rail. He conjoined the appraisal methods with the pricing policy for both 
road and rail, and his conclusions were: 
In spit of the Department's claim that regard is paid to marginal returns in the 
different transport sectors when deciding upon the distribution of resources for 
investment, there seems little doubt that the existing and fundamentally 
incompatible methods used for appraising investment projects will not lead to 
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an appropriate allocation of funds to the inter-urban transport sector as whole 
or to the chief modes in that sector. 
Starkie carried on to say: 
It is essential to take into account the pricing of different transport services. 
Prices charged for these services affect the returns to be expected from 
investing in their provision regardless of which measure of economic surplus 
we use for measuring the efficiency of the investment. Consequently, it is 
important that the pricing policies are broadly compatible between modes 
competing for scarce resources. 
This interaction between appraisal techniques and pricing policy mentioned by Starkie 
was shown to be vital by this study as examined and exemplified in chapter 2, section 
2.3.4, where the theoretical analysis showed that the inconsistency of pricing policy 
may lead to a divergence between the returns on an investment even if the same 
evaluation technique is used. For example, a chance of a divergence exists between 
cost benefit returns measured under different assumptions of pricing policy. This in 
fact leads to an important conclusion. That is, to bring the right balance between road 
and rail, not only evaluation techniques have to be consistent but also the pricing 
policy operated. 
5.3 Previous Rail Studies (Empirical Side) 
5.3.1 Introduction 
This section reviews some of the rail investment studies that were carried out using 
both financial and cost benefit methods to show how the results of the two techniques 
differed and to examine how the sources of benefits and costs that are not included in 
the financial framework have been dealt with in a cost benefit framework. Section 
5.3.2 shows the sources of benefits that were incorporated in the cost benefit 
framework applied in these studies and the method of incorporating them, while 
section 5.3.3 summarises the results of the evaluation. The results of the evaluation 
are meant to illustrate the magnitude of the divergence between financial and cost 
benefit returns. 
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5.3.2 The Method of Cost Benefit Analysis Adopted 
The sources of benefits (and adjustments) that were incorporated in the cost benefit 
evaluation in most of these studies - beside the financial impacts of the scheme- are as 
follows: 
1. Consumer surplus to rail users (user benefits) 
2. Consumer surplus to remaining road users 
3. Accident savings on road 
4. Tax adjustments 
The following paragraphs explain briefly how each of these factors has been 
incorporated in the cost benefit framework. 
1. Change in Consumer Surplus of Rail Users 
Users of the proposed scheme were divided into two types, stayers, those who used 
the service in case of do nothing situation and carry on using it in the do minimum 
situation. The change in the consumer surplus for them was considered to be the full 
change in their perceived costs of travel as a result of the proposed scheme. The other 
type of users is the additional passengers, those new users who switched -switchers- 
from other modes or new generated trips as a result of the proposed rail scheme. The 
change in the consumer surplus for them was estimated (based on the rule of one 
half), as half the change in the perceived cost of making a trip on scheme service 
(DTp 1984). 
2. Consumer Surplus to Remaining Road Users 
This is considered to be the impact of reduced road congestion on the remaining road 
users, in terms of reduction in travel time and vehicle operating costs. Time and 
vehicle operating cost benefits are combined and measured together and usually called 
consumer surplus to remaining road users or congestion reduction benefits in these 
studies. The time and vehicle operating cost benefits or congestion reduction benefits, 
of a passenger km or vehicle km are measured using the estimates of the resource cost 
per vehicle km travelled by road and the speed-flow relationships identified in COBA 
(Nash et al 1991). 
3. Accident Cost Savings 
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The cost savings per a passenger km switched from road to rail was derived from the 
COBA injury accident rates and costs per injury by link type and assuming the mix of 
road types from which switchers transfer. 
4. Tax Adjustments 
These are transfer payments which are not taken into account in British Rail's 
financial analysis, and normally includes: 
A) The loss of general indirect tax revenues to the Exchequer when consumers spend 
more on rail services rather than other goods. 
B) The loss to the Exchequer of road taxation (excise duties and VAT) in respect of 
passengers no longer travelling by road. 
These are the main sources of benefits and adjustments made in these studies. As can 
be noticed no attention is given to the environmental impacts of investment schemes. 
In addition, the issue of perception is not incorporated when measuring non-user 
benefits. This is relevant to both accidents and vehicle operating costs where a 
divergence between resource and perceived costs exists, and on a social assessment 
basis this divergence has to be corrected for. 
It is one of the main intentions of the current study -in developing an appraisal 
framework for rail schemes- to consider and incorporate both the environmental 
impacts of rail schemes and the misperception in accidents and vehicle operating costs 
as will be explained in detail in the next chapter. 
5.3.3 Results of the Evaluation Process of the Studies 
5.3.3.1. Birmingham-London/Basingstoke Electrification Case Study 
The Department of Transport on behalf of the Standing Advisory Committee on 
Trunk Road Investment, in 1982 it commissioned Colin Buchanan and Partners to 
undertake a study of a rail electrification project using comparable techniques to those 
used in road investment appraisal (DTp, 1984). The project in question was to 
electrify the line from Birmingham to Paddington via Oxford, together with the 
branch from Reading to Basingstoke, allowing the Birmingham-Paddington and 
Birmingham-Bournemouth services to be electrically hauled throughout. 
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The study quantified costs and benefits to British Rail, which would be taken into 
account in a financial appraisal, and then the benefits to passengers in terms of time 
savings and reduction in the need to change trains. It also estimated the effect on 
remaining road users of the diversion of traffic from road. It did this by applying the 
speed/flow relationship used in COBA. However, no very good evidence was 
available on what proportion of new rail users would have diverted from road; a 
central assumption of 50% was used, with sensitivity tests of 75% and 25%. Other 
factors taken into account were reductions in road accidents, loss in tax revenue from 
the diversion of spending from taxed road transport to untaxed rail and loss of revenue 
to London Transport from the diversion of some trips away from London. Results of 
the study are given in the following table: 
Table 5.1 Birmingham-London/Basingstok Electrification. (1979 prices at 7%). 
Benefit or cost item Net present value £m 
Change in passenger revenue 6.490 
Savings in operating costs 27.955 
Savings in capital and maintenance costs -40.095 
Financial NPV -5.650 
Rail user benefits (existing and new) 2.857 
Consumer surplus to remaining road users 1.485 
Savings in road accident costs 0.440 
Tax adjustment -1.243 
Change in London Transport revenue -0.063 
Social NPV -2.175 
Source : DTp (1984) 
It may be argued that, given the current purely commercial objectives for British Rail 
Inter-City (profit maximisation), any improvements in service level would be likely to 
be associated with an increase in fares over the route in question. This would tend to 
reduce the discrepancy between social and financial returns. Indeed if the fare were 
raised so far that the traffic level on rail was unchanged, there would be no social 
benefits from the scheme and the two criteria would be identical. However, the ability 
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of British Rail to raise fare in order to absorb the improvement in service quality is 
arguable and very much depend on the demand elasticity of the service. 
The fact that the difference between social and financial NPV in this case was 
relatively small resulted from the fact that the major effect of the scheme was to 
reduce British Rail costs rather than to improve services. Moreover, conversion of 
suburban services to electric traction, which would undoubtedly accompany such an 
electrification scheme and would yield substantial social benefits, was considered 
outside the remit of the study and not considered in detail (Nash and Preston 1991). 
The study report itself concludes that: 
"There seems no obvious reason to expect that such divergence (between financial 
and social appraisals) will be generally insignificant. For these reasons, the study 
provides some support for the conclusion of the Leitch Committee in 1977 that " 
strategic or policy studies conducted to compare the rates of return from investment 
in road and rail should be conducted on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, within the 
framework, rather than financial appraisal" 
5.3.3.2 West Yorkshire New Stations 
The following table outlines the appraisal results that was carried out for six new 
stations in West Yorkshire. A 30-year project life was assumed, along with a 7% 
discount rate. All prices are expressed in 1986 prices. It can be seen from the table 
that the new station program was a fairly small scale example of capital investment, 
involving only around £0.6m, whilst, as the stations were unmanned, recurrent costs 
were minimal. At the time of evaluation was carried out, West Yorkshire Passenger 
Transport Executive (PTE) was responsible for both rail and bus operations. As a 
result, the gain in public transport revenue (estimated, over 30 years, at almost £lm) 
was calculated net of abstraction from bus services. 
The results of the evaluation suggest that social NPV is about 6.4 times the financial 
NPV. Although, benefits to new rail users are substantially high, this is cancelled out 
by the negative value of the benefits to the existing users as a result of increased 
journey times for them. Non-user benefits are relatively high, and more than 70% of 
it is road accident savings. In measuring accident cost savings, neither the 
implications of mode switching nor the issue of user's perception to accident cost was 
incorporated. These two issues are very relevant when assessing rail schemes on a 
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social basis, and incorporating them may affect the amount of non-user benefits 
significantly. 
Table 5.2 Comparison of NPV of two rail investment programs. (30-year project life, 7% 
interest rate, £000,1986 prices) 
Cost or benefit items West Yorkshire Six 
new Stations on 
existing services 
Leicester-Burton 
new service serving 
14 new stations 
1. Gain in public transport revenue from new users 997 8897 
2. Loss in public transport revenue due to increased - - 
journey time 166 - 
3. Recurrent costs -147 -9154 
4. Capital costs -656 -5806 
Financial NPV 28 -6063 
5. Time savings to new rail users 515 4582 
6. Time savings to existing rail users -472 - 
7. Time savings to road users 113 3304 
8. Accident savings 277 2612 
9. Tax adjustment -282 -2326 
Social NPV 179 2109 
excluding user benefits (section 56 grant NPV) 136 -2473 
Source : Nash and Preston 1991 
5.3.3.3 Leicester Burton New Rail Service 
As shown in the table above, Leicester-Burton new rail service, the scheme that has 
been evaluated, involved an initial investment of £5.8m and recurrent operating costs 
equivalent to £9.2m over 30 years. The mid-point estimate of revenue indicates that 
around £8.9m will accrue over 30 years. Hence, under the calculations the project just 
fails to cover operating costs and hence makes no contribution to capital costs. The 
financial NPV is thus highly negative (-£6m). As the project involves a brand new 
service, unlike the West Yorkshire new station program, it has no effects on existing 
rail users. However, the time savings that accrue to users of the new service are 
estimated to be substantial (around £4.6m). This is more than 50% of the gain in 
revenue. Incorporating user and non-user benefits made the social NPV substantially 
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positive. User benefits are the greatest source of social benefits. However, non-user 
benefits in terms of time and accident cost saving for road users are also significant. 
This case shows a typical example of a situation where social and financial NPV 
contradict. This has a very important implications in the investment decision. Simply 
because if the rail organisation only proceeds investments of financial viability, this 
scheme may have to wait for some times to be undertaken. One may argue that, 
Section 56 Grant may help in this case. In fact the case example shows that when user 
benefits are omitted, as Section 56 Grant guidelines require, the project has a negative 
NPV. Further more Section 56 Grant is available for schemes that have some regional 
importance. 
5.3.3.4 The Trans-Pennine Rail Study 
The Trans-Pennine Rail Strategy Study, carried out by Transportation Planning 
Associates (TPA) in association with the Institute for Transport Studies at Leeds 
University for a consortium of Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) and local 
authorities provided an opportunity to assess inter-urban rail investment schemes on a 
basis consistent with the approach used by the Department of Transport for highway 
scheme appraisal. Three overall strategies for developing Trans-Pennine rail services 
were studied. these are: 
9 Strategy A: a strategy based around an enhanced diesel service for the North 
Trans-Pennine route with parallel service improvement on other corridors. 
" Strategy B: an approach based on electrifying the Liverpool-York route with diesel 
rolling stock cascaded to other services, allowing them to be improved at less cost 
than in Strategy A. 
0 Strategy C: a similar strategy to B but with an additional fast diesel service on the 
route from Liverpool to York via Bradford. 
The study involved undertaking appraisals using Economic, Financial and "Section 56 
Grant" approaches. The results of the evaluation are summarised in the following 
table: 
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Table 5.3 Evaluation of Overall Trans-Pennine Strategies (present value of costs and 
benefits discounted to 1994 in 1990 prices) £m 
Benefits or Costs Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C 
a) Costs 
Capital: Infrastructure 2.42 45.93 45.93 
Rolling Stock 13.18 13.42 21.61 
Operating and Maintenance 
Infrastructure -1.03 6.16 6.16 
Train Services 18.52 1.08 15.39 
Total 33.09 66.59 89.10 
b) Benefits 
Revenue 62.18 73.95 89.20 
Non-User: De-congestion 11.43 21.97 24.46 
Accidents 5.51 8.16 9.17 
Total 16.94 30.13 33.63 
User Time Savings 78.02 82.83 100.16 
C) Evaluation 
Financial appraisal 29.09 7.36 0.1 
Section 56 appraisal 46.03 37.48 33.73 
Economic appraisal 124.05 120.32 133.89 
Source: Vaughan et al 1992. 
As can be seen, the evaluation process of the three strategies has not incorporated any 
environmental impacts. Perhaps this was to be consistent with the COBA evaluation 
for road schemes, where no monetary valuation is mad for the environmental impacts. 
User benefits in terms of time savings to rail users are the greater source of economic 
benefits compared with revenue and non-user benefits which is the least important of 
the three categories. Perhaps this is because the evaluation work was carried out using 
the current fare at time (Vaughan et al 1992). One might expect that user benefits 
might have been eroded if fare were allowed to increase, which may have improved 
the financial case and reduced the gap between economic and financial NPV. 
However, the divergence between social and financial NPV will exist unless fare 
increases so that rail traffic level does not change. 
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It is worth mentioning that, on social basis, the benefit to cost ratios of the three 
strategies ranged from 2.1: 1 for option C to 4.7: 1 for option A. Comparing this with 
benefit/cost ratio of 2.5: 1 for road proposals expected by the Department of Transport 
and published in the "Roads for Prosperity" White Paper (DTp 1992), the conclusion 
is that when assessing on an economic basis, rail schemes may achieve benefit cost 
ratios as those for road schemes. 
5.3.4 Conclusions from the Case Studies 
The general conclusion of the above case studies are: 
1. The absence of the environmental impacts in the social evaluation of rail schemes. 
2. When assessing non-user benefits, the studies failed to incorporate the users 
misperception which is very relevant in case of accident and vehicle operating 
costs. 
5.4 Chapter Summary and the Way Ahead 
This chapter summarises the literature of the problem of comparability between 
investment returns measured on different basis and how that may distort the allocation 
of funds. It showed that the problem had been considered as early as 1960. This was 
followed by an attempt to establish a single exchange rate between the financial and 
cost benefit returns which deemed to be difficult. The chapter also reviews some rail 
investment studies where both financial and cost benefit were used, in order to 
demonstrate how the task of cost benefit were carried out for rail schemes. The cases 
mentioned do not include all of the studies, and they illustrate the magnitude of the 
divergence between financial and cost benefit returns in each case. In most of these 
studies, the results of the evaluation process showed a divergence between cost benefit 
and financial returns (NPVs or benefit/cost ratios). The divergence differs from a case 
to another according to the circumstances of each case. Although, the cost benefit and 
financial returns differed in all cases, there is no a priori general statement can be 
drawn -from this empirical side - about the magnitude of the divergence. 
Based on the results of these studies, the argument may be put forward as follows: 
The divergence between cost benefit and financial returns will in general depend 
upon: 
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1. The nature of the investments in terms of their effects on the rail operator and 
users of the service. When the major impact is to reduce costs rather than improve 
services, the divergence might be relatively small, as the case of Birmingham-London 
electrification. But when the scheme has a great impact in improving the quality of 
service, the divergence might be relatively higher. 
2. When the scheme leads to improvement in the quality of service, the 
divergence will again depend upon the following: 
a) to what extent the service quality is improved. 
b) to what extent rail operator can recoup the improvement in the quality of service 
through fare increase. 
c) to what extent the improvement in service quality will attract road users to use rail 
instead, and then the change in consumer surplus to the remaining road users as 
well as the road accident cost savings will be determined. 
3. The comprehensives of the social approach adopted in terms of inclusion of all 
possible sources of benefits and costs. And it is one of the main merits of the current 
study to incorporate all the relevant costs and benefits in the social appraisal of rail 
schemes, such as the environmental impacts, which was absent in all of the previous 
studies. The current study considers these impacts at the margin. 
4. The accuracy of incorporating the sources of benefits and costs that are not 
included in the financial appraisal framework. This is very important when measuring 
non-user benefits. As explained above, in the previous studies no attention has been 
given to the issue of perception when measuring accident and vehicle operating costs 
savings. This may lead to an overestimate of these benefits which in turn distorts the 
investment decision. The measurement is based on the cost of accident times the 
number of road accident saved as a result of the scheme. No consideration is given to 
the misperception of vehicle operating cost items. However, the current study 
approach of measuring non-user benefits of rail schemes incorporates the 
misperception of road and rail accidents as well as the misperception of road vehicle 
operating costs. Another important aspect when measuring non-user benefits of rail 
schemes is to consider the conditions and circumstances of the direct alternative of the 
rail service being assessed. The current study approach incorporates the type of road 
that are of direct alternative to the rail scheme, whether it is a congested road or not, 
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the variations in traffic during the day, the week, the year as well as the variations of 
traffic from one place to another one. This is seen to make a significant difference to 
the evaluation results and will help in making the suitable decision of allocating 
investment funds between road and rail. 
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Chapter 6 
The Approach of the Study 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 discussed the potential undesirable implications of the inconsistency of 
appraisal techniques between transport modes, in particular between road and rail. 
Some alternative options were put forward as solutions to the problem. After 
discussing the suitability and applicability of each of these options, it appeared clear 
that the most appealing option or solution is to make the appraisal techniques 
consistent across all modes in general and between road and rail in particular, by 
applying one common appraisal methods for assessing the investments. In addition, if 
the social welfare is to be maximised out of the investments in the transport sector, 
the common method used for all modes has to be a comprehensive social cost benefit 
approach. The argument in chapter four considered also the question of whether it 
will be possible - given the current organisational structure and financial objectives of 
railways - to apply a comprehensive social cost benefit approach to rail schemes. The 
answer, probably not an easy one. But if the answer is no, that does not mean that the 
consistency between transport modes cannot be achieved. The consistency between the 
modes can be brought, this time not by applying a common comprehensive social cost 
benefit approach explicitly, but rather implicitly. This may be achieved by some 
administration tolls that are designed and tailored to make up and match exactly the 
difference between the financial and social returns on the investments. This might be 
by the making over of grants and subsidies from the government or the responsible 
body to the body making financial appraisals, (in this case railways). In order to 
design and tailor these administration tolls, a comprehensive social cost benefit 
approach has to be carried out for rail investments first, so the administration 
instruments can be based on the results of social measurement of the investment 
benefits and costs. So, whether the consistency is to be brought explicitly, by applying 
the social appraisal approach to road and rail, or implicitly, by administration 
instruments, being based on the results of the social approach carried out for rail 
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schemes, there is a need for developing a comprehensive social appraisal approach to 
be used in measuring the social benefits and costs of rail schemes at the margin. 
Developing this approach, as identified in the study purpose in chapter 1, is the main 
concern of this study. 
Chapter 5 reviewed the literature of the comparability problem and discussed the 
previous rail studies and their approach in measuring the investment benefits. The 
chapter ended by outlining the factors that might affect the divergence between the 
cost benefit and financial returns on the investment, and discussed how some of these 
factors were not considered (e. g. environment) and some were not incorporated 
comprehensively (e. g. perception) in the previous studies. It also hints to the main 
features of the current study in its approach of measuring the rail investment benefits. 
This chapter will follow the story line by outlining the approach adapted in this study 
and how this approach fits in fulfilling the gap of the previous work in the area of 
measuring the investment benefits of rail schemes. Section 6.2 outlines the 'main 
interest groups', that a rail scheme might have effects in. Section 6.3 demonstrates the 
study approach of measuring non-user benefits of a rail scheme and how this fits 
within the appraisal framework as a whole. Types of benefits concerned are showed, 
and the main stages of processing towards incorporating them are demonstrated, as 
well as the expected results from the approach adopted. It is not intended here to give 
the details of how the benefits are measured. This is done in the future relevant 
chapters, where each type of benefit will be given a separate chapter showing exactly 
how each type of benefit concerned is dealt with and measured. Section 6.4 
summarises the contents of the chapter. 
6.2 Impacts of Rail Investment 
At the most general level, rail investment schemes will have effects on the following 
groups: 
1. Rail operator: the effects on the operator will be mainly in terms of changes in 
costs and revenues as a result of the scheme, in addition to the initial capital cost of 
carrying out the project. It is worth mentioning that the impacts on the operator will 
to some extent depend upon the kind of investment concerned. Some schemes might 
not affect the operator's revenues, such as cost reducing investment schemes. 
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2. Rail users: impacts on rail users include changes in the quality of service 
(journey time, comfort, convenience etc. ), if any, and the effects of the project on the 
level of fares. 
3. Non-users: those are other members of the society who are not using the rail 
service in question, such as users of other modes of transport e. g. road, or even any 
person who does not use transport at all. 
4. Other bodies: those are other bodies in the community who might be affected 
by the rail scheme, e. g. the impacts on the exchequer in terms of tax revenue 
changes. 
These are the potential four groups who in general will be affected by the investment 
in a railway scheme. And any comprehensive framework for assessing the investment 
efficiency will have to include the impacts on the four groups. 
6.3 The Study Appraisal Framework and the Approach of measuring Scheme 
Non-user Benefits 
The purpose of the study, as identified in chapter 1, is to develop a methodology for 
appraising rail investment schemes that would be consistent with the cost benefit 
techniques used to assess road investment schemes, and which measures the social 
efficiency of invested resources and help in making the right investment decisions, 
that are based on the desirability and actual needs of the society. To achieve this 
purpose, the methodology framework developed has to measure the relevant benefits 
and costs of rail schemes comprehensively, precisely, and accurately. The following 
sections show the structure of the appraisal framework, and the approach adopted in 
incorporating the impacts of the scheme on non-users, and how non-user benefits are 
dealt with and incorporated in the framework of appraisal in what the study called, 
(The Benefit Algorithm), and how the three requirements mentioned above, 
(comprehensivness, precision and accuracy), were fulfilled in the adapted approach of 
measuring the benefits. 
6.3.1 Structure of the Appraisal Framework and the Study Approach 
The following diagram, shows the structure of a social appraisal framework for a rail 
investment scheme. It illustrates the types of scheme impacts that should be included 
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on a social assessment basis. The diagram also demonstrates the approach that adopted 
by the study in order to incorporate non-user impacts of rail schemes into the 
appraisal framework. 
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from road to rail 
Figure 6.1 Structure of the appraisal framework and the study approach of dealing 
with non-user benefits 
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As can be seen, figure 6.1 illustrates the types of non-user benefits considered and the 
main stages of incorporating them into the appraisal framework. The benefits 
considered are, congestion time benefits, noise, air pollution, accidents and vehicle 
operating costs. The first three of them are considered as externalities to the scheme, 
while the last two are dealt with as cost misperception cases. For externalities, the 
task is to incorporate the external costs and benefits of the scheme at the margin. In 
case of cost misperception, the task will be to correct for resource cost changes 
(resource cost saved and used as a result of a scheme). The exact details of carrying 
out these tasks will be given in future chapters, where a separate chapter will be 
specified for each type of the benefits concerned. 
6.3.2 The Benefit Algorithm 
Under the current study appraisal framework, the following four headings are the 
potential sources of benefit measurements and adjustments for a rail scheme benefit 
and should be included in the appraisal framework. 
1. Operator financial benefits 
2. User benefits 
3. Externalities 
4. Cost Misperception 
The following paragraphs, with the aid of figures 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate how these four 
items are included in the benefit algorithm. 
Generalis 
Cost 
Fore 
dI Q2 No. of trips 0 q2 q, No. of trips 
a) Rail b) Road alternative 
Figure 6.2 The impacts of a rail scheme on an alternative road (externalities) 
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Figure 6.3 The impacts of a rail scheme on an alternative road (cost misperception) 
1. Operator Financial Benefits (producer surplus) 
As illustrated in figure 6.2, when a rail investment scheme shifts the marginal cost 
curve uniformly downward, the operator producer surplus will be presented by the 
area C2BM2-C1AM1. In mathematical form, this is: 
NR=(TR2 -TC2)-(TR, -TC, ) (6.1) 
Where: 
TR2, TR1= are total revenue after and before the investment respectively (£/period 
of time) 
TC2, TC1= are total operating costs after and before the investment (£/period of 
time) 
NR= the financial net revenue that an operator gains out of the scheme on a 
given period of time (producer surplus) 
2. User Benefits 
This type of benefits occur to the railway users, in terms of improvements to the 
service quality as a result of the scheme in question. In figure 6.2, C1 and C2 are the 
generalised cost of travelling by rail before and after the investment. Q1 and Q2 are 
the level of trips by rail before and after situations. The area C1ABC2 presents the 
change in consumer surplus to rail users (stayres and new travellers). In mathematical 
form, this area is measured as follows: 
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q2 qi No. of trips 
UB =2 (Q1 + Q2) (Cl - C2) (6.2) 
Where 
UB= the amount of benefits rail users will gain as a result of the scheme in a 
given period of time 
C1, C2= travel cost by rail before and after the investment 
3. Externalities 
As figure 6.2 shows, the marginal social cost (MSC) of travel by road is above the 
marginal private cost (MPC) of travel. This is due to the fact that there are external 
costs for road travel, in a form of time delays, environmental damages, e. g. noise and 
air pollution. These externalities are not included in the users private travel costs, and 
then are not considered in their decision of making a trip on the road. When a rail 
scheme attracts some previous road users off the road, an area of benefits will 
emerge, (external benefits to the railway investment scheme), reflecting the savings in 
this external costs of road transport. For example if a rail scheme leads to an amount 
of trips equal to (ql-Q2) in figure 6.2 to shift from roads to rail, an amount of benefits 
presented by the area NLKM will be gained. In mathematical form, these external 
benefits may be measured as follows: 
EB=2MECb(q, -q2)+ MECQ(q, qZ 
I 
(q, -g2)(MECb +MECQ) (6.3) 22 
Where: 
EB= the external benefits of a rail scheme in terms of time delays 
and other pollution costs would have been otherwise imposed on 
the remaining road users and the rest of the society if the scheme 
did not go a head (in do-nothing situation). 
MECb, MECa= the marginal eternality cost (the difference between the marginal 
social travel cost and the marginal private travel cost of road) 
reflecting this costs of road travel that road users impose on each 
other and on the rest of the society without including it into 
account when taking a decision to make a trip on the road, for 
before and after the investment. 
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(qI-q2)= movers from road to rail, (no. of trips) as a result of rail 
scheme = (Q2-Q1) in figure 6.2. 
Equation 6.3 will be used in case of addressing congestion benefits, and noise and air 
pollution reduction benefits. This measurement of external benefits to rail schemes 
(EB) as presented in equation 6.3, is based on the assumption that marginal private 
and social cost are straight line functions of traffic flows. In other words, this is to say 
that each additional trip joins the road causes an equal amount of external cost (delays 
and other pollution costs). In fact, this assumption is made only to ease the 
demonstration of externalities in figure 6.2. In reality this might not be the case. And 
one expects that each additional trip joins the road will impose an external cost more 
than the previous trip. In other words, marginal private and social cost are not straight 
line functions of traffic flows. In this case the measurement of the external benefits of 
a rail scheme has to consider the marginal external benefits of each trip transfers from 
road to rail. 
4. Cost Misperception 
This is a sort of correction that has to be made when assessing the social benefits of a 
rail scheme. As has been addressed previously, some travel costs are not perceived 
fully by travellers. An obvious example is road vehicle operating costs. By looking at 
figure 6.3 a, MRC1 and MRC2 are the marginal resource costs for rail travel before 
and after the investment, and they include both the perceived and the unperceived 
costs for rail travel. MPC1 and MPC2 are the perceived costs by rail users. On the 
other hand, in figure 6.3 b, road users do not perceive the full costs of travel, since 
the marginal resource cost MRC is above the marginal private cost of travel by road 
MPC. The difference between MRC and MPC is the unperceived costs of travel. 
When the amount of trips ql-q2 transfers from road to rail, and cost misperception 
prevails for both road and rail cases, an area of benefits equal to UVXY for road will 
emerge and another area of disbenefits equal to ABCD for rail will emerge. The area 
of benefits in road reflects the unperceived cost by those who transfer to rail (resource 
cost saved). The area of disbenefits in rail reflects the unperceived cost 
by the new 
users of rail (resource cost used). The form of correction to be 
incorporated in the 
benefit algorithm of the appraisal framework is as follows: 
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CF = (UTCR - UTC, )(Q2 - Q, ) (6.4) 
Where: 
UTCR, UTCr= the amount of unperceived travel costs per trip or passenger km 
of travel for road and rail respectively 
(Q2-Qi) = movers from road to rail as a result of the investment in rail 
(no. of trips or passenger km) 
CR= correction factor for cost misperception to be included in the 
benefit algorithm of a rail scheme appraisal 
This correction factor will be relevant and applied when measuring vehicle operating 
and accident Benefits. 
6.3.3 The Comprehensivness of the Study Approach 
The comprehensivness of the study approach is due to the inclusion of all the relevant 
social benefits and costs of the schemes. On a social grounds, beside the financial 
benefits and benefits to rail users, the following are the items included and measured 
in the study social cost benefit framework. 
6.3.3.1 Congestion Benefits 
Rail schemes will probably lead to a congestion relief on roads. In fact, the extent to 
which this will happen depends upon so many factors, which has to be considered in 
the measurement process. These factors will be discussed in the following paragraphs, 
and how they have been incorporated in the study approach will be explained in 
details in the relevant future chapters. As far as this point is concerned, the study 
suggests that congestion impacts has to be incorporated correctly and precisely - as 
suggested latter in the study - and any shortcomings in incorporating it will present a 
defect in the social measurements of investment benefits. In fact most of the previous 
work (as discussed in chapter 5) in assessing rail schemes social impacts considered 
the impact of the schemes on road congestion relief. The method of incorporating the 
congestion benefits were probably less specified and congestion benefits were 
conjoined with vehicle operating cost impacts. This probably, brings some sort of 
double counting or misestimation of benefits. This point were clearly realised by the 
current study approach. 
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It is worth mentioning that as the study is considering the impacts of rail schemes on 
road congestion. In fact it is also, to some extent, relevant to consider the implications 
of congestion on the railway network. But this is found to be another big area of 
research which has to be looked at in the light of the whole structure of the rail 
network. 
6.3.3.2 Accidents Benefits 
Accidents are a very important area that have to be considered when assessing the 
social impacts of rail schemes. Rail improvements will probably lead to switching 
some previous road users to the improved rail schemes. It follows, and to the extent 
rail does, an improvements to the accident situations on roads. The impacts of rail 
schemes on road accidents have to be considered in a social assessment approach. On 
the other hand, the rail accidents costs are of an importance also. The current study 
approach incorporates the implications of rail scheme impacts on both rail and road 
accidents. In fact, accident cost savings on roads were considered by the previous 
studies as discussed in chapter 5. The main difference between these studies and the 
current study approach is the method of incorporation of accident cost savings. The 
previous studies considered a scheme that lead to one accident less on roads, will 
bring an accident benefit equal to the whole cost of that accident. The current study 
argues that this may carry a chance of double counting and then brings the issue of 
accident cost perception into consideration. The study argues that only the correction 
of accident cost misperception that is relevant to the evaluation. Another main 
difference between this study and the previous ones is the incorporation of mode 
switching implications on rail accidents which has not been considered in the previous 
studies as discussed in chapter 5. 
6.3.3.3 Vehicle Operating Costs 
If a rail scheme attracts some road users off the road, this switching will have some 
effects on the remaining road users, in terms of travel speed and time. The 
implications of time are considered under quantifying the congestion benefits. The 
impacts on speed and then on vehicle operating costs of the road stayers are to be 
considered separately. In fact, the impacts of rail schemes on vehicle operating costs 
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were considered in the previous studies conjoined with time impacts. The current 
study approach is looking at vehicle operating cost impacts in its own, and as a 
separate issue. This is found to be the correct method of incorporating it. The reason 
is that the method of measuring vehicle operating costs benefits is different from the 
method of measuring congestion benefits. The former, being considered as a case of 
cost misperception, is measured through equation 6.4 above while the latter, being a 
sort of externalities, is measured through equation 6.3. The way both types of benefits 
are estimated will be explained in details in the relevant future chapters. 
6.3.3.4 Environmental Impacts 
This is a very important source of benefits to rail schemes. This is because of the fact 
that roads are responsible for a greater portion of the environmental impacts such as 
noise and air pollution compared with rail transport as shown in chapter 1 (TEST, 
1991). The previous studies of assessing the social costs and benefits have given little 
or no attention to this kind of impacts. That was probably because of the difficulties 
of quantifying the environmental effects, or sometimes the scheme being assessed 
thought to have little impacts on the environment. The current study approach 
stressing in the importance of incorporating the environmental impacts of rail schemes 
into the social appraisal framework, especially in a climate where road traffic is 
growing rapidly, leading to an accumulating damaging impacts on the environment. 
As has been shown in chapter one there are so many impacts on the environment 
caused by transport. The two main sources of environmental damage are air pollution 
and noise. The current study approach is considering these two main impacts. Noise 
and air pollution for both rail and road are quantified in order to measure how much 
benefits will a rail scheme bring to the community in terms of noise and air pollution 
reduction, and which should be incorporated in a social framework of appraisal. 
These are the four sources of benefits and costs that are considered and estimated 
under the current study approach. In fact a rail scheme might have some other sources 
of benefit such as development impacts. But this type of impacts probably does not 
reflect any real benefit to the society. This from the possibility that most of it is just a 
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transfers. Because of that and the factual difficulties of tracing this kind of transfers, it 
is not considered under the current study. 
6.3.4 The Precision of the Study Approach 
The current study appraisal approach is very precise in incorporating the social 
benefits of rail schemes into a social comprehensive framework. This Precision can be 
discussed under three main titles: 
6.3.4.1 Incorporating Externalities 
What is an externality? 
The question of what must be considered as an externality is not easy to answer. The 
answer depends on the level of aggregation employed (the extent to which the 
transport sector is to be broken down into sub-sectors when we attempt to define the 
cost liability of each action), and on where to draw the line between harmful and 
innocuous influence. In general, and as shown in chapter 1, an externality exists when 
an individual, firm, or a body through his action causes benefit or dis-benefit to 
another individual, firm, or body without taking these effects (benefits or dis-benefits) 
of his behaviour into account in his decision of making the action. 
Why incorporate externalities? 
If the pricing system throughout the transport sector is capable of making users pay 
the true costs of their trips, thus all the externalities are internalised, and the 
distortions caused by them will diminish. But, if this internalisation process is not 
applied or partly applied, in this case externalities have to be accounted for when 
considering the assessment of investment in the transport sector services. Looking at 
externalities as either resource cost used (external costs), or resource cost saved or 
released (external benefits). By incorporating externalities in the investment 
assessment process, we are correcting for the use of the resource costs. Taking the 
resource cost saved or released as a benefit to the scheme and considering the resource 
cost used as a cost to the scheme. To elaborate in this, when a rail scheme, for 
example, attracts some road users off the road, this will probably imply a resource 
cost saved or released equal to the amount of external costs caused by those who 
moved to use rail instead of road (movers), in terms of congestion time saved, noise 
103 
and air pollution reduction on the road. On the other hand, those movers may cause 
some external costs on their trips by rail, would not have been caused had they not 
moved, which will imply some use of a resource cost, in terms of extra rail noise and 
air pollution as a result of those new users of the rail services. 
When assessing investment on a social grounds, the question of external impacts of 
projects is a very important one, and has to be brought in. As has been discussed in 
the previous chapters, transport sector investments have many external impacts. This 
externalities have really to be considered at the margin if a comprehensive social 
approach is to be used. It is the current study approach that brings this external 
impacts at the margin into the appraisal framework. This is found to be relevant when 
measuring congestion time benefits, noise and air pollution. A rail scheme that leads 
to a passenger km or vehicle km to be transferred from road to rail will bring a social 
benefits equal to marginal time cost saved as a result of this transfer and would have 
been imposed on other road users if this transfer had not happen. This is really what 
should be incorporated in the social appraisal framework, and what is measured under 
the study approach. 
Environmental impacts is the second kind of externalities which is included under the 
study approach. Noise and air pollution benefits are estimated for road and rail at the 
margin. 
6.3.4.2 Disaggregation by Road Types 
The amount of benefits a rail scheme brings through attracting users off the road, is a 
function of many factors. Beside the type of the investment on the railways being 
developed (replacement, pure expansion, etc. ), the alternative road characteristics will 
share into determining the magnitude of the benefits. It is the intention of the study to 
disaggregate the benefits gained from rail schemes-in terms of impacts on remaining 
road users- by road types. The types of roads disaggregated by are: 
1. Motorways 
2. Major Urban Central Roads 
3. Major Urban Non-central Roads 
4. Rural Dual Carriageway Roads 
5. Rural Single Carriageway Roads 
104 
6. Minor Urban Central Roads 
7. Minor Urban Non-central Roads 
8. Minor Rural Single Roads 
Considering the alternative road type is very essential since it will allow the 
framework appraisal to be a universal one, that can be applied straightforwardly, once 
the road alternative is assigned. Also it will be valid for a large majority of rail 
schemes, since a range of road types is considered. 
6.3.4.3 Incorporation of Traffic Variations 
Beside allowing for different types, the current study approach is trying to measure 
the scheme benefits as precise as possible by incorporating the real variations of 
traffic flows on the British roads and the variations of the traffic over time and place. 
In reality for each type of roads listed above, traffic will vary from time to time and 
from place to another. Instead of basing the measurements of the benefits on some 
average hourly traffic flows, the current study approach allows for the following 
variations in traffic to be incorporated in measuring the benefits: 
1. Traffic variations during the day (24 hours variations) 
2. Traffic variations during the week (7 days variations) 
3. Traffic variations during the year (12 months variations) 
4. Traffic variations from place to another on the network, a sample distribution of 
22-24 sites on the traffic distribution on the network is used. 
The allowance of the traffic variations in the measurement process brings greater 
precision into the measured benefits which makes the framework of appraisal very 
precise. Traffic variations are incorporated in measuring congestion time benefits, 
vehicle operating cost benefits (misperception), and noise benefits. The method of 
measurements will be explained in detail in the relevant chapters in the rest of the 
thesis. 
6.3.5 The Accuracy of the Study Approach 
One of the main features of the study approach is the accuracy of measuring the 
benefits of investments. If benefits or costs mismeasured or measured inaccurately 
while assessing scheme benefits, the resulting decisions may be wrong and then will 
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lead to an undesirable implications. So it is vital to consider the matter of accuracy in 
developing an appraisal framework such that suggested by this study. In the previous 
studies such as discussed in chapter 5, the issue of perception were not considered. 
What is important here is to stress the vitality of this issue especially when assessing 
schemes on a social basis. Transport has so many examples where misperception can 
occur. Travellers may misperceive some costs of their trips, such as some vehicle 
operating cost items. The reasons of misperception were discussed in previous 
chapters. This misperception creates an area of distortions if it is not corrected for. 
The approach of the current study takes care of and incorporates the misperceived 
costs into the appraisal framework. This is found to be relevant in assessing vehicle 
operating cost and accident benefits. 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter is devoted to demonstrate the approach of the study in incorporating non- 
user benefits of rail schemes and how this approach fits within the social appraisal 
framework. Non-user benefits concerned and measured are congestion time benefits, 
noise, air pollution, accidents and vehicle operating costs. The first three are 
considered to be externalities (either external benefits or costs to rail scheme), while 
the last two are dealt with as a case of cost misperception. The chapter shows the 
main stages of incorporating these benefits within a social appraisal framework and 
the expected results from the analysis. The details of the simulation and calculation 
process as well as the exact results of the analysis are all given in the future relevant 
chapters. A specified chapter is given to each type of the concerned non-user benefits. 
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Chapter 7 
Externalities (Road Congestion Time Benefits): Methodology 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the study approach of incorporating the non-user 
benefits of rail schemes into a social appraisal framework. The types of non-user 
benefits to be incorporated were defined to be either externalities, (congestion, noise 
and air pollution), or cost misperception cases, (accidents and vehicle operating 
costs). The methods of measuring these benefits and the results of measurement, as 
mentioned in chapter 6, are detailed and discussed in this chapter and the chapters that 
follow. 
This chapter and the chapter that follow are concerned with the first and perhaps the 
most crucial type of non-user benefits. This is the road congestion time benefits. It is 
crucial due to the fact that it touches the daily life of everybody in the society, either 
directly, or indirectly. The direct impacts of congestion on roads, are delays for 
motorists and travellers as well as goods, stress and annoyance to drivers and 
travellers. The indirect impacts, are due to the interaction between congestion and 
other environmentally damaging effects, such as noise and air pollution, as well as the 
interaction with accidents. 
Time is one of the main resources in a society and probably the most valuable 
resource a person has. Hence any time wasted presents a waste of the well-being of 
individuals as well as the society at large. A policy that rationalises the use of time 
through minimising the time wasted will of course benefit and improve the well-being 
of individuals involved and the society as a whole. This means that it is essential to 
incorporate the time external costs of road congestion into the assessment process of 
the alternative public transport investment, and to measure this externality as 
accurately and precisely as possible. 
The incorporation of the time externality rationalises the use of a very important 
resource (time), and will help in rationalising the use of investment resources, by 
directing the investment towards the efficient and most beneficial use. It follows, that 
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any misestimation of time externality will distort and confuse the results of the 
assessment process, and then will distort the investment decision. 
This chapter is concerned with outlining and explaining the methodology and steps of 
the process of measuring the congestion time cost externality for the UK road 
network. 
The chapter starts, in section 7.2 by showing how time externality happens due to the 
interaction between drivers on the road when congestion builds up. Then section 7.3 
identifies the main determinants of this type of externality and section 7.4 explains 
how time externality is derived mathematically. After that, section 7.5 details the 
method used for measuring congestion time externality for British road network. 
7.2 Road Congestion and Time Externality 
7.2.1 Introduction to Traffic Congestion 
The demand for transport is not constant over time. Transport infrastructure, although 
flexible in the long run, has a finite capacity at any given period of time. When users 
of a particular facility begin to interfere with other users due to the capacity of the 
infrastructure being limited, then congestion externalities arise. Of course, some 
degree of congestion is almost unavoidable if transport facilities are not to stand idle 
most of the time, but the question is how much congestion is desirable. Since people 
accept some level of congestion but resent excessive congestion, because of the time 
and inconvenience costs imposed, there is some implied notion of an optimal degree 
of congestion. 
It is worth adding, that congestion does not only impose costs on the road user in 
terms of time wasted and fuel, the pure congestion costs, but the stopping and starting 
it entails can also worsen atmospheric and other forms of pollution. The problem is 
very acute for local forms of pollution because road traffic congestion, tends to be 
focused in areas where people work and live. 
7.2.2 Interaction Between Road users and Congestion Time Externality 
Neglecting the issues of air pollution and noise damage, etc. for the time being, the 
costs of making a trip on a road have three elements: 
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1. first, is the user's own costs of using the uncongested road (time, fuel, other 
operating costs, risk etc. ) 
2. second, the congestion cost faced by the marginal user of the road (this increases 
with the flow of traffic due to slower journey times) 
3. third, the congestion costs imposed by the marginal road user on other users of the 
road. 
When a road user decides to make a trip on a road, he only considers the first two 
types of costs in his decision of travel as the costs of his trip. In other words, any 
individual user entering the road will only consider the costs he personally bears, he 
will, in most circumstances, either be unaware of or unwilling to consider the 
additional congestion costs he imposes on the other road users. Consequently, the 
individual motorist will only consider the average costs experienced by road users and 
will take no account of the congestion impact of his trip on other vehicles. 
Bearing in mind that, externalities exist when the activities of one group affect the 
welfare of another group without any payment or compensation being made, this 
congestion impact of a road user on the rest of road users is a clear obvious example 
of an externality, that is caused by the interaction between road users and the interfere 
with each other. 
Figure 7.1 shows a graphical demonstration of congestion time externality. DD is the 
demand curve for travel by road, representing different travel demands for different 
levels of generalised cost of travel. The curve MPC, represents the marginal private 
cost curve - that is, the additional cost (time and money costs) borne and perceived by 
the new trip-maker alone. While MSC, represents the marginal social cost for the new 
trip-maker and existing road users of an addition to the traffic flow. The difference 
between MPC and MSC curves at any traffic flow reflects the external congestion 
time cost at that flow. In other words, it is equal to the value of time imposed by the 
marginal trip-maker on the rest of users, and that is not included in his perceived cost 
of the trip. 
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Figure 7.1 External congestion time cost 
Referring to figure 7.1, in the absence of congestion tolls, and because trip-makers 
ignore the congestion that they impose on others, the actual traffic flow level is expected 
to be OQ1, this is the level where the marginal private cost for motorists is equal to the 
marginal benefits they derive from the trip (as presented by demand curve). While, the 
optimal flow level is OQ2, that is the flow level in which the marginal social cost of an 
additional trip will be equal to the marginal benefit of the trip. Limiting traffic flow to the 
optimal level (point C on the graph) will avoid an area of dead-weight loss CAB, as a 
result of excessive traffic congestion. This can only be achieved by designing a toll or tax 
system that matches exactly and make over the difference between the costs trip-maker 
considers and the total actual costs he really cause when making a trip. Put differently, 
the toll has to be exactly equal to the marginal congestion time external cost, otherwise it 
will be distorting to the whole system. That brings home, the essential and crucial need 
to measure the marginal external congestion time cost very accurately, and precisely. 
7.3 Determinants of Marginal Congestion Time Externality 
As explained above congestion time externality happens as a result of road users 
interfering with each other because of the capacity of road is limited. It follows that the 
key factor is the flow of traffic in relation to the capacity of the road. For uncongested 
roads, one expects to find marginal private and social costs of trips are equal, while on a 
built-up road the magnitude of congestion time external cost will be vital. So if the key 
factor is traffic flow (presents the demand side) in relation to capacity of the road 
(presents the supply side) the characteristics of both supply and demand will in turn be 
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the main determinants of the congestion time externality. The following figure 
demonstrates these determinants. 
Coneestion time externality determinants 
Traffic flows (demand) in relation of road capacity (supply) 
demand II supply 
characteristics characteristics 
relationship defines value placed on 
travel speed for a given the congestion 
demand and supply impact 
traffic road type 
variation over 
time and place 
speed - flow II value of time 
relationship 
Figure 7.2 Determinants of congestion time externality 
7.3.1 Time Variation 
Traffic flows on a road are subject to variations throughout the day, (peak, off peak, 
day time off peak, night time travel), reflecting different travel demands from time to 
another during the day. Variation of traffic flows also exists throughout the week and 
the year, reflecting travel demand variations from day to another or from month to 
another throughout the year. These variations with time will in general depend upon 
the social structure of the society as a whole and the characteristics of travel demands. 
It follows, for a given road, congestion time externality will vary with the variation 
on the flow levels, probably from hour to another throughout the day, and from day 
to another throughout the week as well as from one month to another in a year. This 
is a very important determinant to the congestion time externality, and that has to be 
handled carefully and taken account of when measuring this type of externality. 
The study approach as will be explained latter in this chapter, has taken account of 
these variations, which are deemed to have a significant impact on the results as will 
be seen latter. 
7.3.2 Road Type 
Beside the variations on traffic over time, the type of the road concerned will play a 
very important role into the measurement of congestion time cost externality. Traffic 
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flows on a rural single road will differ from that on a built-up road. The flows on the 
latter will vary from one place to another, central or non-central. In addition, the road 
type and characteristics will have some important implications on the travel speed for 
a given traffic flow. This in turn will affect the magnitude and the extent of 
congestion time externality. 
Again the approach of the study has considered this issue of road type through the 
measurement of congestion time externality. A broad range of road types has been 
selected, as shown in the previous chapter. 
7.3.3 Speed flow Relationship 
Since congestion time externality, indicates the value of time imposed on the trip- 
makers by an additional trip-maker, who does not consider this impact in his decision 
of making a trip, the relationship between traffic flows and speed will determine the 
ultimate congestion impact of a given flow of traffic on a given type of road. The 
shape of the speed-flow relationship is a key factor. 
The approach of this study, as explained in details latter, has based the calculations of 
Marginal Congestion Time Externality (MCTE) on a mix of speed-flow relationships 
that are found to be most suitable for the road types concerned. 
7.3.4 Value of Time 
This is a very important determinant of MCTE, since a value has to be placed on the 
extra time imposed on road users as a result of congestion. The value of time in turn 
is, to some extent, a function of the type of the journey made, whether it is a work 
trip, shopping trip or a leisure trip. The value of time used by the study approach are 
those used by COBA in assessing road schemes. A discussion will be made latter on 
in this chapter about the importance of the value of time and the possibilities of using 
different values of time in order to have more precise and accurate results. 
7.4 Derivation of Congestion Time Cost Externality 
The standard method of estimating the marginal congestion time externality (MCTE) 
of an extra vehicle in the traffic stream is as follows: 
First, a relationship between travel speed (km/h) and traffic flow (pcu/hr) where pcu 
are passenger car units has to be defined. Then second to estimate the congestion 
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impact of different types of vehicles in different circumstances. This is shown as 
follows: 
If the time cost of travel per km for a representative vehicle is expressed by the 
following relationship: 
c=s (7.1) 
where: 
C= time cost per vehicle km (h/pcu km) 
S= travel speed (km/h) 
The total time cost of a flow of vehicles (q) per hour on the road will be: 
TC=Cq (7.2) 
Where: 
TC = total time cost for a flow of vehicles per kilometre 
When an additional vehicle is added to the flow, the total social time cost is increased as 
follows: 
= C+q (7.3) Al 64 
Where: 
3TC/öq = is the increase in the total social time cost as a result of the additional vehicle 
that joined the flow. 
The first term in equation 7.3 (C) is the private time cost borne by the additional vehicle 
itself. The second part is the extra time cost borne by other road users as a result of the 
additional vehicle, and this is the Marginal Congestion Time Externality (MCTE). From 
equation 7.3, 
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MCTE=q 
Where: 
MCTE = marginal congestion time externality (h/pcu km) 
(7.4) 
If v is the value of time (£/pcu hour), equation 7.4 can be used to identify the value of 
MCTE as follows: 
MOTE' = vq (7.5) 
Oýq 
Where: 
MCTE* = marginal congestion time cost externality (£/pcu km) 
MCTE and MCTE* will be measured for the UK road network. The measurement 
process will incorporate traffic flow variations over time (daily, weekly, and yearly 
variations) and the location variations in traffic on the road network. The following 
sections detail the method of measurement while the results are shown in the next 
chapter. 
7.5 Methodology of Measuring Marginal Time Externality 
7.5.1 Methodology Framework 
The framework of the methodology used to measure the marginal congestion time 
externality for each type of road for the UK road network is demonstrated in figure 7.3. 
The following sections explain the work steps in details. 
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Road Network 
Motorways Major Built - up roads Major Non-built up roads Minor roads 
I& 4r -4 Central Non- Single Dual Central non-central Single 
roads central carriageways carriageways minor minor minor 
JL- Traffic distributions for each road Annual Length of type flows of 
road types 1. Hourly distribution traffic for 
2. Daily distribution each road 
3. Seasonally distribution type 
4. Location distribution 
Average number of lanes for each road type 
Hourly flow of traffic per lane for each road type, for each hour 
of day, for each day of the week, for each month of the year, for 
each location point on the road network 
Relevant 
speed-flow 
relationship 
Average speed for each road type, for each hour of day, 
for each day of the week, for each month of the year, for 
each location point on the road network 
Marginal congestion time externality for each road type, for each 
hour of day, for each day of the week, for each month of the year, 
for each location point on the road network 
Average marginal congestion time externality for each road type 
weighted by traffic flows and composition 
Values of time per 
vehicle hour for Average marginal congestion time cost Proportions of 
each type of externality for each road type weighted by vehicle types in the 
vehicles traffic flows and composition traffic flow 
Figure 7.3 Methodology framework of measuring time cost externality 
odels Data Out ut 
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7.5.2 Steps of the Process 
The following sections explain the steps of the process, containing all the assumptions 
made, the sources of data and other required information, mathematical models and 
relationships used, and the calculations made, in a story line along with figure 7.3 
showing how the marginal congestion time externality is measured for the UK road 
network. 
7.5.2.1 Step One: Road Types 
Traffic flows and length statistics for the UK road network are broken down for the 
following road classes (DTp, 1993): 
1. Motorways 
2. Major built-up roads : identified as all of those with a speed limit of 40 mile 
per hour or less (irrespective of whether there are buildings or not) 
3. Major non-built up roads : identified as all roads with speed limit in excess of 
40 mile per hour 
4. All minor roads: identified as B, C and unclassified roads 
Q For the purpose of the study, and in order to measure congestion time cost 
externality for a broader range of road types, major built-up roads are broken 
down into: 
1. Major urban central roads : major roads in central areas where central areas are 
defined as those including the main shops, offices and central rail stations, with 
high density of land used and frequent multi-story developments. 
2. Major urban non-central roads : comprise roads in the remainder of the urban 
areas. 
Q Major non-built up roads are broken down to: 
1. Single carriageway roads 
2. Dual carriageway roads 
Q Minor roads are divided into three types: 
1. Minor urban central roads : B, C, and unclassified roads in central urban areas. 
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2. Minor urban non-central roads : B, C, and unclassified roads in the remainder of 
the urban areas. 
3. Minor rural single roads : B, C, and unclassified roads in rural areas. 
This process gives 8 types of road which represent the entire road network, and for 
which congestion time externality is measured. 
7.5.2.2 Step Two: Road Traffic and Length Data 
Annual traffic flows (billion vehicle kilometres) and road length are given as 
mentioned above (DTp 1993) for the four broad types of roads (motorways, major 
built-up, major non-built up, and minor roads). On the basis mentioned in step one 
above, the traffic and length data are adapted to the 8 types of road as follows: 
1. Motorways: as mentioned above traffic and length data are given separately for 
motorways. 
2. Major built-up roads 
Total vehicle kilometre travelled (VKT) and length of major built-up roads are split 
between major urban central and non-central roads. Central urban roads are assumed 
to accommodate for 20% of VKT, and the rest 80% is on non-central roads. Based on 
information from COBA, central roads account for 11 % of the total length of built-up 
roads, this figure is used by the study to split the total length of built-up roads 
between central and non-central urban roads. 
3. Major non-built-up roads 
Traffic and length statistics are given for this types of roads in total and split into 
trunk and principal roads. Some additional information obtained from the Department 
of Transport suggested the following: 
a) 30% of trunk roads are single carriageways and the rest is dual carriageways. 
b) 80% of principle roads are single carriageways and the rest is dual carriageways. 
Based on this information, traffic and length data are split between single and dual 
carriageways and used to measure the marginal congestion time externality for these 
two types of roads. 
4. Minor roads 
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Traffic data are given as a total for all minor roads together. Some assumptions have 
to be made for splitting the traffic between the three types of minor roads identified 
by the study above. Minor urban central roads are assumed to accommodate for 10% 
of all minor road traffic. The rest is split between minor urban non-central and minor 
rural single roads as 60 and 30% respectively. 
Road length data for the three types of minor roads are given in the Department of 
Transport Statistics (DTp, 1992). About 55% of minor roads are rural and the rest is 
in built-up areas, 5% of which is in central urban areas and the rest 40 % is in urban 
non-central areas. 
7.5.2.3 Step Three: Traffic Distributions 
In order to measure the marginal time externality, the variations of traffic flows are 
incorporated, so the ultimate results can be based on the actual traffic streams on the 
roads. Four traffic distributions are incorporated. These are: 
a) Traffic distribution by month, giving the seasonal variation throughout the year 
(12 month variations). 
b) Traffic distribution by day of week, giving the daily variations in the traffic 
(Monday to Sunday variations). 
c) Traffic distribution by time of day, indicating the hourly variations of traffic 
flows (24 hour variations). 
d) Traffic distribution by location on the road network, placing a picture of the 
variations of the traffic flows from place to another on the road network. 
The first three distributions (seasonally, daily, and hourly) are found to be broken 
down by different road classes for all motor vehicles in the Department of Transport 
Statistics (DTp, 1993,1994a). The distributions are set in the form of indices 
reflecting the variations of traffic flows from month to another throughout the year, 
from day to another throughout the week, and hour to hour variations throughout the 
day. The indices are set relative to the average monthly, daily and hourly traffic 
flows. These indices are used in the calculations of the hourly per lane flows of traffic 
and then the corresponding speeds and MCTE and MCTE . 
Traffic distribution by location on the road network 
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In the Department of Transport statistics, the distribution of traffic flows by location 
on the road network is not given in the same form as the first three distributions 
mentioned above . As shown in table 7.1, the distribution of all motor vehicle flow by 
road class is given as a percentage of sites counted for each range of average daily 
flow of vehicles (DTp, 1993). 
This distribution is used to generate a location distribution of traffic flows in a form 
of indices indicating the variations of traffic flows from one point to another relative 
to the average point in the road network. The generated indices would give a picture 
of the variations of traffic flows over the entire network, and then would be consistent 
with the other three distributions of traffic (seasonally, daily, hourly). 
Table 7.1 Distribution of all motor vehicle flow by road class 
Percentage of sites counted 
Range of average 
daily flow of 
vehicles 
Motorways Major built-up 
roads 
Major non-built-up 
roads 
Minor roads 
0-499 0 0.25 2 37 
500-999 0 0.25 3 14 
1000-2499 0.5 1 9 18 
2500-4999 0.5 4 15 14 
5000-7499 0.5 6 14 7 
7500-9999 0.5 9 12 4 
10000-24999 13 58 33 5 
25000-49999 36 19 11 1 
50000-74999 28 2 1 0 
75000-99999 13 0.25 0 0 
100000-124999 5 0.25 0 0 
125000 or more 3 0 0 0 
all ranges 100 100 100 100 
Source: Department of Transport 1993 
The process of generating the location distribution of traffic flows is as follows: 
1. The percentage of sites counted for each range of traffic flows in table 7.1 are 
accumulated as shown in table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2 Accumulated nercentage of sites counted by road class 
Percentage of sites counted accumulated by range of vehicle flow 
Range of average 
daily flow of 
vehicles 
Motorways Major built-up 
roads 
Major non-built-up 
roads 
Minor roads 
0-499 0 0.25 2 37 
0-999 0 0.5 5 51 
0-2499 0.5 1.5 14 69 
0-4999 1 5.5 29 83 
0-7499 1.5 11.5 43 90 
0-9999 2 20.5 55 94 
0-24999 15 78.5 88 99 
0-49999 51 97.5 99 100 
0-74999 79 99.5 100 
0-99999 92 99.75 
0-124999 97 100 
0-125000 or more 100 
This table is derived from table 7.1 
2. The accumulated percentage of sites counted are replaced by a number of points 
representing each percentage counted for each range of daily flow of traffic. For 
example, for motorways, table 7.2 shows that 15% of the sites counted for the range of 0 
to 24999 vehicles per day. This is represented by 3 points out of 20 point representing 
the 100% of sites counted for motorways. On the same basis, this process is carried out 
for all types of roads giving the representative distribution in table 7.3 and graphically in 
figure 7.4. 
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Table 7.3 Adjusted Location distribution for traffic flows 
location Vehicles/day Index 
Averse location point = 100 
Point on 
the 
network 
Motorwa 
ys 
built up 
Roads 
Non-built 
up roads 
Minor 
roads 
Motorways built up 
Roads 
Non-built up 
roads 
Minor roads 
1 10576.9 2656.3 583.3 33.8 19.5 12.5 4.6 1.2 
2 16346.2 5208.3 1333.3 94.6 30.1 24.4 10.4 3.4 
3 22115.4 6979.2 2083.3 155.4 40.7 32.8 16.3 5.6 
4 26736.1 8333.3 2833.3 216.2 49.2 39.1 22.2 7.8 
5 30208.3 9513.9 3583.3 277.0 55.6 44.7 28.0 10.0 
6 33680.6 10646.6 4333.3 337.8 62.0 50.0 33.9 12.1 
7 37152.8 11745.7 5089.3 398.6 68.3 55.1 39.8 14.3 
8 40625.0 12844.8 5892.9 459.5 74.7 60.3 46.1 16.5 
9 44097.2 13944.0 6696.4 553.6 81.1 65.4 52.4 19.9 
10 47569.4 15043.1 7500.0 714.3 87.5 70.6 58.6 25.7 
11 51339.3 16142.2 8437.5 875.0 94.4 75.8 66.0 31.5 
12 55803.6 17241.4 9375.0 1083.3 102.7 80.9 73.3 39.0 
13 60267.9 18340.5 10681.8 1458.3 110.9 86.1 83.5 52.4 
14 64732.1 19439.7 12727.3 1833.3 119.1 91.2 99.5 65.9 
15 69196.4 20538.8 14772.7 2208.3 127.3 96.4 115.5 79.4 
16 73660.7 21637.9 16818.2 2678.6 135.5 101.6 131.5 96.3 
17 81730.8 22737.1 18863.6 3482.1 150.4 106.7 147.5 125.2 
18 91346.2 23836.2 21136.4 4285.7 168.0 111.9 165.3 154.1 
19 102500 24935.3 22954.5 5178.6 188.6 117.0 179.5 186.2 
20 127500 30263.2 25000.0 6785.7 234.6 142.0 195.5 244.0 
21 35855.3 35227.3 9062.5 168.3 275.4 325.9 
22 41447.4 45454.5 19000.0 194.5 355.4 683.3 
23 47039.5 220.8 
24 75000.0 352.0 
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Figure 7.4 Distribution of all motor vehicle traffic flow by road class 
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These four distributions, give an illustration of traffic flows on the road network and are 
incorporated in the process of measuring the marginal congestion time externality. 
7.5.2.4 Step Four: Number of Lanes by Road Type 
In order to make traffic flows suitable for the speed-flow relationships used in the 
methodology of measuring MCTE and MCTE*, flows have to be measured per hour per 
lane. So some assumptions are made about the average number of lanes for each road 
type of the 8 types of the study. These assumptions are. 
Table 7.4 Assumptions of the average number of lanes for different roads 
Road type Average number of lanes assumed 
(two way) 
1. Motorways 5 
2. Major central urban roads 3.5 
3. Major non-central urban roads 3.5 
4. Single carriageway roads 2 
5. Dual carriageway roads 4 
6. Minor central urban roads 2 
7. Minor non-central urban roads 2 
8. Minor single rural roads 2 
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The number of lanes assumed indicates the total two way lanes of the road concerned. 
In fact these averages were based on some underlying assumptions of the possibilities 
of the number of lanes for each type of road. For example, for motorways it is 
assumed that 50% of the motorways network are 4 lanes (both ways), and the other 
50% are 6 lanes (both ways). This assumption leads to an average of 5 lanes for the 
motorway network. By the same manner, 75% of the built-up road network is 
assumed to be 4 lanes, and the rest is 2 lanes (both ways). This will give an average 
of 3.5 lanes. This applies for both built-up central and non-central roads. Single 
carriageways are given the assumption of 2 lanes and dual carriageways are assumed 
to have an average of 4 lanes both ways. Minor roads are assumed to be 2 lane. 
These assumptions are based on some knowledge of the UK road network, and some 
information supplied by the Department of Transport. 
7.5.2.5 Step Five: Hourly Flow of Traffic 
The hourly flow of traffic is calculated for all types of roads as follows: 
gmdhl _ _VK 
Tr X I; " XIaX I" xr 
RL, x N, xH 
Where: 
(7.6) 
grn, ani = traffic flow per hour per lane for the corresponding road type r, for the 
corresponding month of year m, day of week d, hour of day h, location 
on the network I (pcu/ hour/lane) 
Irtm, Ird, Iih, Irl = indices of traffic distributions reflecting traffic flows for the 
corresponding road type r month m, day d, hour h and location 1 
relative to the average monthly, daily, hourly and location flows. 
RLT = road length, total length of the network for the corresponding road 
type r (kilometres). 
VKTr = annual vehicle kilometres travelled on the corresponding road type r 
(pcu kilometres) 
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Nr = average number of lanes assumed for the corresponding road type r 
(total both ways lanes). 
H= are number of hours per year (365 days x 24 hours). 
Equation 7.6 is used to calculate the hourly per lane traffic flow (pcu /h/lane) for each 
hour of day, for each day of week, for each month of the year and for each representative 
location point on the road network. This is done for all the 8 road types. 
7.5.2.6 Step Six: Speed- flow Relationship and Speed Calculations 
A) Speed-flow Relationship 
In traffic modelling and assignment, it is not travel speed which is of interest, but rather 
its use for measuring journey time and travel delays on road links. 
When modelling traffic congestion, one must be clear as what is needed, and what the 
proposed speed-flow relationship actually measures. Road users usually demand 
completed trips from origin to destination rather than the use of a particular stretch of 
road or link of road. Hence, speed-flow relationships should measure the average speed 
for a given trip from start to the end. However, most of the relationships developed by 
traffic engineers are for link speeds. 
The Department of Transport, in planning for road building and maintenance uses 
formulae based on studies carried out by the Transport and Road Research Laboratory 
(TRRL 1979a, 1979b, 1980a, 1980b, Duncan et al 1980, and Marlow 1978). 
The formulae are given in details in the Cost Benefit Analysis COBA manual (DTp, 
1981). COBA contains eight sets of speed-flow curves, including curves for rural, 
suburban, urban central and non-central roads. The general form of the formula is as 
follows: 
S=a-/3q (7.7) 
Where: 
S= speed (km/h) 
q= flow of vehicles per lane per hour (pcu/hr/3.65m lane) 
a, 0= constants. 
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The values of a depends on the geometric characteristics of the road (number of 
intersections, percentage of development, percentage of heavy vehicles, bendiness, sum 
of rises and falls per unit distance (m/km), etc. ). 
ß is the slope of the speed-flow curve and depends upon the road type and flows of 
traffic. For rural roads, the value of the slope ß is a function of the flows of traffic giving 
a steeper slope for the speed-flow curve beyond a certain traffic flow. 
In built-up areas, the road network become more dense and intersections play a more 
significant role in determining travel speeds compared with rural roads. COBA speed- 
flow formulas for urban roads make allowance for delays at junctions and intersections. 
However, the formula developed for rural roads do not incorporate junction delays. In 
general, therefore, junctions on rural roads are always modelled explicitly. 
Link capacities in COBA are set to be equal the highest levels of traffic flow per standard 
lane (3.65m) that have been observed when the speed-flow curves were developed. 
Speeds are allowed to continue drooping with increasing flows beyond capacities until a 
minimum speed is reached. The minimum speeds set in COBA are 45 km/h for 
motorways and other rural roads. For urban central and non-central the minimum speeds 
are 15 and 25 km/h respectively. 
With this constraint of minimum speed in COBA, the realism of the predicted speed 
might be questioned. Maintaining those minimum speeds does not allow for the 
occurrence of higher traffic flows. The occurrence of high and over capacity flows may 
be limited for rural roads and motorways. However, in case of urban roads, over capacity 
and high levels of traffic flows are more likely to occur. In such a case, the developed 
COBA speed-flow relationship might not be realistic in predicting the average travel 
speeds in urban areas. 
With a limit set in COBA on the effect of congestion by the assumption of minimum 
speed independent of demand when demand exceeds capacity, some other models have 
been developed to take account of demand in excess of capacity. These models assume 
that in the region of demand in excess of capacity, there is an additional delay that varies 
with the difference between flows and capacity. The most widely used relationship is the 
BPR (Bureau of Public Roads, 1964). The relationship is expressed in a form of a time 
cost/flow curve as follows (Thomas, 1991): 
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T=Tf 
(I+a(mq)b 
(7.8) 
Where: 
T= travel time (h/km) 
Tf = free flow travel time (h/km) 
q= traffic flow per standard lane per hour (pcu/h/lane) 
M= practical capacity (pcu/h/lane) 
a, b= constants with suggested values of 0.15 and 4 respectively. 
The time cost/flow curve of equation 7.8 is used to derive the speed-flow relationship, to 
give the following form: 
S° 
S= (7.9) 
l+a(q b 
M 
Where: 
S= average speed (km/h) 
S° = free flow speed, average speed when flow of traffic is equal zero (km/h) 
The formula allows flows to exceed capacity and measures the impacts on average 
speeds in the congested conditions. Hence it is more appropriate for predicting speeds on 
urban areas where congestion is more likely to occur. 
B) Speed Calculations 
1. Rural Roads 
Calculations of the speed for rural roads are based on the COBA (DTp, 1981) speed- 
flow relationship. The manual of the COBA program gives speed-flow relationships for 
different road classes in a straight line form, as shown in equation 7.7 above. Based on 
this formula, speeds are calculated for rural roads as follows: 
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Sr»x§71 =a _/rý 
mahl 
rr /'r 
ýr 
Where: 
S mdhl = r 
mdhl 
aar = 
R mdhl 
(7.10) 
average speed for rural road type r, in month in, on day d, at hour h, and for 
location point I (km/h) 
flow of vehicles per lane per hour for rural road type r, in month m, on day 
d, at hour h, and for location point I (pcu/h/3.65m lane) 
the value of the constant a for rural road type r 
the value of the speed flow slope for rural road type r, in month m, on day d, 
at hour h, and for location point I 
As can be seen, the terms a and ß will depend upon the type and characteristics of the 
road (number of intersections, percentage of development, percentage of heavy vehicles, 
bendiness, sum of rises and falls per unit distance (m/km), etc. ). In addition the value of 
the slope ß is a function of the hourly per lane traffic flow. 
Speed calculations are carried out for each type of rural road using this speed-flow 
relationship and the relevant values of the terms a and ß from the COBA manual, and 
based on the hourly per lane traffic flow calculated by equation 7.6. So speed (km/h) is 
calculated for each rural road type, for each hour of day, for each day of week, for each 
month of the year, and for each location on the road network. 
2. Urban Roads 
Speed calculations for urban roads are based on the speed-flow relationship from BPR 
that explained above and shown in equation 7.9. Using this formula and the hourly per 
lane flow measured in equation 7.6 above, speed is calculated for urban roads as follows: 
mdhl 
r 
S, ° 
mdhl 
+a( 
9" )b 
Mr 
(7.11) 
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Where: 
SrmdhI = speed for urban road type r, in month m, on day d, at hour h, and for 
location point 1 (km/h) 
Sr° = free flow speed for urban road type r 
Mr = capacity of urban road type r (pcu/h/lane) 
The values of Sr° and M1 are taken from COBA. The free flow speed for urban central 
and non-central roads are 35.5 and 50 km/h respectively. 
7.5.2.7 Step Seven: Marginal Congestion Time Externality 
Bearing in mind the method of deriving the marginal congestion time externality, as 
shown in section 7.4, and with the speed-flow relationships used by the study for rural 
and urban roads, as shown above by equation 7.7 and 7.9, marginal congestion time 
externality is measured as follows: 
1. Rural Roads 
MCTEr'd`'` 
and/il 
q 
and/il 
= 
ßr 
r 
(Smdht l2 
lr1 
(7.12) 
Where: 
MCTEr°'dhl = marginal congestion time externality (h/pcu km), reflecting the time 
imposed on road users as a result of an extra pcu km joining the road 
for rural road type r, in month m, on day d, at hour h, and for location 
point 1. 
Basing on the values of traffic flows per hour per lane (q) and speed (S) that are 
calculated by equation 7.6 and 7.10, and using the COBA relevant values for ß, equation 
7.12 is used to measure the marginal congestion time externality for different rural road 
types, in each hour of day, for each day of week, for each month of the year and for each 
location point on the network. As mentioned before, the value of speed- flow slope 0, is 
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a function of the traffic flows. In other words, ß has different values for different traffic 
flow levels. This has been incorporated into the calculation process. 
2. Urban Roads 
Based on the speed-flow formula used by the study for urban roads, the marginal 
congestion time externality is measured as follows: 
d'hl 
b 
MCTE = 
ab qr 
r SO Mr (7.13) 
Where: 
MCTErmdhi = marginal congestion time externality (h/pcu km), reflecting the time 
imposed on road users as a result of an extra pcu km joining the road 
for urban road type r, in month m, on day d, at hour h, and for 
location point 1. 
Basing on the values of traffic flows per hour per lane (q) that are calculated by 
equation 7.6 , and using the values 
for a and b, equation 7.13 is used to measure the 
marginal congestion time externality for different urban road types, in each hour of 
day, for each day of week, for each month of the year and for each location point on 
the network. 
7.5.2.8 Step Eight: Average Weighted Marginal Time Externality 
For each road type, the intention is to produce a value for the marginal congestion 
time externality that reflects and incorporates the variations in traffic (seasonally 
throughout the year, daily throughout the week, hour to hour during the day, and the 
distribution throughout the entire network), and incorporates road type characteristics. 
This is done by the average weighted value of marginal congestion time externality 
That is calculated as follows: 
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12 7 24 L 
MCTE mdh! x qmdhl xS mdhl rrr 
AA('T)7 - m=1 
d=1 h=1 L=1 
12 7 24 L 
cr mdhl 
7.14) 
q mdhl x 'J 
m=1 d=1 h=1 L=1 
Where: 
MCTEr = average weighted marginal congestion time externality for road type r 
(h/pcu km). 
Equation 7.14, gives the average extra time that is imposed on road users as a result of a 
pcu km joining the road for each road type, weighted by the vehicle kilometre travelled 
at each hour of the day, each day of the week, each month of the year and each location 
point on the network. This can be translated into money using the value of time as shown 
in the following step. 
7.5.2.9 Step Nine: Marginal Congestion Time Cost Externality 
In this step, the value of the time externality measured by equation 7.14 (MCTEr) is 
translated into money by using the value of time for each type of vehicles and the 
proportions of each vehicle type in the total traffic flow. The values of time that are used 
for appraising road investment schemes and included in the COBA manual are used in 
this study. The resource values of time for 1988 were as shown in table 7.5. 
Table 7.5 Values of time for 1988 and 1993 prices and values 
Vehicle type Pence per hour 
1988 values' Updated values for 1993 
1. Average car 468.80 629.07 
2. Light goods vehicles 859.00 1152.66 
3. Other goods vehicles 622.50 835.31 
4. Passenger service vehicle 3213.70 4312.35 
1. COBA values (Department of Transport, 1981) 
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The COBA values of time are updated for 1993 prices and values based on the change in 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is found to have increased by 2% 
approximately from 1988 to 1993 and the retail price index, which showed an increase of 
31.5% approximately in prices during the period 1988-1993. This update gives the 
values shown in table 7.5 for 1993 values and prices, which are used for transforming 
the time externality into money using the values of times for 1993 as follows: 
MCTEr = MCTEr (Cr T, + Lr x TLGv + or X TOGv + Pr X TPSV) (7.15) 
Where: 
MCTEr* = average marginal congestion time cost externality for road 
type r (£/pcu km). 
Cr, Lr, Or, Pr = proportions of cars, light goods vehicles, other goods 
vehicles, and passenger service vehicles for road type r. 
Tc, TLGV, To0V, Tpsv = values of time for the four types of vehicles respectively 
(£/vehicle hour). 
7.5.2.10 Step Ten: Average Weighted Travel Speed by Road Class 
For each road class, a value for travel speed that reflects the variations in traffic flows 
and incorporates road type characteristics is produced. This is carried out by 
estimating the weighted average speed that is weighted by the vehicle kilometre 
travelled at each hour of day, each day of week, each month of the year, and each 
location point on the network of roads. Equation 7.16 shows the calculation process. 
12 7 24 1 
ýmcßtl `Sr" x r 
nr-1 d=1 11=1 1=1 Sr 
- 12 7 24 1 
ý 
qrufhl 
ni=l d=1 h=1 1=1 
Where: 
(7.16) 
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Sr = average weighted speed of travel for road type r (km/h) 
7.5.2.11 Step Eleven: Calculation and Measurement Process 
A computer program has been developed to carry out the burden of the calculations 
process. A flowchart showing the structure and how the steps of the work (1 to 10) 
are incorporated and undertaken by the program as well as a copy of the program 
itself are given in appendix 1. 
7.5.2.12 Step Twelve : Distribution of Congestion Time Cost 
To elaborate more, in addition to measuring the marginal congestion time cost 
externality for each road type, the aim is to create a distribution demonstrating the 
percentage of vehicle kilometre travelled on the road network for each category of 
congestion time cost. This is to give a clear picture of the magnitude of congestion 
time cost for different road types. The results are shown in the next chapter. 
7.5.2.13 Step Thirteen: Speed Distribution 
For more elaboration, a distribution for speed for each road type is given. The 
distribution gives a picture of different speed level categories and the proportions of 
vehicles travelled at each speed category. This is carried out by the program and the 
resultant distribution is discussed latter in the next chapter. 
7.5.2.14 Step Fourteen: Congestion Time Cost and Speed Forecasts 
This methodology process is used to predict the congestion time cost and speed in the 
future years. This is carried out by feeding the projected traffic flows form the 
Department of Transport National Road Traffic Forecasts (DTp, 1993), to the 
program using the same methodology outlined above to have an estimation of the 
marginal time externality and speed for future years. In this context, road network 
length did not change. One may argue that road network may be extended in the 
corresponding future years. Although, the projection of road building and the road 
building plan are usually announced in advance, the actual achievement may differ 
significantly from the plans, which may makes it difficult to have a presumption of 
the growth of the network of roads. 
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7.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter details the methodology adapted for measuring the marginal congestion 
time cost for British road network, which in turn may reflect the congestion time 
benefits of rail investment schemes. It shows how the breakdown of road types are 
selected and how traffic and length data are adapted for the selected road types. The 
real variations in traffic flows (hourly, daily, seasonally, and location) are 
incorporated so that a precise and accurate measurement of congestion time cost for 
different road types is carried out. The chapter shows how these distributions are 
incorporated and the adjustments carried out for the location distribution to be 
consistent with the other three distributions of traffic. 
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Chapter 8 
Externalities (Road Congestion Time Benefits): Results 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explained the method used for estimating the congestion time 
externality for the UK road network. This chapter presents and discusses the results of 
the measurement. 
8.2 Marginal Congestion Time Externality by Road and Vehicle Type 
8.2.1 The Study Results 
A) Marginal Congestion Time Cost by Road Type 
Table 8.1 and figure 8.2 show the results of the measurement process for marginal 
congestion time cost. As can be seen, urban roads in the central areas are causing the 
highest congestion time cost, on average a time cost of 27.3 pence approximately is 
imposed on other road users for each personal car unit kilometre (pcu km) joining a 
central urban road. On the other hand, dual carriageway roads proved to have the 
lowest marginal time externality, only 0.19 pence for each pcu km. Other types of 
roads ranged from 0.32 pence per pcu km for minor single roads in rural areas to 7.5 
pence per pcu km for minor urban central road. The average weighted marginal 
congestion cost for all roads is approximately 3 pence per pcu km. This average is 
weighted by the percentage of pcu km travelled on each road type shown in column 4 
table 8.1. If this average is multiplied by the total pcu km travelled for 1993, (441.36 
billions pcu km), this will give a total congestion cost of £13.44 billions 
approximately. 
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Table 8.1 Marginal congestion time cost externality for different road types for 1993 
values and prices 
Road Types Marginal Marginal % of Vehicle Index of 
time congestion time Kilometre marginal 
externality cost externality Travelled congestion time 
cost 
h/ cu km once/ cu km average = 100 
1. Motorways 0.0037 2.68 16.37 88.16 
2. Major urban 0.0374 27.30 3.75 896.60 
central road 
3. Major urban non- 0.0069 5.01 15.01 164.58 
central road 
4. Rural single 0.0021 1.52 15.96 49.96 
carriageway 
5. Rural dual 0.0003 0.19 13.38 6.11 
carriageways 
6. Minor urban 0.0103 7.55 3.55 247.93 
central road 
7. Minor urban non- 0.0017 1.21 21.31 39.81 
central road 
8. Minor rural 0.0004 0.32 10.65 10.60 
single road 
" Average 0.0042 3.04 100.00 100.00 
weighted all 
roads 
" Total congestion 13.44 
cost (billions) 
Fivure 8.1 Marginal congestion time externality for 1993 values and prices 
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B) Marginal Congestion Time Cost by Time of Day and Road Type 
Average weighted marginal time cost is also estimated by hour of day for different 
road types. Figures 8.2 and 8.3 demonstrate the results for urban and rural roads. 
Figure 8.2 Marginal congestion time cost per time of day for urban roads 
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C) Average Estimates of Marginal Congestion Time Externality 
For the purpose of comparing the results based on the typical distributions of traffic 
with that measured on the basis of average values of speeds and flows of traffic, the 
value of the marginal congestion time cost is measured for different types of roads 
using average estimates of traffic flows and speeds. Table 8.2 shows the results. The 
figures in the table are based on the same assumptions of the methodology process 
explained above, except the four distributions of traffic (seasonally, daily, hourly, and 
location) are not incorporated. Values of the hourly per lane traffic and speeds are 
estimated as averages and used directly to estimate the marginal congestion time cost. 
Table 8.2 Average estimates of marginal congestion time cost by road type 
Road type pence per 
pcu km 
Average estimate : estimates based on 
the real distributions of traffic flows 
1. Motorways 0.23 1: 11.8 
2. Major urban central road 18.49 1: 1.47 
3. Major urban non-central road 2.49 1: 2.01 
4. Rural single carriageway 0.44 1: 3.45 
5. Rural dual carriageways 0.06 1: 2.97 
6. Minor urban central road 1.40 1: 5.37 
7. Minor urban non-central road 0.44 1: 2.74 
8. Minor rural single road 0.03 1: 9.25 
" Average weighted all roads 1.33 1: 2.28 
As can be seen from table 8.2, marginal congestion time cost estimates that 
incorporates the four distribution of traffic is significantly higher than the average 
estimates that are based on the average traffic flows and speeds for all road types. 
Estimates based on traffic distributions range between 1.5 times -for urban central 
roads- to more than 11.5 times -for motorways. 
8.2.2 Comparing the Study Results with Pervious Estimates 
Newbery (1987a, 1987b, 1987c 1988 , 1990) estimated the marginal congestion costs 
for British roads for the year 1985. His breakdown of roads were different from this 
study, except for motorways and rural dual carriageway. Beside motorways, dual 
rural carriageways, Newbery chose to divide roads into urban central (peak and off- 
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peak), urban non-central (peak and off-peak), small towns (peak and off-peak), and 
other rural roads. His method produced an average weighted for all roads of 1.7 
pence per pcu km for 1985. 
In 1990 Newbery updated the 1985 estimates by the increase in traffic over the 
period. His estimates for 1990 were 0.26 and 0.07 pence per pcu km for motorways 
and dual rural carriageways respectively, and he produced an average weighted 
congestion cost of 3.4p per pcu km for all roads as shown in table 8.3 
To make these estimates comparable with the current study figures, they are updated 
for 1993 values and prices. Since traffic flows on the UK road network has not 
changed significantly during the period 1990-1993 (DTp, 1993), they are only 
updated by the change in the value of time during the period. This is carried out by 
updating these estimates by the change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which is 
found to have decreased by 0.9% during the period 1990-1993. In addition, prices are 
found to have increased by 11.5% during the period concerned, so a correction is 
made to incorporate the inflation impacts. Updating Newbery estimates for 1993 
values and prices, would give the figures shown in table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 Previous estimates of congestion time cost updated for 1993 values and 
prices 
Road type 1990 estimates 
pence/pcu km 
Updated for 1993 values and prices 
pence/pcu km 
Motorway 0.26 0.29 
Urban central peak 36.37 40.20 
Urban central off peak 29.23 32.30 
Non-central peak 15.86 17.50 
Non-central off peak 8.74 9.65 
Small town peak 6.89 7.60 
Small town off peak 4.2 4.60 
Other urban 0.08 0.09 
Rural dual carriageway 0.07 0.07 
Other trunk and Principal 0.19 0.21 
Other rural 0.05 0.05 
Average weighted 3.4 3.76 
The table is adapted from Newbery 1990 
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The current study breakdown of road types is meant to be suitable for incorporating 
rail scheme benefits. Newbery's breakdown of road is different, since his purpose was 
to illustrate a basis for road pricing. So, comparing the estimates of the current study 
with the previous estimates of marginal congestion externality cannot be made for all 
road types due to the use of different breakdown of road class. However, the figures 
for motorways and dual carriageways can be compared. 
1. Motorways: 
The current study produces a marginal congestion cost of 2.68 pence per pcu km on 
motorways. This figure is about 9 times as much as the figure produced by 
Newbery's estimates. 
This is mainly due to the method of measuring MCTE in both cases. The current 
study estimates are based on the typical distributions of traffic flows, while Newbery 
figures are based on a crude estimates of the distribution of traffic flows on 
motorways. In his estimates, Newbery assumed that 7 percent of vehicle kilometre 
travel on motorways occurs at hourly flows of more than 1200 pcu per hour per 
standard lane, and the rest occurs at hourly flows of less than 1200 pcu/h/lane. The 
current study calculations of the hourly per lane flows suggested that 23 percent of 
vehicle kilometre travel at hourly per lane flow of more than 1200 pcu, and the rest 
77 percent occurs at hourly flows less than 1200 pcu. 
Using CUBA speed-flow formula, Newbery estimated the value of MCTE to be the 
average weighted of its value for flow above and below 1200 pcu/h/lane. This method 
imply that MCTE takes only two values, one for the range of flows 0 to 1200 and the 
other is for flows above 1200. This approach may underestimate the value of MCTE, 
because if flows of traffic change from hour to another throughout the day, speeds 
and then the delays travellers impose on each other vary accordingly. And when this 
variation in traffic over time and place is incorporated as the current study does, the 
value of MCTE is estimated to be much higher. 
2. Dual Carriageways 
The current study produces a value for MCTE for dual carriageways of 0.19 pence 
per pcu km. This is more than two and half times the figure produced in Newbery's 
estimates. The reason is that the latter estimates are based on the average values of 
flows and speeds (Newbery, 1987a, 1987b) and then when allowing for the typical 
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variations of traffic over time and place, as the current study does, the estimated 
figure is much higher. 
It is worth mentioning that for dual carriageways, the value of marginal congestion 
time cost estimated on average basis by this study as shown in table 8.2, is not 
significantly different from the figure produced in Newbery's estimates. 
8.2.3 Marginal Congestion Time for Different Vehicle Class 
Table 8.4 shows the estimated congestion time externality for each vehicle class on 
different types of roads. The figures are weighted by the percentage of kilometre 
travelled by each vehicle class on different types of roads. The figures for buses and 
heavy goods vehicles are based on the assumption that a bus is equal to 1.6 personal 
car unit (pcu), and a heavy goods vehicle is equal to 2 pcu. These are the values used 
in the trunk road appraisal framework explained in COBA. 
Table 8.4 Marginal congestion time externality by road and vehicle class 
Pence per vehicle km 
Road type Car or LGV Heavy goods Bus 
vehicle 
1. Motorways 2.68 5.37 4.29 
2. Major urban central road 27.30 54.59 43.67 
3. Major urban non-central road 5.01 10.02 8.02 
4. Rural single carriageway 1.52 3.04 2.43 
5. Rural dual carriageways 0.19 0.37 0.30 
6. Minor urban central road 7.55 15.10 12.08 
7. Minor urban non-central road 1.21 2.42 1.94 
8. Minor rural single road 0.32 0.65 0.52 
" Average weighted all road 3.08 3.03 5.48 6.09 
I= average for car 
2= average for light goods vehicle 
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Z5.4 Marginal congestion time cost by vehicle and road class 
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As can be seen from table 8.4 and figure 8.4, buses have the highest marginal 
congestion time cost (6.09 pence per bus km on average). This is mainly due to the 
distribution of bus kilometre travelled on different roads, where , more than 
50 
percent of bus kilometre travel on urban roads (central and non-central), with high 
level of marginal congestion time cost. 
The average values for cars and light goods vehicles are not significantly different. 
This is due to the very similar distribution of vehicle kilometre travelled for both of 
them. 
8.3 Average Speed by Road Class 
Table 8.5 shows average speeds for different road types. These averages, as explained 
in step 10 of the methodology process in chapter 7, are weighted by the percentage of 
vehicle kilometre travelled at different times of the day, week, year and places. 
142 
Table 8.5 Average weighted speed of travel by road type 
Road type Average weighted speed of travel km/h 
1. Motorways 86.00 
2. Major urban central road 26.66 
3. Major urban non-central road 46.05 
4. Rural single carriageway 57.72 
5. Rural dual carriageways 73.14 
6. Minor urban central road 32.52 
7. Minor urban non-central road 48.98 
8. Minor rural single road (') 62.69 
" Average weighted all road 59.26 
(1) Average speed is corrected to incorporate junction delays on these roads 
As explained before, the COBA speed-flow relationship is used in the process of 
measuring MCTE and speeds for rural roads. Speed-flow formulae for rural roads do 
not incorporate junction delays (DTp, 1981). This means the calculated average speed 
is above the real speed on those roads. To obtain the average actual speed, delays at 
junctions have to be incorporated. This is carried out for rural single and dual 
carriageways and minor rural single roads. The underlying assumptions are: 
1. There is a junction every 5 kilometre on these roads. 
2. A time delay of 20 seconds for each junction. 
Based on these assumptions, the measured speed is corrected to incorporate junction 
delays, and the results are shown in table 8.5 above. 
The estimated average speeds of the study are compared with and discussed in the 
light of the results of National Travel Surveys when presenting speed distributions in 
the following sections. 
8.4 Distribution of Congestion Time Cost and Speed 
The aim here is, beside having an average weighted estimates for MCTE and speeds, 
to illustrate and identify the proportion of vehicle kilometre travelled for each 
category of marginal congestion time cost and speed. This is carried out by 
categorising the congestion cost and speed and calculating the percentage of vehicle 
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kilometre travelled for each category. The following demonstrates the results for 
different road types: 
8.4.1 Motorways 
Figure 8.5 and 8.6 present the distributions of marginal congestion cost and speed for 
motorways. 
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1. Congestion Cost Distribution 
As can be seen from figure 8.5, for about 47% of Personal Car Unit Kilometre 
Travelled (PCUKT) on motorways, marginal congestion cost is 0.4p or less per pcu 
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km and the rest of PCUKT falls into three categories of marginal congestion cost. 
About 19% for >0.4-0.6p, 16% for >0.6-0.8p and 18% for >2p. As can be 
noticed there are no observations for categories >0.8-2p. This is due to the speed- 
flow relationship used. The slope of COBA speed flow relationship for motorways is 
a function of flow of traffic. For flows less than 1200 pcu/hour/lane, the slope takes 
the value of 0.006 and zero for light and heavy vehicles respectively. But once the 
flow reached 1200 or more these values become 0.027 and 0.014 respectively. This in 
turn affects the measured speed and then the measured marginal congestion cost. In 
other words, speed is less sensitive to traffic flows before the level of 1200 pcu per 
hour per lane, after that point, speed becomes more sensitive to flows, which reflects 
a dramatic drop in the measured speed when flows reached that level. Then the 
measured MCTE rises dramatically. Figure 8.8 shows both MCTE and speed for 
different levels of traffic flows. 
Average speed (km/h) 
0 400 800 1200 1400 1600 
Traffic flow (vehicles/hr/lane 3.65m) 
Figure 8.7 Speed-flow relationship used for motorways 
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Figure 8.8 Speed and marp-inal congestion cost for different traffic flows 
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2. Speed Distribution 
Motorways' speed distribution shows that about 35 % of pcu km travelled at speed 
category of > 90-100 km/h and about 31 % at speed more than 100 km/h. This means 
that over 65 percent of pcu km travel at speed of over 90 km/h. The estimated 
average weighted speed for motorways is 86 krn/h. 
This average is significantly different from the National Traffic Survey results for 
1992 (DTp, 1993). Based on the distribution of speed that is taken from 18 motorway 
sites, the average is estimated and weighted by the number of vehicles observed, this 
gives an average speed of 109 km/h. However, this average provides estimates of 
speeds unconstrained by congestion or other road conditions on motorways. So the 
results of the current study may provide a reasonable and more accurate 
approximation to speeds on the motorway network and one that is more suitable for 
measuring the congestion time costs. 
8.4.2 Built-up Major Roads 
Figures 8.9 and 8.10 show the distributions of marginal congestion cost and speeds 
for major built-up roads. 
1. Congestion Cost Distribution 
As can be seen from figure 8.9, marginal congestion cost is 5p or less for 62 and 78 
percent of PCUKT travelled for major urban central and non-central roads 
respectively. Overall, marginal congestion cost takes the form of an extended one tail 
distribution. If more categories are created after 120p, the distribution would have 
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continued to give lower proportions of PCUKT for each higher category of congestion 
cost. Congestion cost is more than the average for only about 13% and 22% of 
PCUKT for both types of road respectively. 
It is worth mentioning that the occurrence of very high marginal congestion cost (up 
to 100 pence per pcu km) is explained by the distributions of traffic flows used and 
discussed before. The distributions show that for a certain time and places the flow of 
traffic could be two or three times the average flow. This in turn causes a very high 
value of MCTE. 
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2. Speed Distribution 
As illustrated in figure 8.10 traffic speeds on central urban roads fall in about 4 
categories. Although the measured average weighted is 26.6 km/h, about 31 % of 
PCUKT is at speeds less than the average speeds with about 18% at speeds between 
10 and 15 km/h. This explains the existence of a proportion of PCUKT travel at 
marginal congestion cost as high as 100 pence per pcu km. 
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Figure 8.10 Speed distribution for major urban roads 
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The speed distribution for non-central urban roads groups PCUKT into 5 categories, 
with a maximum of 55 km/h. About 80% of PCUKT occur at speeds over 45 to 55 
km/h. Although the average weighted estimated for all non-central urban roads is 46 
km/h as shown in table 8.5 above, the distribution shows that only 25% of PCUKT 
travel at speed less than the average and the rest travel at or above the average speed. 
A survey of speeds in 24 English towns and cities has been undertaken by the 
Department of Transport in 1993 (DTp, 1994b). The survey covered speeds on all 
major roads in each of the 19 largest urban areas in England (excluding London). In 
addition, another 5 towns were selected and surveyed. The average peak and off-peak 
speeds were estimated for each area. Average speeds in the peak periods ranged from 
25.4 km/h in Leicester to 59.2 km/h in Peterborough. In the off-peak periods, 
average speeds ranged from 31.5 km/h in Sheffield and Grimsby/Cleethorpes to 62 
km/h in Peterborough. 
To compare the survey results with the estimated average speeds for major urban 
roads in this study, an average speed for the 24 areas is estimated. This is carried out 
by weighting the measured speed of each area by the length of the surveyed network 
of that area and estimating average for all areas. This gives an average speed for all 
areas of 32 and 39 km/h for peak and off-peak periods respectively. Assuming that 
peak period is one quarter of the time, this gives overall average speed of 37.5 km/h. 
The current study produces average speeds of 26.7 and 46 km/h for major urban 
central and non-central roads respectively. Based on the assumption that central areas 
are 11 percent of the total urban areas, this gives an average of about 43.8 km/h. 
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The slight difference between the study average and the average produced by the 
Department of Transport survey is due to the fact that The Department of Transport 
Survey results are based on speeds measured on a small number of sites compared 
with the current study which estimate average speeds for the entire urban road 
network. In addition, traffic in urban areas is subject to disruption by a wide variety 
of events, such as accidents and road works. These disruptions affect travel speeds 
negatively. In the Department of Transport survey no attempt is made to exclude data 
gathered during such disruptions (DTp, 1994b). Consequently, the measured speed of 
the survey incorporates the impacts of such disruptions, while the current study does 
not. This in turn explains the difference in the average speeds produced in both cases. 
8.4.3 Major Rural Roads 
Figures 8.11 and 8.12 demonstrate the distributions of marginal congestion cost and 
speeds for rural major roads. 
1. Congestion Cost Distribution 
Marginal congestion cost distribution for single carriageways again is in the shape of 
one tail distribution as shown in figure 8.11, with about 23% of PCUKT for a 
marginal congestion cost of 0.5 pence or less per pcu km, and then a diminishing 
proportions of PCUKT for higher categories of marginal congestion cost. The 
distribution shows that less than 10% of PCUKT at the average weighted marginal 
cost (1.52p), while about 60% travelled at marginal cost less than the average, and the 
rest travels at marginal cost above the average. Dual carriageway distribution allocates 
PCUKT to only two groups with most of PCUKT at marginal cost of 0.5 pence or 
less. There is a very small proportion of PCUKT at more than 4.5 pence per pcu km. 
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Figure 8.11 Marginal congestion time cost distribution for rural major roads 
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2. Speed Distribution 
As figure 8.12 shows, the distribution for speeds on single carriageways shows that 
most of the PCUKT (85%) is at speeds of more than 60 km/h, maximum speed of 80 
km/h, with an average weighted of about 57 km/h approximately after incorporating 
junction delays. The National Traffic Survey (NTS) (DTp, 1993) results, based on 24 
single carriageway "A" road sites, show that for a small percentage of the vehicles, 
the speed was less than 40 km/h, and the greater portion of the sites falls in speed 
category of 48-96 km/h. The average weighted speed of the National Traffic Survey 
results for all vehicles is found to be 72 km/h. This average is significantly different 
from the average of the current study. This is due to the fact that NTS average does 
measure average speeds unconstrained from any congestion impacts, while the current 
study results by incorporating the traffic distributions on the network, the measured 
speeds are more realistic and appropriate for estimating congestion costs. In 
addition, the distribution of the speed shows some difference compared with the NTS 
distributions for single carriageways. This is also explained by the fact that the NTS 
results are measured at a sample of sites on non-built up roads, and in principal they 
provide estimates of speeds unconstrained by congestion or other road conditions. So, 
the results of the current study may reflect the congestion on single carriageways 
more realistically. 
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The distribution of speed on dual carriageways shows that more than 98% of PCUKT 
is at speeds of more than 80 km/h, and a maximum speed of 95 km/h with an average 
weighted speed of 73 km/h approximately. This average incorporates the delays at 
junctions. The speed distribution of NTS, which again was based on a measurement 
for speed from 3 dual carriageway sites (DTp, 1993), shows that the speed measured 
falls in a broader range of categories compared with the current study results. Speed 
categories were between 50 and over 100 km/h. The estimated average weighted 
based on this figures is 103 km/h. In fact this average is different from the current 
study average of speed and so is the distribution. This is partly due to the fact that 
NTS results were taken from a speed measurement from only 3 dual carriageway 
sites, and partly because the current study incorporates congestion impacts, and in a 
general statement the current study results could be relied upon more accurately, since 
it incorporates different traffic flow variations, and measured speed for the whole dual 
road network. 
8.4.4 Minor Roads 
A) Minor Central Roads 
1. Congestion Time Cost Distribution 
As can be seen, for about 70% of PCUKT, marginal congestion cost is 5p or less per 
pcu km, then the congestion cost is taking a one tail distribution like other road types, 
with a weighted average of 7.5 pence approximately. 
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Figure 8.13 Congestion cost distribution for central minor roads 
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2. Speed Distribution 
The speed distribution for minor central roads shows that for about 79% of PCUKT, 
speed is more than 30 km/h. The rest of PCUKT (20%) is distributed for categories 
of speed between 30 and 10 km/h. The average weighted speed is about 32 km/h. 
Figure 8.14 Speed distribution for central minor roads 
B) Non-central Minor Roads 
1. Congestion Cost Distribution 
Again we have a one tail distribution, with about three quarter of PCUKT at marginal 
congestion cost of 1 pence or less, then showing a diminishing proportions of 
PCUKT for higher categories of congestion cost. Although the average weighted 
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marginal congestion cost is about 1.2 pence per pcu km , only 
20% occurs at a 
congestion cost of more than the average. 
Figure 8.15 Congestion cost distribution for non-central minor roads 
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2. Speed Distribution 
For non-central minor roads, about 92% of PCUKT is in the speed category of more 
than 45 to 55 km/h with a maximum speed of 55 km/h. The rest of PCUKT occurs at 
speeds of more than 35 to 45 km/h. 
Figure 8.16 Speed distribution for non-central minor roads 
C) Single Minor roads 
1 Congestion Cost Distribution 
153 
The distribution is not very different from other road types in terms of shape. Around 
75% of PCUKT at marginal congestion cost of 0.5 pence or less, with an estimated 
average weighted marginal cost of about 0.32 pence per pcu km. The distribution 
shows that for about 3.5 % of PCUKT, marginal congestion cost is more than 1 pence 
with a maximum of 1.5 pence per pcu km. 
Figure 8.17 Congestion cost distribution for single minor roads 
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2 Speed Distribution 
The distribution for speeds of single minor roads shows that all of PCUKT falls in the 
category of > 70-80 km/h. When incorporating junction delays, the average weighted 
speed is 62.7 km/h. 
Figure 8.18 Speed distribution for single minor roads 
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8.5 Marginal Congestion Time Cost and Speed Forecasting 
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 present the results of marginal time cost and speed for the year 
2000. This is estimated by applying the same methodology (steps 1-10) explained in 
chapter 7 and using the lower and upper traffic forecasts contained in National Road 
Traffic Forecasts Great Britain 1989, (DTp, 1994a). All motor vehicle traffic is 
forecast to increase by between 13 and 22 percent by the year 2000, compared with 
1993. 
The value of marginal congestion cost is estimated using the values of time for 1993. 
As mentioned before, road network length is assumed not to change. 
Table 8.6 Marginal congestion cost forecasting for different road types in 1993 values 
and prices 
Marginal congestion time cost for the year 2000 
(pence per pcu km) 
Road type Lower forecasts of traffic Upper forecasts of 
traffic 
1. Motorways 4.08 4.74 
2. Major urban central road 34.35 39.57 
3. Major urban non-central road 6.82 8.17 
4. Rural single carriageway 1.79 2.00 
5. Rural dual carriageways 0.25 0.32 
6. Minor urban central road 10.40 12.50 
7. Minor urban non-central road 1.86 2.42 
8. Minor rural single road 0.37 0.39 
" Average weighted all roads 4.11 4.86 
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Figure 8.19 Marginal congestion cost for the year 2000 
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As can be seen from table 8.6 above, the average weighted marginal congestion cost 
for all roads increases by 35 and 60 percent as a result of 13 and 22 percent increase 
in traffic respectively. This means for each 1 percent increase in traffic, marginal 
congestion cost increases by about 2.7 percent. In other words, the elasticity of 
marginal congestion cost with respect to traffic is about 2.7. 
Table 8.7 shows that the average weighted speed for all roads decreases by 2.5 and 
4.2 percent as a result of 13 and 22 percent increase in traffic respectively. This 
means for each 1 percent increase in traffic, speed decreases by about 0.19 percent. In 
other words, the elasticity of speed with respect to traffic is about 0.19 in absolute 
values. 
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Table 8.7 Speed forecasts by road types 
Average speed km/h 
Road type 1993 2000 Lower 2000 Upper 
forecasts of forecasts of 
traffic traffic 
1. Motorways 86.00 81.50 78.34 
2. Major urban central road 26.66 25.04 23.97 
3. Major urban non-central road 46.05 44.77 43.68 
4. Rural single carriageway 57.72 56.58 55.79 
5. Rural dual carriageways 73.14 72.20 71.68 
6. Minor urban central road 32.52 31.51 30.18 
7. Minor urban non-central road 48.98 48.45 48.01 
8. Minor rural single road 62.69 62.24 62.12 
" Average weighted all road 59.26 57.78 56.76 
8.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
The results of the measurements are presented and show that central urban roads are 
responsible for the highest marginal congestion cost (27.3 p per pcu km), while dual 
carriageways are of the lowest marginal congestion cost (0.19 p per pcu km). For the 
1993 traffic flows this is equivalent to a total congestion time cost of £13.44 billions. 
The chapter compares the results of the current study with the previous estimates of 
congestion time cost -after updating them to be comparable with the current study 
figures- and concludes that there is a difference between the current study results and 
the previous estimates. The study results are found to be much higher for some road 
types, example; motorways and dual carriageways, compared with previous estimates, 
and this is explained by the method used in both cases. While previous estimates were 
very much based on average values for traffic flows and speeds, the current study 
methodology incorporates the real variations in traffic in order to estimate the real 
impact on speeds and congestion cost. MCTE estimates based on the four distributions 
of traffic is between 1.5 (for major central urban roads) and 11.8 (in case of 
motorways) times as much as that based on average values of flows and speeds. 
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A comparison is made between the estimated average speed for major urban roads 
with that produced by the Department of Transport Survey of speeds in English urban 
areas, 1994. The comparison showed a slight difference between the measured speeds 
in both cases. This is explained by the fact that The Department of Transport survey 
results are based on speed measured on a small sample of sites. In addition, traffic in 
urban areas is prone to disruption by a wide variety of events. For example accidents 
and road works. In the Department of Transport survey, no attempt is made to 
exclude data gathered during such disruption. Then the surveyed speed is expected to 
be slightly lower compared with the current study estimates. 
The chapter presented a distribution for both marginal congestion cost and speed for 
different road types. For all road types, congestion time cost takes the shape of one 
tail distribution, showing a diminishing proportions of PCUKT for higher categories 
of marginal congestion cost. 
Speed distributions for motorways and other non-built up roads were discussed in the 
light of the results of National Traffic Survey (NTS). It is noticed that, there is a 
divergence or difference between the study results and the NTS results. This 
difference is explained by the fact that NTS results are based on traffic speed 
measured at a sample of sites on non-built up roads, and then do not comprehensively 
reflect the real traffic on the roads. Hence the current study speed distributions are 
more reliable and then more appropriate for the purpose of congestion time cost 
measurements. 
The chapter then ends by providing a projection of congestion time cost for the year 
2000 based on the upper and lower traffic forecasts. The elasticity of marginal 
congestion cost with respect to traffic is estimated in average to be 2.7, and the speed 
elasticity with respect to traffic is estimated in average to be -0.19. 
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Chapter 9 
Externalities (Noise Pollution Benefits) 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to the second type of non-user benefits of rail investment 
schemes concerned in the study. This is road traffic noise pollution. 
Noise pollution is considered to be one of the main sources of external costs generated 
by transport users and inflicted on the non-travelling public. In the United Kingdom, a 
study cited by Sharp and Jennings (1976) put the cost of reducing road traffic noise by 
10 dBA at £14.2 billion in 1972. Quinet (OECD, 1990b) suggests that traffic noise 
may give rise to damages in the form of productivity loss and annoyance amounting to 
0.1 per cent of GNP. In 1991 for the UK, this is equivalent to £0.6 billion. But the 
Quinet figure does not express the total cost of traffic noise, since it does not include 
other effects of noise such as health impacts. For other modes of transport, Quinet 
suggests the figures of 0.01 percent of GNP or £0.06 billions. Quinet added that the 
majority of road traffic noise comes from heavy goods vehicles. This evidence 
illustrates the magnitude of noise impacts for both road and other modes of transport, 
which suggests that road traffic noise is much more damaging compared with other 
modes of transport, in particular railways. 
It follows that a policy which reduces road traffic, will create an area of benefits to 
the society in terms of less noise damage for those who are affected by road traffic 
noise. This means it is essential to consider noise impacts when assessing, on a social 
basis, the benefits and costs of rail investment schemes. 
It is the main concern of this chapter to look at the noise impacts of both road and rail 
at the margin, in a process to measure the amount of benefit that will emerge as a 
result of a vehicle km transfer from road to rail, and that has to be included as a non- 
user benefit in the benefit side of a rail investment scheme. The aim is to disaggregate 
the noise benefits by road types, so noise benefits of a rail investment scheme can be 
quantified once the alternative road type is assigned. This will be carried out for 8 
160 
road types for the UK road network (the same breakdown of roads as for the case of 
congestion time cost benefits in chapter 7). 
Since road noise costs will be measured at the margin to be incorporated in a social 
appraisal framework for rail investment schemes, it is also relevant to consider the 
noise cost of railways. Hence it is also the concern of this chapter to consider rail 
noise costs, so the climate becomes visible for assessing the social costs and benefits 
of a rail investment scheme. 
The chapter starts by a general definition of noise in section 9.2. Then section 9.3 
explains why noise is considered to be one of the transport externalities. After that 
section 9.4 discusses the units for measuring road and railway noise, followed by an 
illustration of the extent and magnitude of railway and road noise in the United 
Kingdom in section 9.5. A comparison between the annoyance caused by road and rail 
noise is discussed in section 9.6. A brief discussion about the techniques and 
procedures of quantifying the cost of transport noise is given in section 9.7. Section 
9.8 forms the heart of the chapter. It details the study methodology of estimating the 
marginal and average cost of road noise for the United Kingdom road network. This 
includes all the assumptions made, the data and information required and used as well 
as their sources, the mathematical models and relationships used, and the results of 
the measurement process. Section 9.9 shows the calculation process of rail noise 
costs. At the end, a summary of the contents and a conclusion of the findings of the 
chapter is given in section 9.10. 
9.2 Noise and Sound 
Noise, often defined as unwanted sound, is caused by small pressure fluctuations in 
the air (Sharp and Jennings, 1976), (DTp, 1991). But which sounds are wanted and 
which are not depends on human judgement, a jet plane, a symphony orchestra and a 
busy motorway may all have the same sound level in dB(A) and there might be some 
individuals who enjoy the sound of the symphony and dislike the sound of the jet 
plane. Time is another determinant of wanted and unwanted sounds. An individual 
may be bothered so much by a sound of a heavy truck early in the morning, but he 
might not annoyed to much if this was during the day. In fact there is no objective test 
which can be used to classify the wanted and unwanted sound. On the other hand, 
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there is some levels of noise that can be accepted by the individuals without being 
annoyed or disturbed. This will depend, beside other things, on the source of the 
sound or noise. It will be shown latter, the relationship between noise levels of road 
and rail and annoyance. 
The reasons for disliking noise are that, it may be regarded as intrinsically unpleasant, 
because it interferes with some wanted sound such as speech or music, because it 
interferes with work performance, especially where this requires mental 
concentration, because it disrupts sleep, and because it has physiological effects. 
9.3 Transport Noise as an Externality 
Noise of transport modes is a clear example of pure pollution. In other words, there 
are some users who do abuse the medium, the -polluters- while others are relatively 
passive victims of such abuse -the public-, e. g. a busy motorway or a jet plane make 
the noise, housewives and families living adjacent to the road or the airport are forced 
to submit to the noise. This creates an area of externalities, where the polluter affects 
the well-being of other groups without being charged or making any compensation to 
those who are affected. 
If noise is paid for in any form of charges, this area of externalities would have been 
avoided. But as far as noise costs are not charged for, or only partly charged for, the 
externalities exist. Although efforts have long been going on to quantify the noise 
costs of transport modes as a basis for containing this type of externality in any form, 
the application of any noise charges is still limited. It is extremely difficult to devise a 
satisfactory way of charging for noise pollution. Apart from restraining the use of 
vehicles (particularly heavy goods vehicles) in urban and residential areas by road 
pricing, the only other alternative appears to be the use of command and control 
regulations covering the design and construction of motor vehicles. The maximum 
limits for noise are currently 84 dB(A) for heavy goods vehicles and 77 dB(A) for 
cars. However, there is no metered testing of the noise levels of vehicles in the UK 
either in the MOT test or at the roadside (Pearce, 1993). 
An investment policy that incorporates the costs of transport noise at the margins into 
the assessment process will bring benefits to the society and the users of transport 
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services, by directing the investment resources toward the most desirable and noise 
friendly modes. 
9.4 Measurement of Transport Noise 
Houtman and Immers (1987) describe how noise can be objectively quantified in 
various ways: 
1. Noise level in Decibels (dBs) 
2. Loudness in Sones 
3. Loudness level in Phons 
4. Frequency characteristics in Hertz 
5. Interval time in Seconds 
However, the standard measure of noise is the decibel (dB). This is a unit of sound 
pressure level related to a standard reference level of 0.00002 Newtons per square 
meter (TEST, 1991). Various types of decibel are commonly used. For example, the 
dB measure which gives greatest emphasis to those frequencies most audible to the 
human ear is the A-weighted decibel. This measurement however may not adequately 
reflect the low frequencies emitted by diesel locomotives (OECD, 1988; Flindell, 
1983). Decibels are rated on a logarithmic scale. Therefore increasing volume by one 
dB will barely be noticeable, while increasing it by 10 dB would be described by the 
average listener as a doubling of loudness (OECD 1973). For the purpose of 
comparison, the following shows some of the noise levels in dB(A): 
Table 9.1 Typical Noise Levels in dB(A) 
1. Aircraft at takeoff 120 
2. Pneumatic drill (at 1m distance) 100 
3. Lorry, motorcycle, underground train 90 
4. Busy cross-roads 80 
5. Noise level near a motorway 70 
6. Busy street through open windows 60 
7. Busy street through closed windows 50 
8. Bird song 45 
9. Quiet room 35 
10 . Broadcasting studio 
20 
Source: OECD (1988); OECD (1973) 
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For the measurement and comparison of transport noise, the LAeq (equivalent sound 
level in decibels) is commonly used. LAeq is a measure that gives a single figure 
sound reading, expressed in decibels, for a given period of time. Thus LAeq, 24h is a 
widely accepted 24-hour value of LAeq. LAeq is particularly useful as it is a unit that 
represents the constant level of noise which, in energy terms, equals the varying noise 
throughout the period (Nelson, 1978). Other measures of transport noise include 
LAID, LA50, LA90 measures. These refer to any noise levels exceeded for over 10% , 
50%, and 90% of the time respectively (TEST, 1991). In a recent report (TEST 
1991), it is suggested that LAeq is the most appropriate method by which to assess the 
overall impact of transport noise since it accommodates all facets of the noise climate. 
As will be seen latter in this chapter, the noise level for each road type of the UK 
road network is measured in LAeq scale, and this is used to measure the marginal and 
average noise cost for each road type. 
9.5 Magnitude of Exposure to Road and Rail Noise 
The following table illustrates the national population exposure to land transport noise 
for the UK case. 
Table 9.2 United Kingdom national population exposure to land transport noise 
(percent) 1 
Outdoor sound level in Leq[dB(A)] 
Road transport noise Railways noise 
>55 > 60 > 65 > 70 > 75 >55 >60 >65 > 70 > 75 
50 25 11 4 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.1 
1. percentages are commutative and not additive (for example: The % of persons exposed to >55 
dB(A) includes % of persons exposed to >60 dB(A), etc. ) 
2. daytime L,, 
q 
(6-22 hours) measured in front of the most exposed facades of buildings. 
3. road traffic noise : Ley averaged (06.00-24.00), 1972 survey, England only 
4. railways: 1976 data, great Britain only (L. 24 hours) 
Source : (OED, 1990a) 
Surveys have shown that of all sources of noise nuisance, road traffic noise is most 
often stated to be the dominant source. In thirteen OECD member countries, between 
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7% and 31 % of the population are exposed to a road traffic noise level of over 65 
dB(A) compared to between 0.4% and 4% for equivalent noise levels from railways 
(OECD 1988, Nelson et al 1989). According to an OECD report (1990a) 
approximately 119 million people in all OECD countries are exposed to levels of over 
65 dB(A) from road traffic. Some other research shows that 25% of the European 
Community's population is exposed to unacceptably high levels of noise and for 
thirteen European countries, road transport is the dominant noise source, heard by 
89% of the population at homes (Nelson et al 1989, TEST 1991). Table 8.2 shows the 
magnitude of exposure to road and rail noise for the UK population. As can be seen 
from the table, 11% of the UK population are exposed to a road traffic noise level 
more than 65 dB(A) compared to only 0.3 for equivalent noise levels from railways. 
According to OECD (1990a), there are 6 million people in Britain exposed to road 
traffic noise levels of more than 65 dB(A). This figure refers to 1987 estimates. If the 
average household size is 2.5 persons (Social Trends 1992), this means that a total of 
2.4 million house are exposed to noise level from road traffic of more than 65 dB(A). 
The corresponding length of road network open to traffic was 352700 km (DTp, 
1993). Thus the number of houses per km exposed to a noise level of more than 65 
dB(A) was about 6.8 per km. 
These estimates can be used to make a very approximate estimate of the number of 
houses exposed to road traffic noise from the new roads, and then the figure for 1987 
can be updated to more recent years. The necessary assumptions, which may well not 
be valid, are that the distribution of houses along the new roads is, on average, the 
same as that along the existing roads in 1987, and that the noise characteristics of new 
roads will be the same as those of existing roads in 1987. 
Fields and Walker (1982) estimated the number of houses in Great Britain exposed to 
different noise levels from railways. They estimated the number exposed to more than 
60 dB(A) to be 178,474; to more than 65 dB(A), 59,667; and to more than 70 dB(A), 
17,834. The corresponding length of railway routes was 18,166 km. Thus the number 
of houses per km exposed to different noise levels from existing railways was about 
9.8 per km exposed to more than 60 dB(A), 3.3 to more than 65 dB(A) and 1 to more 
than 70 dB(A). These estimates may be used to update the exposure to railway noise 
for the more recent years. This will require two assumptions. The first, is that the 
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distribution of houses along the new railway lines are the same as the old ones. 
Second, that the noise characteristics of the new railway lines are the same as the 
1982. These assumptions might not hold, and then the resultant estimates will be very 
approximate ones. 
Throughout the OECD, there are more reported evidence of exposure of the 
population to road traffic noise than to rail (DTp, 1991). This is explained by and 
reflects two main characteristics. First, due to the differing density of the two modes 
networks, a larger proportion of people live closer to potential road traffic noise than 
to rail noise sources. Therefore more people will be exposed to road traffic noise than 
to rail noise. According to OECD (1986), 25 times as many people in the USA are 
exposed to road noise as compared to rail noise. The corresponding figure for Norway 
is 45 times. Second, the higher reporting of exposure of population to road rather than 
rail noise reflects the nature of the noise produced. This is the result of the design 
characteristics of road and rail as well as the differences between the nature of service 
provided. Some studies show that for a given amount of passengers or goods carried 
at the same speed, rail is on average about 5 to 10 decibels quieter than road 
(Linkerhagner and Amann 1987) 
9.6 Comparison of the Annoyance Caused by Road and Railway Noise 
Extensive research has been carried out into people's response to road and rail noise 
in the last thirty years (DTp, 1991). It is usually quantified in terms of the population 
who suffer, are bothered, disturbed, annoyed, or dissatisfied by the noise. The main 
results of the earlier studies confirm that a higher percentage of the population heard 
road traffic noise than rail noise and proportionally more people were affected by 
noise from road traffic sources (British Railway Board 1976; Williams, et al 1978; 
Flindell 1983). 
The concept of a threshold limit for annoyance due to noise has long been the subject 
of debate. A detailed literature review of 26 reports relating to noise with reference to 
the annoyance threshold (the theorized critical level when people became annoyed at 
the noise source) has been carried out by Flindell (1983). He stated that according to 
Gilbert (1973) in the Paris Area Railway Noise Survey, the estimated values for 
threshold were: 
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Motorways and road traffic noise 
Railway noise 
65 LAeq 
70 LAeq 
This means that for noise levels less than 65 dB(A) from road and 70 dB(A) for rail, 
minimal annoyance is caused by either road or rail. The general conclusion of Flindell 
study is that there is an estimated higher annoyance threshold for rail than road. 
Other surveys investigating threshold levels have given slightly different results. 
Walker (1988) concluded that at less than 60 dB(A), minimal annoyance is caused by 
both road and rail. But for a5 dB(A) increase in rail and a 10 dB increase in road 
noise, will double the proportion of population annoyed. Anderson, et al (1988) stated 
that about 39% of people in Denmark are annoyed at railway noise levels of 55 dB(A) 
LAeq, 24h, and research by Peeters et al (1983) found that annoyance is roused at 
noise ranges between 50-53 dB(A) LAeq. Heintz et al (1980) suggested that road noise 
is more annoying than rail noise for equivalent LAeq levels (cited from Moheler 
1988). 
As can be seen, on one hand, most of the studies agrees in that the threshold level for 
railway is higher than for road. On the other hand, the research results contradict in 
the theorized critical level when people become annoyed at the noise source. This 
contradiction may be attributed to different cultures and public perceptions, attitudes 
and reactions at different times in different countries. It also may reflect different 
survey methodologies, sample sizes, interpretation of results. 
In addition to the differences between road and rail noise with regard to the threshold, 
some studies confirm that annoyance from railway noise increases less rapidly than 
annoyance from road noise, as noise levels increase. Fields and Walker (1982) 
confirm that at higher noise levels road traffic noise is between 4 and 20 dB more 
annoying than rail. Other studies by Peeters et al (1983) and Heintz et al (1980) 
support this conclusions. This observation suggests that people are more tolerant of 
railway noise than of road noise. 
9.7 Techniques of Measuring Transport Noise Cost 
Kanafani (1983) has set out the economic impacts of transport noise to be: 
1. Damage costs. This includes 
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a) productivity losses due to inability to concentrate, communication difficulties at 
work, or fatigue due to lack of sleep or inadequate rest outside work. 
b) health care costs, for example the effects of sleep less or damage to hearing in 
case of intense exposure to noise. 
2. Expenditure on protection from noise. This includes: 
a) abatement costs at source. Particularly with regard to vehicles. 
b) expenditure on protection for the community, e. g. anti-noise screens along 
roadways, or cuttings and tunnels. 
c) also private expenditure against noise, e. g. double glazing, double windows in 
dwellings. 
3. The effects on property values, which are driven down by nearby noise. 
It follows that the social cost of transport noise can be looked at and quantified in 
three ways, these are: 
1. The sum of productivity losses and health care costs 
2. Expenditure on noise abatement 
3. The reduction on property values as a result of exposure to noise 
It should be noted that these three ways are not independent of one another. And if 
both individuals and governments are perfectly informed and rational, and if markets 
are perfect, one would expect that the sum of marginal productivity losses and 
marginal health care costs is equal to the marginal expenditure on noise abatement, 
and is also equal to the marginal reduction in property values. 
It is quiet difficult to assess health care costs and productivity losses. This is due to 
the fact that noise as a cause cannot be isolated from other causes and factors. The 
only figures available in the literature are the evaluation of sleep loss due to noise in 
Norway (Ringheim, 1983) and that was equivalent to 0.05% of GDP. The other 
evidence comes from an evaluation of productivity losses in Germany (Wicke, 1987) 
which amounted 0.2% of GDP. 
Extensive research studies have been undertaken measuring the expenditure on noise 
abatement and the cost of noise protection. A very detailed review of these studies is 
given in (Verhoef, 1994 and OECD 1990b). 
The third and commonly used method of measuring social costs of transport noise is 
by measuring the effects on the value of property. The principle behind this method is 
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that it measures people's willingness to pay to eliminate or reduce transport noise. 
The result of measurement is usually identified in terms of a percent change in house 
prices for a unit change in the level of noise. The technique used in this process is 
called Hedonic Pricing. The following section highlights this technique in brief. 
9.7.1 Hedonic Pricing 
The Hedonic Pricing technique (HP) uses information revealed by the decisions of 
purchasers to measure the money value of environmental attributes that have no 
market prices (TRRL, 1992). The most widely used case is that of house prices. 
House prices vary in accordance with the quality of environment, so they can be used 
to estimate the money value of environmental attributes. HP is based on the 
assumption that house prices reflect people willingness to pay for better environment, 
which is in turn based on the assumption that individuals are rational and aware of the 
real impact of the quality of environment on them. Pearce and Markyanda (1989) 
point out that individuals may undervalue the benefits of reducing pollution because 
they are not fully aware of its impact upon their health. 
The relationship between house prices and environmental attributes is usually 
identified using multiple regression analysis. Most of HP studies have only considered 
the effect of a single environmental factor on house prices (usually noise levels or air 
pollution). Environmental values are usually expressed in terms of percentage change 
in house prices as a result of a single unit change of the concerned environmental 
attribute. 
Extensive research studies have been undertaken both in the USA and in Europe to 
establish the relationship between house prices and the level of transport noise. Most 
of the studies are concerned with the aircraft noise impact. However, some research 
concerned with road traffic noise has been carried out. Table 9.3 shows the results of 
some empirical work in the USA and Europe. 
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Table 9.3 The impact of traffic noise on house prices (% of house prices) 
Location Impact of one unit change 
in Ley 
1. USA 
*North Virginia 0.15 
'Tidewater 0.14 
'North Springfield 0.18-0.50 
'Towson 0.54 
'Washington DC 0.88 
"Kingsgate 0.48 
'North King Country 
0.40 
'Spokane 
0.08 
'Chicago 
0.65 
2. Canada 
1.05 
'Toronto 
3. Switzerland 
1.26 
'Basel 
Source: Pearce and Turner (1990) 
Note: L, 
.q 
(equivalent continuos sound level)= a level of constant sound in dBA which would have the 
same sound energy over a given period as the measured fluctuating sound under consideration. 
According to table 9.3, a unit change in noise level would lead to a change in house 
prices ranging from 0.08 percent in Spokane to 1.26 percent in Basel. 
In France, the Institute de Recherche Des Transports (IRT) quotes several studies 
giving depreciation indices of between 0.15 and 0.71 percent (OECD, 1990b). 
Kanafani (1983) stated that the fall in house values are estimated at between 1 percent 
and 10 percent according to the level of noise in dB(A), and may be as low as 0.5 per 
cent. A study in Norway also gives a figure of 0.4 percent (Ringheim, 1983). 
Overall, according to OECD (1990b), the most recent assessments of loss of property 
value and that is also quoted from (Nelson et al 1989), is around 0.4 percent. The 
threshold from which cost is counted is located between 50 dB, below which no 
disturbance is perceived, and 65 dB, a legal limit in some countries. The figure of 0.4 
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percent is used by this study to indicate the change in house prices with a change of 
one unit of noise level in dB(A). 
A study by Pearce, Barde and Lambert (1984) calculated the value of the social cost 
of traffic noise impact for the housing stock in France in 1980. Taking a depreciation 
in property value of 0.4% per unit of noise and applying this factor to the number of 
dwellings exposed to noise levels between 55 and 80 dB(A) on the Leq scale, it was 
found that the total depreciation obtained was 61.4 billion French Francs. The study 
assumed that the level of noise after which people start to be annoyed is 55 dB(A) on 
the Leq scale and the maximum level people may be exposed to is 80 dBA. 
9.8 Estimating the Cost of Road Traffic Noise for the British Road Network 
9.8.1 Introduction 
This section explains the method used in estimating the social cost of road traffic 
noise for the UK road network. The estimation process aims to measure the total 
social noise cost and to allocate this cost for different types of roads. The break down 
of roads is the same as that used for measuring congestion time cost in the previous 
chapter. The process is divided into two main stages, these are: 
1. Measuring the noise level for each road type 
2. Using the measured noise level to estimate the social noise cost for each road type 
at the margin 
9.8.2 Measuring Noise Level for Different Types of Roads 
The method of measuring the noise level for different road types is based on the noise 
prediction method developed by the Transport and Road Research Laboratory 
(Harland, 1978). The model calculates the noise level as a function of the average 
speed (km/h), total flow of traffic (vehicles/h), and the percentage of heavy vehicles 
on the traffic flow. Specifically, the model is: 
J 
0(lhour)= 10log, oq+33log, a(V+40+5ý)+101og, o(1+ 
)+0.2G-27.6 
(9.1) 
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Where: 
L, o (1 hour) = is the level of noise in dBA exceeded 10 percent of the time for any one 
hour. 
q= is the total traffic flow in the hour considered (pcu/h) 
V= is the mean traffic speed (km/h) 
p= is the percentage of vehicles, other than motorcars, whose unladen weight 
exceeds 1525 kg. 
G= is the gradient of the road expressed as a percentage. 
9.8.2.1 Methodology Framework and Steps of the Process 
As figure 9.1 demonstrates, the methodology incorporates the distribution of traffic into 
the measurement of the average noise level of roads. Calculating the hourly traffic flow 
and speed for the measurement of noise level for each road type is carried out on the 
same basis as that for the measurement of congestion cost externality. The four 
distributions of traffic are incorporated to calculate the hourly traffic flow and speed, 
which in turn is used to calculate the noise level for each hour for the concerned road 
type. 
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Figure 9.1 Methodology framework of calculating the noise level and nuisance level for 
roads 
Data Output 
Models 
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1. Noise Level L10 (1 hour) 
Equation 9.2 shows the measurement of the noise level for each road type. 
NL . id 101o 'a%'N +3310 (S "ý'' +40+ 
500 
+10log (1+ 
S, 
Sp" 
)+0.2G -27.6 , or 
g, 
o 
9r 
r 
g, 
o r 77Z, -m-) ,o mdh! r 
Jr 
r 
(9.2) 
Where: 
NLIOTdhI = is the L10 noise level for the road type r, for month m, for day d, for hour 
h, and for the location point 1(dB(A)) 
g1mdhi = traffic flow per lane per hour for the road type r, for month in, for day d, 
for hour h, and for the location point I calculated in equation 7.6 
(pcu/h/lane) 
Nr = number of lanes for road type r 
Srmani = average speed for the road type r, for month in, for day d, for hour h, and 
for the location point I calculated in equation 7.10 and 7.11 (km/h) 
Pr = is the percentage of heavy vehicles for road type r 
Gr = is the gradient of the road type r 
2. Average Weighted Noise Level 
For each road type, the intention is to produce a value for the noise level Llo that reflects 
and incorporates the variations in traffic (seasonally throughout the year, daily 
throughout the week, hour to hour during the day, and the location distribution 
throughout the entire network), and incorporates road type characteristics. This is done 
by the average weighted value of noise level that is calculated as follows: 
12 7 24 1 
` 
L, 
Ormdhl 
m=I d=l h=l 1=1 NL, o, = mxdxhxl 
Where: 
(9.3) 
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NL10r = average weighted noise level for the road type r (dB(A)) 
m, h, d, I= are referring to month of year, day of week, hour of day, and location 
point on the road network 
3. Energy Mean Sound Level (Leq) 
This measure of noise accounts for the magnitude and duration of all the sounds 
occurring during a given period and, by definition, is equal to the steady-state continuous 
sound level having the same energy content as the actual time-varying noise (Nelson, 
1978). The energy mean sound level is also referred to as the equivalent sound level, and 
denoted by Leq. According to Nelson (1978), the noise level L10 and Ley are highly 
correlated with a correlation coefficient equal to 0.95, and the formula relates Leq to Llo 
is as follows: 
Leq = L10 - 3dB ± 2dB (9.4) 
This formula is used to calculate the equivalent sound level for each road type as 
described in the following equation: 
ESLr = NLIOr - 3dB (9.5) 
Where: 
ESLI. = value of the equivalent sound level (Ley) for road type r (dB(A)) 
4. Average Nuisance Level 
If people start to be annoyed from traffic noise when the noise level in Ley scale became 
more than 55 dB, then the nuisance level is the number of dB in excess of 55. The study 
assumes that the annoyance is aroused at a noise level on the Leq scale >55 dB(A). This 
is based on the empirical research studies undertaken to investigate human response to 
road noise. Some of the evidence is discussed above in section 9.6 . 
The nuisance level is 
estimated for each road type as follows: 
ANLr=ESLr - 55dB(A) (9.6) 
Where: 
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ANLr = is the average nuisance level for road type r (dB(A)) and which any 
household living adjacent to road r is facing. 
5. Marginal Nuisance Level 
In order to estimate the social noise benefits of a railway scheme that attracts people 
off the road, it is required to estimate the marginal nuisance level. The word marginal 
refers to the change in nuisance level for an additional pcu km using the road. The 
marginal nuisance level (MNL) is estimated by adding one pcu km to the traffic flow 
and measuring the impact on the average noise level (NL10r) and average nuisance 
level (ANLF) explained above. This is carried out for the 8 road types identified for 
the study. The calculations are undertaken by a BASIC computer program that is 
developed and mentioned in chapter 7. A flowchart of the program is given in detail 
in appendix 1. 
9.8.3 Estimating Social Road Noise Costs 
In this stage, the aim is to use the average and marginal nuisance level for different 
road types estimated above and the information of exposure to road traffic noise in the 
UK, in a process to measure the total social cost of road traffic noise and to allocate 
the cost for different road types in order to measure the average and marginal noise 
cost. The following steps along with figure 9.2 show how this is carried out. 
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Figure 9.2 Estimating average and marginal traffic noise cost externality 
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9.8.3.1 Step One: Identify the Exposure to Road Traffic Noise 
As shown in table 9.2, according to the OECD (1990a), in 1972,50% of the UK 
population are exposed to noise level from road traffic of >55 dB(A) Leq scale. Based on 
this and information on road network length and average family size for 1972, that means 
an average of about 28.4 house per km of the road network. This value is used to 
estimate the number of houses exposed to noise level more than 55 dB(A) for 1993 
multiplying by the road network length in 1993. The necessary assumption made is that 
the distribution of houses along the new roads is, on average, the same as that for 1972. 
9.8.3.2 Step Two: House Distribution between Roads 
In order to disaggragate the cost of traffic noise by different road types, it is required to 
identify the number of houses exposed to traffic noise from each road type. This will 
require information of the distribution of houses along different road types within the 
entire road network. Some assumptions are made to allocate the total number of houses 
exposed to road traffic noise >55 dB(A) between the 8 road types, these are: 
1.15 % of the houses are in rural areas, of which 1% are exposed to motorways, 10% 
exposed to single carriageways, 4% exposed to dual carriageways. 
2. The rest of the houses (85%) are in urban areas, of which 10% are exposed to major 
urban central roads, 75% exposed to major urban non-central roads. 
9.8.3.3 Step Three: Identify the Average House Prices 
House prices vary according to the type of the house (detached, semi-detached, terraced 
or any other types), and also vary with the condition of the house (new, modern, or old). 
In addition, the prices vary from region to another throughout the county. 
The calculation of noise cost in this study is based on the average prices of houses given 
by the building society Nationwide (Nationwide, 1994). Average house prices for the UK 
are £61168, £56659, and £52052 for new, modern and older houses respectively. The 
average for all houses from all types is £54216. 
9.8.3.4 Step Four : Identify the Relationship between House Price and 
Noise Level 
The study is based on the assumption that a straight line relationship exists between 
traffic noise level and house prices. In other words, an increase of noise level by one unit 
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will lead to a reduction of 0.4% of house prices. This is regardless of the noise level 
itself. In fact this may be an approximate assumption, and one may argue that the 
reduction of house prices will depend on the noise level. Then the relationship may take 
other form rather than a straight line. Kanafani (1983) reports that falls in property value 
are estimated at between 1 percent and 10 percent according to the dB level. 
9.8.3.5 Step Five: Total Noise Cost 
The noise cost for each road type is measured as follows: 
TNCr = ANLr x PRr x HPr x NHr (9,7) 
Where: 
TNCr= total noise cost for road type r (£) 
ANLr = average nuisance level for road type r (dB(A)) 
PR, = percentage of house price reduction as a result of a one unit of increase in 
road traffic noise for road type r (%/dB) 
HPr = the average price of houses for road type r (£/house) 
NHS = number of houses exposed to road traffic noise from road type r 
Equation 9.7 gives the total capital cost of noise for each road type. This total is used to 
estimate the annual noise cost for each road type. The calculation of the annual cost is 
based on the following assumptions: 
1. The life of the house is 25 years 
2. Interest rat is 10% 
Then the annual noise cost is used to estimate the average noise cost per pcu km, for 
each road type basing on the number of pcu km travelled on each road type. 
9.8.3.6 Step Six: Average Cost per Nuisance Unit 
The total noise cost per year and the average nuisance level for each road type estimated 
by equation 9.6 are used to calculate the average cost per nuisance unit for each road 
type as follows: 
CNUr = 
A NCr 
ANL (9.8) 
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Where: 
ANCr = annual noise cost for road type r 
CNUr = average cost per unit of nuisance for road type r (£/dB) 
9.8.3.7 Step Seven: Marginal Noise Cost Externality 
Marginal noise cost (MNC) is measured as follows: 
A4 
VC, = LVI/VL, X 
CNU, (9.9) 
Where: 
MNCI = marginal noise cost externality for road type r, the extra noise cost 
imposed on the society as a result of an extra pcu km using the road type r 
(£/pcu km) 
MNL. = marginal nuisance level for road type r measured above reflecting the 
extra nuisance level as a result of an extra pcu km using the road r 
(dB/pcu km) 
9.8.4 Results 
9.8.4.1 Average Noise and Nuisance Level by Road Type 
Table 9.4 presents the estimated average noise and nuisance levels by road type. 
Table 9.4 Average noise and nuisance levels by road class 
Road type Average noise 
level 
L, o (dB(A)) 
Equivalent 
sound level 
Leq (dB(A)) 
Nuisance 
level 
(dB(A)) 
1. Motorways 75.05 72.05 17.05 
2. Major urban central 70.53 67.53 12.53 
3. Major urban non-central 68.63 65.63 10.63 
4. Single carriageways 68.55 65.55 10.55 
5. Dual carriageways 72.57 69.57 14.57 
6. Minor urban central 52.10 49.10 0 
7. Minor urban non-central 51.69 48.69 0 
8. Minor rural single 55.18 52.18 0 
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As can be seen from the table, motorways cause the highest level of noise, followed by 
dual and single carriageways. Minor roads have the lowest noise level. This is mainly 
explained by the varying levels of traffic flows, speeds and proportions of heavy vehicles 
between road types. 
As can be noticed, for rural roads, speed is the dominant determinant of noise and 
nuisance levels. In other words, roads with higher speeds have higher levels of noise e. g. 
motorways, and vice versa. On the other hand, in urban roads, where average speeds are 
lower compared with rural roads, the flow and density of traffic is the main determinant 
of noise levels. Road with higher traffic flows per hour have the highest noise level. 
9.8.4.2 Average and Marginal Noise Cost by Road Class 
Based on the methodology framework for measuring marginal nuisance levels for 
different road types and using the distribution of houses between the roads, and using the 
0.4 percent depreciation in house values, average and marginal noise cost are estimated 
for different road types. The results are shown in table 9.5. 
Table 9.5 Average and marginal noise cost by road class for 1993 
Road types Total noise 
cost per year 
£ billions 
Average noise 
cost 
(pence/pcu km) 
Marginal noise 
cost 
(pence/pcu km) 
1. Motorways 0.042 0.06 0.011 
2. Major urban central 0.308 1.86 0.846 
3. Major urban non-central 1.96 2.96 1.253 
4. Single carriageways 0.234 0.33 0.138 
5. Dual carriageways 0.143 0.24 0.076 
6. Minor urban central 0 0 0 
7. Minor urban non-central 0 0 0 
8. Minor single 0 0 0 
" Total all roads 2.69 0.61 0.25 
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Figure 9.3 Average and marginal noise cost by road class for 1993 
3 
average cost marginal cost 25 
E 2 e . Al 
C 1.5 
u 
ý 1 - a i f CL. 
0.5 3i 
L7C 3 Ü al 7 
Öi C Üö OI 2 
Ü 
. 
Ü N c c ö 
C 
C C U U M LC 
The figures in table 9.5 show that, although motorways and other major rural roads 
have higher noise levels compared with urban roads, their estimated average and 
marginal cost are much lower than those of urban roads. This is explained by the fact 
that houses are much dense in urban areas and although the traffic noise of urban 
roads is lower, it is received by much more people. On the other hand, the high noise 
level of motorways and dual carriageways is received by fewer houses. This in turn 
affects the estimated marginal noise cost. For an extra pcu km joining a motorway, a 
cost of only 0.011 pence occurs to the society, however if this pcu km were to join an 
urban road, the cost would be between 0.85 to more than 1 pence depending on the 
type of the road. 
9.9 The Cost of Noise from Railways 
9.9.1 Introduction 
The methodology of measuring railways noise cost is similar to that of measuring the 
noise cost of road traffic. The reduction in property values is taken to reflect people's 
willingness to pay for noise reduction (the Hedonic Pricing Approach). 
9.9.2 Exposure to Railway Noise 
The number of houses in Great Britain exposed to various noise levels from railways are 
estimated for 1982 by Fields and Walker (1982). They reported that for 1979, the 
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number exposed to more than 60 dBA in Leq scale was 178474; to more than 65 dBA, 
59667; and to more than 70 dBA, 17834. The corresponding length of railway routes 
open to traffic was 18166 km. This means the number of houses per km exposed to 
different noise levels from existing railways was about 9.8 per km exposed to more than 
60 dBA, 3.3 to more than 65 dBA and I to more than 70 dBA. 
The results of Fields and Walker are rearranged to give the exposure to railway noise 
levels for different categories of noise levels. Table 9.6 shows the results of these 
arrangements. 
Table 9.6 Exposure to railway noise for different noise categories in 1979 
Noise level category (dBA) No. of houses House per km 
more than 60 - 65 118807 6.5 
more than 65 - 70 41833 2.3 
more than 70 17834 0.98 
Source: Adapted from Fields and Walker (1982) 
The results of table 9.6 are updated for 1993 to make approximate estimate of the 
number of houses exposed to different noise level categories from the railways. The 
necessary assumptions made are: 
1. The distribution of houses along the railway lines is, on average, the same as 1979. 
2. The noise characteristics of railway are the same as those of existing lines in 1979. 
Based on these assumptions and on the length of railway routes open to passengers and 
freight traffic in 1993 (DTp, 1994), table 9.7 presents the updated exposure to railway 
noise. 
Table 9.7 Exposure to railway noise for different noise categories in 1993 
Noise level category (dBA) No. of houses 
Passenger Freight 
more than 60 - 65 93060.5 14371.5 
more than 65 - 70 32929.1 5085.3 
more than 70 14030.7 2166.78 
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9.9.3 Nuisance Level for Railways 
As discussed in section 9.6, most of the research studies suggested that there is an 
estimated higher annoyance threshold for rail than for road (Flindell 1983). In other 
words, the noise level after which people start to become annoyed from rail noise is 
higher than that for road noise. Based on some empirical research investigating the 
human response to road traffic noise, the study assumed that people's annoyance from 
road traffic noise started at a noise level of 55 dBA (Leq scale). Despite the difficulties of 
identifying the response of humans to noise, several authors have attempted to compare 
the annoyance caused by road and railway noise. Table 9.8 compares the results of 
different studies reviewed. 
Table 9.8 Differences between levels of road and railway noise for equal general 
annoyance 
Study Noise level d eferential, dBA Leg, 24 
50 to 60 dBA 60 to 70 overall range 
dBA of levels 
Studies known to use large samples 
over a wide area 
Fields &Walker (1982) PBO(1983) +1 +5 +4 to +15 
Knall et all(1983) +2 +6 
Moheler et al(1986) +1 +7 
Other studies(not necessarily less 
reliable) 
Berry(1983) -ve 
Flindell(1983) +10 
Holzmann(1978) +7 to +11 +5 to +9 
Kastka et al (1983) +ve 
Heintz et al(1980) 0 to +4 +5 to +9 
Ohrstrom et al(1980) -ve 
Peeters et al(1983) +3 to +5 
Kumagai et al(19750 -3 (convential 
train) 
+1 (high speed 
train) 
Source: DTp (1991) 
+ ve = people more tolerant of railway noise than road noise 
- ve = people less tolerant of railway noise than road noise 
184 
Table 9.8 shows that the majority of study surveys found that railway noise is less 
annoying compared to road noise. The differential in favour of rail varies between studies 
within the range of 3 to 15 dBA at levels of 60 to 70 dBA, though most found values are 
between 4 and 9 dBA. At noise levels of 50 to 60 dBA, the differential is small, and 
sometimes zero. Two studies produced the result that railway noise is more annoying 
than road noise. According to DTp (1991), these two studies are considered to be 
relatively insignificant, one relying wholly on secondary analysis of previous survey data 
and the other wholly on laboratory studies. 
Based on these results the study assumes that on average the differential in favour of 
railway is 5 dBA. In other words, if people's annoyance from road traffic noise starts at a 
noise level of 55 dBA, for railways that happens at noise level more than 60 dBA. The 
study assumes that the maximum noise level that people may hear from railways is 80 
dBA. This is based on reviewing the noise standards for existing railways in the United 
Kingdom. The maximum noise levels are found to be in the range 73 dBA for Glasgow 
and 88 dBA for Warwick in Lq scale. Accordingly, the nuisance level from railways 
(RNL) is estimated to be the excess in dBA over the 60 dBA (the minimum level over 
which people become annoyed with railway noise), and with a maximum of 80 dBA. 
Table 9.9 demonstrates the nuisance level from railway noise for different categories of 
noise levels. 
Table 9.9 Nuisance level from railway noise 
Noise category level (dBA) Average nuisance (average excess in 
dB(A)) 
>60 to 65 2.5 
>65 to 70 7.5 
>70 to 80 15 
9.9.4 Total Cost of Railway Noise 
The total cost of railway noise is estimated as follows: 
RNC=RNLxPRxHPxNH (9.10) 
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Where: 
RNC= total cost of railway noise (£) 
RNL= nuisance level for railways (average excess in dBA above 60 dBA with a 
maximum of 80 dBA) 
PR= percentage reduction in house prices for a unit increase in noise level for 
railways (%/dBA) 
HP= average house price (1/house) 
NH= number of houses exposed to railway noise level more than 60 dBA 
Equation 9.10 is used to estimate the total noise cost for the three categories of noise 
levels shown in table 9.9. The results are disaggregated by the type of service (passenger 
and fright), and are presented in the next section. 
9.9.5 Results 
The methodology explained above would give a total noise cost for railways of £0.172 
billions, of which £0.149 is for passengers and the rest is for freight. Assuming a 10% 
interest rate and 25 years for the life of houses, this gives annual noise cost of 0.016 and 
0.0025 billions for passenger and freight respectively. Using the total number of 
passenger and tonne kilometre moved by rail in the year 1993, this would give an 
average noise cost of 0.052 and 0.016 pence per passenger and tonne km respectively. 
9.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter is devoted to the measurement of noise cost externality for road and rail. 
The methodology used and the measurement process are explained. Average and 
marginal road noise cost are disaggregated by road types. Urban roads have higher 
noise cost compared with rural roads and motorways. This is explained by the fact 
that houses are much dense in urban areas compared with rural areas, and then urban 
traffic noise, although lower than noise from rural road, is received by more houses. 
Rail noise cost is also measured, and the results shows lower cost for rail noise 
compared with road traffic noise cost. 
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Chapter 10 
Externalities (Air Pollution Benefits) 
10.1 introduction 
This chapter is devoted to the third type of non-user benefits of rail investment 
schemes concerned in the study. This is air pollution. The chapter explains how this 
type of externality is dealt with in order to identify and estimate the marginal impacts 
of rail schemes on the air pollution, and then to extract the amount of marginal air 
pollution benefit that is to be incorporated into the social framework of a rail scheme 
appraisal. 
10.2 Why Incorporating Air Pollution? 
Air pollution is another clear example of pure pollution, where the user of transport 
service do abuse the medium - the polluters - while others are relatively passive 
victims of such abuse - the public. Since, no charge is paid for the air pollution 
caused by motorists, the action of polluting the air is an externality to road transport. 
When a rail scheme attracts some road users off the road, there will be an associated 
area of benefits equals to the marginal improvement in air quality. The word marginal 
refers to the measurement of the marginal impact on the air pollution as a result of the 
rail scheme concerned. This of course considers the air pollution impacts of both rail 
and road. 
It follows, that a policy of incorporating this type of externality into the social 
assessment of rail investment schemes will help in directing the investment funds 
towards the most beneficial (on social basis) and more environmentally friendly form 
of transport, and in turn improves the well-being of individuals and the society at 
large. 
10.3 Air Pollution and Rail Investment Appraisal 
The current practice of assessing rail investment schemes, as explained in chapter 3, 
has no formal procedure for evaluating air pollution impacts of railway schemes. 
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More recently, the introduction of a new legislation on Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) of rail projects requested that major new rail schemes require an 
EIA (Nash et al, 1991). A case example is the Manchester Light Rapid Transit. This 
requirement for EIA for rail schemes follows the same procedures that are laid out in 
the Manual of Environment Appraisal (MEA) for roads (DTp 1983). Such an 
assessment considers only the negative impacts of rail schemes on the environment. 
No considerations are given to comparing the relative air pollution impacts of road 
and rail, neither does it consider the pollution impacts of users switching from one 
mode to another. 
On a social basis, it is the relative impact of rail vs. road investment that is relevant 
rather than the negative impacts of rail transport. The air pollution benefits of modal 
switching at margins have to be incorporated in the appraisal framework so that the 
investment decision can be based upon and incorporates the relative advantage of both 
modes. 
10.4 The Nature of Air Pollution 
According to Faiz et al (1990), air pollution may be classified into two categories: 
primary pollution, which results from the direct emissions into the atmosphere from 
the polluting source. This includes, Carbon Monoxide (CO), Hydrocarbons (HC), 
Sulphur Oxides (SOx), Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), particulate matter such as dust and 
smoke, lead (Pb) compounds, Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) and Carbon 
Dioxide (C02). Secondary pollution, which results from the creation of new 
compounds and mixtures from primary pollutants due to the chemical processes that 
occur in the atmosphere. Acid depositions is a clear example of the secondary 
pollutants. 
Both primary and secondary pollutants have detrimental health impacts. These impacts 
are function of the concentration of the pollutant and the duration of exposure. The 
analysis of health impacts associated with air pollution is complex, and then the 
results vary considerably. According to (TEST 1991)), (cited from The World Health 
Organisation WHO 1990) millions of people in Europe live in areas with air pollution 
severe enough to cause thousands of premature deaths and make many more ill each 
year. In contrast the former UK Department of Health and Social Security considers 
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the health risk from air pollution produced from motor vehicles fairly small 
(Hickman, 1990). 
10.5 Air Pollution Impacts 
Air pollution impacts may be discussed under two main headings; these are: 
1. Impacts on People's Health 
2. Impacts on the Natural Environment 
10.5.1 Health Impacts 
10.5.1.1 Carbon Monoxide (CO) 
CO can have detrimental effects on health due to the interference with the absorption 
of oxygen by red blood cells. This may lead to increased morbidity and adversely 
affects fertility and there is evidence that it affects people's productivity (Button, 
1993). Studies have shown that in North America and Europe, 50% of urban residents 
are exposed to unacceptable high level of CO (French 1990). Exposure to high 
concentrations, where the CO haemoglobin compound reaches levels in the blood of 
50% may result in death (OECD 1988). Some other studies stated that, at much lower 
blood levels of 5% and 1.3%, the impact is a reduction in people's reaction speeds 
and physical performance (TEST 1991). 
10.5.1.2 Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) 
The exposure to nitrogen dioxide N02 increase susceptibility to respiratory infections, 
decrease gaseous exchanges in human blood and affect pulmonary functioning (Walsh 
1989; OECD 1988). The exposure to N02, in the short term, results in respiratory 
problems in children (OECD 1988). Some recent research has shown that the rise in 
NOx levels has lead to an increase in hay fever attacks, whose occurrence should had 
been decreasing due to generally lower pollen levels (TEST 1991 cited from Adams 
1990). 
10.5.1.3 Sulphur Dioxide (S02) 
Research studies have shown that at high concentrations, S02 is strong irritant to eyes 
and can cause cardiovascular problems including bronchitis and others (TEST 1991). 
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The most serious health effects associated with S02 are found when exposure occurs 
in conjunction with elevated levels of particulate. S02 may be absorbed onto the 
surface of particulate matter which is then inhaled deep into lungs where sulphuric 
acid is formed. Holman (1989) stated that both short and long term exposure under 
these conditions have been associated with increased mortality and morbidity rates. 
10.5.1.4 Suspended Particulate Matter 
These embrace fine solids or liquid particles found in the air or in emissions such as 
dust, smoke or smog. The sources include particles stemming from wear and tear of 
tyres and brakes and matter resulting from engine, and especially diesel engine, 
combustion. Suspended particulate matter are reported to be a cause of cancer. In 
addition, a strong correlation has been established between suspended particulate and 
child mortality and total mortality rates in urban areas (TEST 1991). Another survey 
from the US has shown that above normal levels of respiratory illnesses among 
children living in cities with high particulate levels derived from transport vehicles 
(Dockery et al 1989). 
10.5.1.5 Lead (Pb) 
Renner (1988), cited by TEST (1991), reported that lead has long been considered as 
a major threat to human health, especially its harmful effect on intelligence in young 
children. According to the IUR (1987), over 2 million people in the European 
Community are reported to suffer from Pb poisoning, and Pb emissions are 
considered to be a major air pollution problem, especially in densely populated third 
world cities. A recent study in Mexico City concluded that 7 out of 10 new-born 
babies have Pb blood levels exceeding the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
guidelines (French 1990). 
10.6 Transport Share in Air Pollution 
Transport is a source of many harmful gases. Relative to other sectors, transport is 
considered to be one of the major contributors of the atmospheric pollutants. Table 
10.1 presents the share of transport emissions in total emissions for the OECD 
countries, while table 10.2 shows the case for the UK. 
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Table 10.1 Share of transport emissions in total emissions (%) 
Pollutant OECD total North America OECD Europe 
Nitrogen Oxides (Nox) 47 51 48 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) 71 81 75 
Hydrocarbons (HC) 39 45 40 
Sulphur Oxides (Sox) 4 3 3 
Particulate 14 8 13 
Source: OECD (1988) 
Note: data refers to 1987 or the most recent year available 
Table 10.2 Share of Transport Emissions in Total Emissions in the UK in 1992 
Pollutant All emissions Transport 
thousand tonnes % thousand tonnes % 
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) 2750 100 1670 61 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) 6710 100 6100 91 
Sulphur Oxides (SOx) 3100 100 N/A N/A 
Particulate 457 100 221 48 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 566600 100 139400 25 
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) 2560 100 1220 48 
Lead (Pb) 1.7 100 1.7 100 
Source: This table is derived from (DTp 1994) 
As table 10.1 shows, for most of OECD countries, transport has a significant share in 
the air pollution emissions and more than 70% of CO emissions are attributable to 
transport modes. The UK emission data as presented in table 10.2, shows that 
transport has even greater share in air pollution emissions. 
10.7 Road and Railways Contribution in Air Pollution Emissions 
Table 10.3 demonstrates the contribution of both road and rail in the air pollution 
emissions. 
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Table 10.3 Road and rail share in air pollution emissions for 1993 (thousands) 
All transport road rail other transport 
tons % tons % tons % tons % 
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) 1670 100 1460 87.4 50 3 160 9.6 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) 6100 100 6050 99.2 10 0.14 40 0.66 
Sulphur Oxides (SOx) N/A N/A 62 2 3 0.01 N/A N/A 
Particulate 221 100 216 98 1 0.5 4 1.5 
Carbon Dioxide (C02) 139400 100 121200 87 5800 4.1 12400 8.9 
Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOC) 
1220 100 1170 96 10 0.8 40 3.2 
Lead (Pb) 1.7 000 1.7 100 0 0 0 0 
Source: data in this table are from various sources (DTp 1994,1993, DOE 1992) ) 
Having shown that transport modes contribution to air pollution emissions is very 
significant, table 10.3 shows that most of transport emissions are mainly from road 
vehicles, while rail and other transport modes share is insignificant compared with 
road share. Almost all the emissions of lead and CO are from road vehicles and most 
of particulate emissions are attributable to road. 
Rail emissions are very low compared with road. This is partly because of the lower 
density of railways compared with roads. But the main reason is the polluting 
characteristics of both modes. This become more clear when comparing the emissions 
of both modes in terms of emission unit per passenger or tonne km. 
Studies that considered the emission efficiencies of road and rail have concluded that 
road C02 emissions are 2-7 times higher per km for fright and 1.1 times higher per 
km for passenger travel. Per passenger km, road transport emits 14 times more CO, 
2.4 times more VOC and 1.2 times more NOx than does rail (TEST, 1991). 
10.8 Polluting Characteristics of Different Vehicles 
The following diagram illustrates the emission indicator for different types of vehicles 
and for different circumstances of operation. 
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Emission of Pollutants (g/vehicle km) 
Figure 10.1 Emission Indicators in Road Transport 
Source: derived and adapted from Commission of European Communities 1992. 
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10.9 Costing of Air Pollution 
10.9.1 Introduction 
The costing of air pollution impacts has proved to be a difficult task. This is partly 
due to the difficulty of isolating the impacts of air pollution from other impacts. The 
obvious example of this difficulty, is the health impacts of air pollution, though some 
studies managed to have a rough estimate of air pollution impacts on human health. 
Other reasons of the difficulty of air pollution costing is related to the poor perception 
of the extent of air pollution, and its impacts on health in particular restricts the use of 
some monetary evaluation techniques that may be used to measure people's 
willingness to pay to reduce air pollution, such as the Hedonic Pricing Technique and 
the Contingent Valuation Method. 
This section outlines the monetary evaluation techniques for air pollution impacts, and 
review the previous results of costing air pollution of transport modes. After that an 
explanation of the method used in this study to estimate the air pollution costs for both 
road and rail is made. This is followed by the results of the estimation. 
10.9.2 Monetary Valuation Techniques 
In general, the techniques available for deriving private preference monetary values 
for environmental impacts are (Planning 1992): 
1. Indirect methods: these methods mainly used to identify a relationship between the 
environmental attribute concerned and its impacts. For example, establishing a 
relationship between the physical or health damage and the level of pollution. The 
most widespread use of indirect techniques is in obtaining money values of air 
pollution via dose-response relationships. 
2. Direct methods: this method tries to measure the people's willingness to pay for the 
environmental impacts. The following are the main techniques: 
a) Hedonic pricing 
b) Travel cost method 
c) Contingent valuation method 
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Each of these techniques has some advantages and disadvantages, and yields different 
results. Some of the techniques is more relevant for monetising some environmental 
attributes than the others. 
10.9.3 Estimating the Social Costs of Air Pollution 
Three main methods may be used to estimate the social costs of air pollution, these 
are: 
1. Quantifying the cost of reducing air pollution. This is by evaluating the costs and 
expenditure incurred in the car manufacturing and refining industry in order to reduce 
air pollution emissions. In other words to measure the extra costs of cars (extra 
equipment to be fitted, impacts on operating costs; especially fuel) and other extra 
costs incurred for reducing transport emissions. 
2. Estimating the cost of the damage caused by air pollution. This is by measuring the 
damage impacts of air pollution, for example, health damage costs, agriculture 
damage costs, and the cost of damage to buildings. The most widespread technique 
used is the dose-response technique. The technique is based on creating a physical 
damage function relating different levels of air pollution (the dose) to differing levels 
of damage (the response). Once the physical damage function is identified, the level 
of air pollution can be fed into it to predict the likely health impacts, for example. 
Then these can be translated into money values using the value of life estimations. 
Other impacts upon buildings and materials damage, agriculture losses and forest 
degradation can be also evaluated the same way. 
3. The third method of estimating the social costs of air pollution, is by looking at 
people's Willingness to Pay (WTP) for reducing air pollution to acceptable levels. 
The most widespread techniques of identifying the WTP are Hedonic Pricing (HP) 
and The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). The poor perception of air pollution 
impacts may restrict the use of these techniques, or underestimate the social cost of air 
pollution measured. 
It should be noted that in a rational and fully informed economy, the three method of 
estimating social cost of air pollution should give the same result. In other words, the 
marginal expenditure for air pollution reduction on the car and refining industries 
should be equal to the marginal damage cost of air pollution, and should also be equal 
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to the willingness to pay for those who are affected by air pollution. However, it is 
usually argued (Verhoef 1994) that the marginal expenditure on air pollution reduction 
(in terms of extra cost of manufacturing transport vehicles) does not reflect the net 
external cost of air pollution. This is because of the program adapted to reduce vehicle 
emission is unlikely to reduce the damage cost of air pollution to zero. So Verhoef 
suggests that in addition to the marginal expenditure on vehicles, there will be an 
element of air pollution damage cost that has to be included in order to estimate the 
net external air pollution cost. 
10.9.4 Recent Empirical Estimates of the External Costs of Road Traffic Air 
Pollution 
Table 10.4 presents selected estimates of external costs of road traffic air pollution. 
Table 10.4 Selected estimates of external costs of road traffic air pollution 
Author year country value % of GDP Method 
Shulz 1987 FGR DM 3-6 bin 0.15-0.30 30% of total damage to health, 
buildings, and forests due to 
air pollution 
DM 5-16 bin 0.25-0.79 30 % of total willingness to pay 
for clean air 
Perrin 1984 EC $17.5 bin 0.5 Cost of complete introduction of 
catalytic converters 
Quinet 1989 General 0.4 Comparison of studies 
Kanafani 1983 Europe 0.16-0.21 Comparison of studies 
USA 0.3 
Bouladon 1979 general 0.6-1.2 Vehicle price increase plus 
unclear extra charge 
Bleijenberg 1988 NL DFL 1200-1700 0.27-0.38 Prevention at source plus 
remaining damage 
V. D. Mei's 1983 NL DFL 100-1200 0.03-0.31 Abatement at source 
Dietz 1990 NL DFL 619 min. 0.14 Net government costs of 
abatement of environmental 
pollution incl. noise; all modes 
McKinsey 1986 NL DFL 600 min 0.14 Prevention plus damage 
including noise 
Dogs 1991 FGR DM 12.1 bin 0.49 Roads: damage cost 
DM 0.2 bin 0.01 Rail : damage cost 
DM 22.3 bin 0.91 Roads : WTP 
DM 0.3 bin 0.01 Rail : WTP 
Gru 986 FGR DM 4.3-10.3 bin 0.22-0.53 Damage cost 
Source: Verhoef (1994) 
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As can be seen from table 10.4, the external air pollution cost for road traffic ranges 
between 0.12 and 0.91 % of GDP. This wide range is a result of using different 
methods of the estimation, as well as the way the external costs have been looked at. 
Some studies looked at the external costs as the expenditure on air pollution 
prevention at source, while others have considered both the expenditure on prevention 
and the damage cost together as the external cost of air pollution. One of the studies 
(Dogs 1991) has looked at the cost of air pollution from railways, and as can be seen 
the resultant figure for railway cost is much lower than that produced for roads. One 
reason for that is the differing densities (lengths of road and railways network) for 
both rail and road. However, the main reason is the difference in polluting 
characteristics of road and railways. 
Pearce et al (1993) has produced an estimate of the cost of air pollution from road 
transport in the United Kingdom. These estimates are based on the damage cost per 
unit of pollutants. The results are presented in table 10.5. 
Table 10.5 The cost of air pollution from road transport, 1991 
Pollutant Emissions 
(thousand tonnes) 
Unit value 
(£/tonne) 
Damage 
costs 
(£m) 
1. Carbon dioxide (C02) 30000 13.33 400 
2. Methane (CH4) 10 70 0.7 
3. Sulphur oxides (SOx) 58 220.69 12.8 
4. Nitrogen oxides (NOx) 1400 190 266 
5. Carbon monoxide (CO) 6000 10.43 62.6 
6. Volatile organic compounds (VOCs) 970 N/A N/A 
7. Particulate 208 9778.84 2034 
8. Lead (Pb) 1.8 N/A N/A 
Total 2776 
Source : Pearce et al (1993) 
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10.9.5 Road Air Pollution Costs 
The study method of estimating the costs of air pollution from road transport is based 
on the damage unit cost produced by Pearce (1993) and shown above. These figures 
are used to estimate the total damage costs of each emission pollutant for 1993. Then 
the cost is allocated between the 8 road types identified by the study. Figure 10.2 
shows the structure of the cost estimation and allocation process between road types. 
As can be seen, the allocation method of air pollution costs is based on the polluting 
characteristics of different vehicles under different circumstances of operation and the 
flows of traffic for each road type. 
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Figure 10.2 Air pollution cost estimates and allocation 
202 
Table 10.6 shows the estimated total air pollution costs by road class and type of 
emission. The cost per pcu km is given in table 10.7. 
Table 10.6 Road air pollution cost for 1993 by road class and pollutant (£ million) 
Road type Carbon 
monoxide 
Nitrogen 
oxide 
Carbon 
dioxide 
Sulphur 
dioxide 
Particulate Total 
Motorways 5.35 57.68 228.06 3.38 216.19 510.7 
Major urban central 4.67 8.59 74.03 0.28 130.27 217.8 
Major urban non-central 14.16 38.81 263.29 1.97 390.82 709.1 
Single carriageway 5.86 45.98 196.49 2.14 242.63 493.1 
Dual carriageway 4.98 42.21 259.34 2.45 198.52 507.4 
Minor urban central 2.98 14.07 119.71 0.45 204.11 341.3 
Minor urban non-central 22.57 46.07 373.92 1.85 612.33 1056.8 
Minor single 2.62 24.08 97.13 1.16 117.36 117.4 
0 All roads 63.10 277.40 1611.96 13.68 2112.23 3836.03 
Table 10.7 Road air pollution cost by road class for 1993 
Road type Pence per pcu km 
1. Motorways 0.733 
2. Major urban central 1.31 
3. Major urban non-central 1.06 
4. Single carriageway 0.697 
5. Dual carriageway 0.718 
6. Minor urban central 2.16 
7. Minor urban non-central 1.12 
8. Minor single 0.513 
0 Average all roads 0.866 
The figures in table 10.7 shows that urban roads have higher unit cost than motorways 
and other rural roads. This is due to the higher polluting emission (g/vehicle km) of 
vehicles in urban areas compared with rural conditions. 
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10.9.6 Rail Air Pollution Costs 
Table 10.8 shows the estimated total cost of air pollution from railways. The cost is 
based on the damage unit cost produced by Pearce and the total emissions from 
railways. 
Table 10.8 Railways air pollution cost for 1993 
Type of pollutant Total cost (£ millions) 
1. Carbon monoxide 0.10 
2. Oxide of nitrogen 9.50 
3. Carbon dioxide 77.14 
4. Particulate 9.78 
5. Sulphur dioxide 0.66 
Total 97.00 
The estimated total cost is distributed between passenger and freight transport 
according to the total train km travelled for both passenger and freight . In 1993, train 
km is 348.9 and 39.6 millions for passenger and freight respectively. Accordingly, 
the allocation of air pollution costs would be 87.1 and 9.9 millions for passenger and 
fright respectively. Based on the total rail passenger and tonne km in 1993, this gives 
a cost of 0.27 and 0.063 pence per passenger and tonne km respectively. 
10.10 Chapter Summary 
The chapter is concerned with the air pollution benefits of rail schemes. It starts by 
discussing why to incorporate air pollution in the assessment of rail schemes and the 
extent to which air pollution is incorporated in the current practice of rail investment 
appraisal. Then the nature and health impacts of air pollution are outlined, followed 
by an outline of the contribution of transport modes in air pollution emissions. The 
comparison between road and rail shares of air pollution shows that road transport 
emissions are much higher compared with rail. 
The chapter then demonstrates the pollution characteristics of road vehicles. For most 
of the pollutants, road vehicles' emissions per km are much higher in urban areas 
compared with non-urban areas. This is followed by identifying the monetary 
valuation techniques of air pollution costs, which is either indirectly by establishing a 
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relationship between air pollution level and its impacts, or directly by measuring 
people's willingness to pay for reducing air pollution impacts and the recent empirical 
estimates of the external costs of road traffic air pollution are reviewed. 
After that the study method of estimating air pollution costs for both road and rail is 
detailed. The cost estimates are based on the air pollution unit damage cost produced 
by Pearce (1993). The results are disaggregated by the 8 road types identified by the 
study. Urban roads have higher unit cost compared with rural roads, and this is 
explained by the differing pollution characteristics of vehicles. Rail costs are 
disaggregated by freight and passenger. The total estimated cost of road air pollution 
is more than 38 times as much as that for railways. 
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Chapter 11 
Cost Misperception (Vehicle Operating Costs) 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to the fourth item of non-user benefits of rail investment 
schemes concerned by the study. This is vehicle operating costs (VOC) of road use. 
As shown in chapter 6, VOC of road use is considered by the study to be a case of 
cost misperception. It follows that, the benefits of a rail scheme with respect to road 
vehicle operating costs, is only a correction to be made in order to incorporate the 
misperceived part of vehicle operating costs by motorists. The amount of correction 
depends, as will be seen in this chapter, on the extent to which road motorists do 
misperceive VOC, and the existence and magnitude of any price distortions such as 
taxes and subsidies attached with road vehicle operating cost elements. 
The chapter illustrates why the VOC of using roads needs to be incorporated in the 
appraisal framework of rail investment schemes, and how the incorporation process is 
made. The chapter also presents the results of the estimation process of vehicle 
operating cost misperception that are measured for the UK road network and need to 
be incorporated and corrected for in assessing the benefits of rail investment schemes 
in the UK. The results are disaggregated by vehicle and road types. The breakdown of 
roads is the same as for other non-user benefits explained in the previous chapters. 
11.2 Perception of Road Vehicle Operating Costs 
The problem of cost misperception is a common one in transport studies. The reasons 
behind the misperception, as mentioned in chapter 6, vary from one cost item to 
another. In the case of vehicle operating costs, the reasons include: 
1. The cost item does not vary with the use of the vehicle, such as insurance and 
licence costs. 
2. The costs may be so small and then it does not affect the decision of making 
a trip. 
3. The existence of a tax or subsidy element in vehicle operating costs. 
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Whatever the reasons behind the failure of a full perception of marginal social VOC, 
the result is that vehicle operating cost of making a trip on the road will have two 
values, these are: 
1. Value to the motorist, this is the costs that the motorist perceives or considers in 
his decision of making a road trip and is called perceived or behavioural cost. 
2. Value to the society, this is the real cost of the trip that the society scarifies as a 
result of a road trip. This include all the costs involved in a road trip regardless of 
who bears the cost and is called marginal social or resource cost. 
Resource and behavioural cost of a road trip will be different as far as the motorists 
do misperceive some of their vehicle operating costs. 
Another reason of the divergence between resource and behavioural cost of making a 
trip on the road is the existence of taxes or subsidies on some of the cost items, such 
as fuel tax. For a motorist, the tax element is perceived as part of fuel price, and then 
is considered in his decision of making a road trip. For the society, the tax element is 
only a transfer payments, and does not reflect a true cost to the society. Then the 
resource cost of a trip will not include any tax payments. 
11.3 Why Incorporate Vehicle Operating Cost Misperception? 
When assessing investment schemes on a social basis, the target is to identify the costs 
sacrificed and benefits gained from the society viewpoint. That means costs and 
benefits that does not reflect a real costs and benefits to the society are not included. It 
follows, that costs and benefits have to be valued on the basis of their real resource 
values to the society. 
In the context of rail investment schemes, the issue of road vehicle operating costs can 
be looked at as follows: 
1. The existence of a divergence between resource and behavioural vehicle 
operating costs because road motorists do fail to perceive the full vehicle operating 
costs of their trips. In this case a rail investment scheme that attracts some road users 
to use railways instead will result in some benefits to the society equal to the 
difference between the resource and behavioural vehicle operating costs for those who 
shift to use railways (Movers). Put differently, a road motorist used to make a trip on 
the road that costs him £4 in total. But because of misperception of the cost on roads, 
208 
the real cost to the society of that trip was £5. After improving railways, the motorist 
decided to use railways in his travel. That means a savings to the society of £1, which 
is the extra cost previously (before the railway scheme) imposed on the society and 
not considered by the trip maker. For more illustration, figure 11.1 (a) presents the 
case of misperception graphically. As can be seen, VOCR and VOCP represent 
resource and perceived road vehicle operating costs. DI and D2 are road travel 
demand curves before and after the rail scheme. Q1 Q2 is the number of road trips 
moved to use rail as a result of the scheme. As a result, an area of benefits emerges 
equal to ABCD. This is the amount of unperceived VOC by those who moved to rail. 
In other words, the area ABCD reflects the resource cost released or saved as a result 
of rail scheme. 
Cost 
A BVOCR Tax 
OCP Cost 
C 
D2 'DI III \D2'D1 
Q2 Q1 Flow qz q1 Flow 
a) cost misperception b) existence of tax 
Figure 11.1 Vehicle operating cost misperception 
2. An existence of a divergence between resource and behavioural road vehicle 
operating cost due to an element of tax or subsidy is incorporated in the vehicle 
operating cost components. A case example of this is the fuel tax and any form of 
subsidy to public transport users such as fare being lower than the real cost of 
journeys. In this case when a rail investment scheme is assessed on a social basis, an 
element of correction has to be made for such difference between resource and 
behavioural costs of the road journeys that now transferred to railways, and 
previously made on the road. Figure 11.1 (b) shows the existence of tax on road 
VOC. This means that the perceived value of VOC (VOCP) is above the resource 
value (VOCR). When rail scheme lead to shifting the number of trips glq2 from road 
b/ VOCp 
DI NI. \l cI Idt VOCR 
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to rail, an amount of tax revenue equal to the area abcd is lost. This amount does not 
reflect a real resources but rather a transfer payments. So when assessing rail scheme 
on a social basis, this amount of tax is to be corrected for. 
11.4 Determinants of Vehicle Operating Costs 
The Department of Transport, in planning road construction and maintenance, 
identifies vehicle operating costs as a function of distance and average speed of travel. 
The costs involved consist of fuel, oil, tyres, maintenance and depreciation. The 
depreciation in value of private motor cars is not included. The general formula used 
is as follows (DTp, 1981): 
VOC=a+b+cS2 (11.1) 
Where: 
VOC = vehicle operating cost per kilometre (pence per vehicle km). 
a, b, c= are constants. 
S= average speed (km/h). 
The values of the constants a, b, and c are functions of vehicle type and the cost item. 
In other words, separate values are calculated for cars, light goods vehicles (under 30 
cwt unladen), heavy goods vehicles and buses. In addition, separate values are 
calculated for fuel and non-fuel operating costs (DTp, 1981). 
The manual of the Cost Benefit Analysis program (COBA) identifies the values of 
those constants for different vehicle and cost categories. Separate values are identified 
for perceived and resource vehicle operating costs. The values for perceived and 
resource costs are based on the following assumptions: 
1. for non-working cars only fuel costs of VOC are perceived and; 
2. for other vehicles the full costs of operation are assumed to be perceived. 
In addition, the values takes account of fuel tax, which is perceived for all vehicle 
categories but does not reflect a real resource costs. 
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11.5 Methodology of Estimating Vehicle Operating Cost Misperception 
11.5.1 Introduction 
The study objective with respect to vehicle operating cost misperception, is to identify 
the difference between the perceived and resource costs and then the amount to be 
incorporated in rail appraisal schemes to correct for road vehicle operating cost 
misperception. For the consistency with other non-user benefits estimated in this 
study, this correction is disaggregated by the same road type breakdown. 
This section explains the method used to estimate vehicle operating cost misperception 
for the UK road network. 
11.5.2 Methodology Framework and the Steps of the Process 
Figure 11.3 demonstrates the framework of the methodology used and the following 
sections explain the steps of the process. 
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Figure 11.2 Methodology framework of estimating vehicle operating cost 
misperception for the UK road network 
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1. Step One: Vehicle Operating Cost Formula 
As mentioned above, section 11.4, COBA manual identifies vehicle operating costs as 
a function of average speed of travel, and gives the values of the parameters for the 
formula. The study calculations of both perceived and resource road vehicle operating 
costs are based on the COBA formula and parameters. 
2 Step Two: Updating the Parameters 
The values of the parameters a, b, and c of VOC formula are given in the COBA 
manual for 1988 average prices and values. These values are updated for 1993 as 
suggested in COBA manual by the growth in fuel prices. 
3. Step Three: Estimating the Misperception 
The following formula shows the calculation of the difference between perceived and 
resource vehicle operating costs for different road types: 
r )2 -b nui C ri = am, _ ap, + 
bnv 
, , lý 
+ (c - )(S , 71 (11.2) 
ýr 
Where: 
C rv 
°'dhl = amount of correction indicates the difference between resource and 
perceived cost for road type r, vehicle type v, for the corresponding month 
of the year m, day of the week d, hour of the day h, and location point on 
road network I (£/vehicle km). 
aRv, aß, = values of the constant (a) for vehicle type v for resource and perceived 
COST. 
bRv 
, bA, = values of the constant (b) for vehicle type v for resource and perceived 
cost. 
CRv, cA, = values of the constant (c) for vehicle type v for resource and perceived 
cost. 
S I1 W= travel speed for road type r, for month of year m, day of week d, hour of 
day h, and location point on the road network 1 (km/h) and that is 
measured in chapter 7. 
It should be noted that the value of travel speed that used for measuring vehicle 
operating costs is measured on the same basis and assumptions that used for 
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measuring the marginal congestion cost externality and that explained in detail in 
chapter 7. In other words, vehicle operating costs estimates incorporate the 
distributions of traffic flows for different types of roads. It is worth mentioning that, 
according to COBA, the values of a, b, c for cars and light goods vehicles (for fuel 
element only) are 15 % lower on motorways compared with other roads. This has been 
incorporated in the calculation process that is carried out by a BASIC computer 
program as shown in appendix 1. 
4. Step Four: Average Weighted Correction. 
For each road and vehicle type, the intention is to produce a value for the amount of 
correction for road vehicle operating costs, that reflects and incorporates the 
variations in traffic (seasonally throughout the year, daily throughout the week, hourly 
throughout the day , and the location distribution on the road network) and 
incorporates road type and characteristics. This is undertaken by measuring the 
average weighted value of the difference between resource and perceived vehicle 
operating costs. This is calculated as follows: 
12 7 24 1 
Cmdhl X/ý mdhl X Smdhl 
rv 
qr 
'_ 
m-1 d=l h 1=1 
rv 12 7 24 1ý1 
1" 3ý 
1q mdhl mdhl 
rX . 
Sr 
m=1 d=1 h=1 1=1 
Where: 
grmdhI = hourly per lane traffic flow for road type r, for month of year m, day of 
week d, hour of day h, and location point 1 (pcu/h/lane). 
C rv = average weighted amount of correction indicates the difference between 
resource and perceived cost for road type r, vehicle type v (£/vehicle km). 
5. Step 5: Depreciation Cost of Private Cars 
As mentioned above, COBA formula for resource and behavioural vehicle operating 
costs does not include the cost of depreciation of private cars. This is a resource cost, 
and need also to be incorporated in the appraisal framework of rail investment 
schemes. 
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Automobile Association (AA 1994) gives the figures for standing and running costs 
for private cars for different engine capacities. Depreciation cost is given per annum 
for each engine size capacity assuming 10000 miles a year. These figures with the 
number of cars for each engine size for 1993 as supplied in the Department of 
Transport Statistics (DTp, 1993) are used to estimate depreciation per km for each 
engine size. An average weighted depreciation for all cars is produced, which is 
considered to be a resource cost and to be added to the difference between resource 
and perceived costs estimated in the previous step to give total amount of correction to 
be made for private cars. 
11.6 Results 
11.6.1 Amount of Correction by Vehicle Type and Road Class 
Table 11.1 shows the amount of VOC correction disaggregated by vehicle and road 
type. 
Table 11.1 Resource minus perceived VOC by vehicle and road type for 1993 
(p/vehicle km) 
Vehicle Type 
Road Type Car Light goods vehicle Heavy goods Buses and 
vehicle Coaches 
1. Motorway 2.91 -2.29 -6.80 -7.55 
2. Major urban central 2.22 -3.01 -6.36 -7.83 
3. Major urban non-central 2.65 -2.41 -5.75 -6.91 
4. Single carriageway 2.68 -2.39 -6.00 -6.94 
5. Dual carriageway 2.50 -2.65 -6.73 -7.47 
6. Minor urban central 2.44 -2.70 -5.99 -7.34 
7. Minor urban non-central 2.68 -2.37 -5.71 -6.84 
8. Minor rural single 2.65 -2.43 -6.16 -7.04 
0 Average all roads 2.66 -2.45 -6.36 -7.12 
As can be seen, for cars the value of the difference between resource and perceived 
VOC is positive. This reflects the amount of non-fuel VOC that is not perceived by 
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car users for non-working trips. For other types of vehicles, the difference is negative 
reflecting the amount of fuel tax. 
11.6.2 Amount of Correction by Personal Car Unit 
For the consistency of other non-user benefits measured in the previous chapters, the 
figures in table 11.1 are used to estimate the amount of VOC correction per personal 
car unit km (pcu km) based on the proportions of vehicle types for each road class. 
The results are shown in the following table. 
Table 11.2 Amount of VOC correction by road class for 1993 
Road Type pence/pcu km 
1. Motorway 1.05 
2. Major urban central 1.43 
3. Major urban non-central 1.49 
4. Single carriageway 1.45 
5. Dual carriageway 1.06 
6. Minor urban central 1.61 
7. Minor urban non-central 1.79 
8. Minor rural single 1.63 
" Average all roads 1.43 
11.6.3 Depreciation of Private Cars by Road Class 
As mentioned before, the depreciation of private cars is estimated based on the annual 
depreciation for each engine size. This gives a 10.23 pence per car km. This figure is 
used along with the number of car km and personal car unit for each road type to 
estimate the amount of depreciation per personal car unit km (pcu km). The results 
are shown in table 11.3. 
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Table 11.3 Depreciation cost by road class for 1993 
Road Type Pence/ cu km 
1. Motorway 7.88 
2. Major urban central 8.69 
3. Major urban non-central 8.18 
4. Single carriageway 8.28 
5. Dual carriageway 8.18 
6. Minor urban central 8.80 
7. Minor urban non-central 8.59 
8. Minor rural single 8.49 
" Average all roads 8.31 
11.7 Chapter Summary 
The chapter is concerned with the incorporation of VOC misperception in the social 
appraisal of rail schemes. It shows that when assessing rail schemes on a social basis, 
a correction is to be made for the misperceived part of road VOC. The methodology 
of measuring the amount of correction is based on the use of VOC formula that is 
used by the Department of Transport in assessing road scheme benefits. The 
methodology incorporates the variations in traffic over time and place. For all road 
types, an average correction of 1.43 pence per pcu km is estimated. In addition to 
that, an average correction of 8.31 pence per pcu km is estimated for the depreciation 
of private cars. 
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Chapter 12 
Cost Misperception (Accidents) 
12.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to the last item of rail investment non-user benefits concerned 
by the study. This is the safety benefits of rail schemes. 
The chapter, demonstrates in section 12.2, that road accidents do not reflect any 
external effects, and then unlike congestion and pollution effects, when considering 
rail investment non-user benefits, road accident externality can be safely ignored. 
However, section 12.3, shows how accident costs present a case of cost 
misperception, and then this misperception has to be corrected for and incorporated in 
a social framework of rail scheme appraisal. 
The chapter then explains the method used to derive the resource and perceived 
accident costs for road and rail. This includes the types of accident costs that 
considered by the study to be unperceived for both road and rail, and the valuation of 
accident costs. For the consistency with other non-user benefits considered in the 
previous chapters, the results of road accident costs are disaggergated by the same 8 
road types identified by the study. 
12.2 Accident Costs and Justifying the Investment in Road and Rail 
12.2.1 Magnitude of Road and Rail Accident Risk and Costs 
From their nature, road and railways have different implications for safety of humans. 
This is due to the very different characteristics of both modes in terms of the control 
of the vehicle, interaction between vehicles, and the number of travellers on board. 
Despite the fall in fatal accidents on Britain's roads, according to TEST (1991), the 
risk of being killed on the road is over five times that for rail per passenger kilometre. 
The chance of being injured on the road is seven times as high as railways. 
The Department of Transport estimated the financial cost of road accidents to be £5.5 
billion in 1988 . On the 
basis of unit costs, death and injury costs for road are £4.9 
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and £2 per billion passenger kilometre, respectively, while for rail they are £0.5 and 
£0.2 respectively (TEST, 1991) 
However, the direct comparison between road and rail on the basis of total accident 
costs may under or overestimate the true resource costs. This is for reasons, such as: 
first, the underreporting of accidents which is probably associated with road accidents, 
that makes rail accident statistics more accurate than road. Second the definition of 
accident for both modes might differ slightly, especially the definition of the level of 
injury to passengers. For example, in the UK a road death is defined as one reported 
within 30 days of the accident, but for rail the death has to occur before publication of 
the British Rail end of year accident report. The third reason is the time loss cost. If 
accident costs are to be compared, the difference in travel time should to be included. 
12.2.2 Justifying Road and Rail Investment 
Road investment decisions, being based on the Cost Benefit Analysis (COBA) 
incorporates the estimated savings in road accident costs from the schemes. Bearing in 
mind the higher accident risk of roads than that for railways, the inclusion of accident 
cost savings in road investment decision is therefore an advantage towards and in 
favour of the justification of road investment. On the other hand, rail investment 
schemes are assessed on a financial basis. Financial appraisal only considers the 
financial impacts of the scheme on the British Rail, hence accident cost savings are 
not incorporated. This might be seen as a disadvantage against rail investment 
justification. Neither COBA for roads nor the commercial appraisal for rail 
incorporate the implications of mode switching on the accident costs of road and rail. 
The fact that road accident magnitude is higher than that for rail, raise the issue of the 
potential rail investment opportunities that would be justified if the effects of rail 
schemes on road accidents were to be incorporated in the rail investment scheme 
appraisals, and that otherwise, are not justified because rail schemes are being 
assessed on a commercial basis. This commercial appraisal practice of rail schemes 
does not allow for wider impacts of schemes, such as scheme implications on road 
accidents, to be incorporated. The higher the values placed on human lives, damage 
and police and administration accident costs, the higher the missing opportunities for 
rail investment schemes, due to the current rail appraisal practice. 
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As mentioned above, the CBA practice used for justifying road projects does not 
allow any effects of the road schemes on rail accidents. However, realising that rail 
accidents are of much lower magnitude than roads, this defect may not be very 
significant and may bring much less bias than its counterpart defect that is associated 
with rail scheme appraisal practice, that does not incorporate the scheme implications 
on road accidents. 
12.3 Road Accident External Effects 
Some activities are sources of external effects of the road system. As has been shown 
in the previous chapters, congestion and pollution costs are the most obvious examples 
and widely studied. Road accidents may also, even if of less magnitude, engender 
negative or positive external effects which, if not properly priced or otherwise 
internalised, can lead to resource misallocation. This section discusses the relationship 
between road accidents and the volume of traffic and whether road accident are an 
external effect or not. 
12.3.1 Road Accidents and the Volume of Traffic 
The key element in determining road accident external effects is the relationship 
between number of accidents and the flow of traffic. As in the case of road 
congestion, developed in chapter 7, the source of the external effect is the difference 
between the marginal and the average cost of an accident. If the number of accidents 
rise more than proportionately with the volume of traffic, then the marginal and 
average rate of accidents are not equal, (the marginal is above the average). It follows 
that, an extra vehicle journey increases the accident rate of other road users, causing 
an external effect. 
The issue of marginal and average rate of accidents has long been debated. The 
existing empirical evidence about the relationship between accidents and traffic flow is 
sparse. Vickrey (1969) used 1960-62 data for California freeways to investigate the 
relationship between average and marginal accident rates. He concluded that the ratio 
of marginal to average accident rate is 1.5. Vickrey results suggests a significant 
negative externality exists. Bailey (1970) criticised Vickrey (1969) for failing to allow 
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for the existence of a positive externality to road accidents. Bailey suggests that the 
number of accidents might grow less than proportionally with the flow of traffic. 
The 1982 Highway Cost Allocation Study ignored the issue of the relationship 
between accidents and traffic volume. This is on the grounds that no clear relationship 
between traffic and accidents are found (Vitaliano and Held 1991). 
According to Newbery (1988), the UK Department of Transport in its planning 
manuals, assumes that the relationship between accidents and traffic volume is 
proportional. He stated that this is analogous to the position of the US Federal 
Highway Administration of assuming a zero external effect. In estimating optimal 
road user charges for Great Britain, Newbery (1988) used a marginal to average 
accident rate ratio of 1.25. This figure is a compromise between Vickrey's figure of 
1.5 and the official figure assumed by the Department of Transport of 1. 
In considering the external road accident costs, Pearce (1993) concluded that evidence 
regarding whether there exists a link between the accident rate per PCU kilometre and 
traffic flow is ambiguous. 
The evidence analysed here offers little support for the notion that an important road 
accident externality exists and then supports the view of no significant external effects 
of road accidents exists. 
This view of no significant externality regarding accidents is supported by the findings 
of Vitaliano and Held (1991). They estimated the relationship between the number of 
accidents and traffic volume. Their analysis were based on a random sample of 399 
road segments covering urban and rural roads in New York State (USA) in 1985. No 
significant externality was detected by their research. They concluded that on very 
high volume of traffic on urban roads, the marginal to average accident rate ratio is 
1.06. On all other types of roads, a ratio of 0.98 was found. These findings contrast 
sharply with those of Vickrey, who estimated a ratio of 1.5 for California freeways in 
1962. The conclusions of the research are, however, consistent with the official view 
of both the UK Department of Transport and the US highway authority that no 
significant accident externality exists. 
Based on the results of the empirical research discussed above, it is probably safe to 
assume that the average and marginal accident rate are approximately equal, and then 
the external effects of accidents are very insignificant. It follows that for those who 
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are concerned with assessing non-user benefits of rail investment schemes, 
considering road accidents as a source of external effects of road transport and then a 
source of external benefits to the rail scheme is not relevant. 
However, this conclusion should not negate the fact that rail investment schemes do 
imply some road accident benefits. The accident benefits associated with rail 
investment schemes will be generated as a result of the fact that accident costs are not 
fully perceived by trip makers, and then there is some costs borne by the society. Put 
differently, the accident benefits of rail schemes will be in this case on the basis and a 
result of the misperception of the risks involved. 
12.4 Road Accident Cost Misperception 
12.4.1 Costs of Accidents 
A road accident will incur some or all of the following consequences: 
1. Peoples killed, this include vehicle users and pedestrians 
2. People seriously injured, vehicle users or pedestrians 
3. People slightly injured, again this includes users or pedestrians 
4. Damage to vehicles involved in the accident 
5. Damage to buildings, or any other property damage. 
6. Policing and administration work 
7. Medical treatment work to those injured 
8. Pain, suffering and grief for the relatives of the accident victims 
These are the direct consequences of an accident. There will be some other indirect 
impacts such as clearing the road after an accident. 
Both the direct and indirect consequences of an accident imply costs to individuals and 
the society at large. The term social accident costs is sometimes used to indicate the 
total costs of accidents. Quinet has estimated the social costs of road accidents in the 
UK to be 1.5 percent of GDP in 1986. 
12.4.2 Who Bears the Accident Costs 
The crucial question to be asked is who bears the costs of accidents. Put differently, 
does the road user consider all these types of costs in his decision to make a trip on 
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the road. And if not how much of the costs is considered in his decision. In fact, if 
the answer was that road users, in their decision of making a trip on the road, do 
consider all the implied costs of a potential road accident, that will mean resource and 
perceived accident cost are the same, and no consideration needed to be taken to 
account for road accident benefits when assessing rail projects on a social basis. 
However, this might not be the case. 
A road user may be very much concerned about himself being injured or killed in an 
accident, but he might not be bothered by the implied policing and administration 
costs of the accident. 
Another road user may not be fully aware of the real accident rate on the road, and 
hence he may underestimate the potential risk of being involved in an accident. 
It follows that, misperceiving the accident risk and costs involved by road users is not 
irrelevant in this case. Before proceeding to investigate which of the accident costs are 
perceived by users and which is not, an illustration of why and how the misperception 
of road accident costs is relevant and need to be corrected for in the social appraisal 
framework of rail schemes. 
12.4.3 Why Incorporate Road Accident Misperception in the Appraisal Framework 
of Rail Schemes? 
Regardless of the reasons, when road users misperceive the true accident risk and then 
the true accident costs, their decisions of using roads are based on a false risk and cost 
indicators. Their behaviour regarding travel on roads will be based on what they 
believe to be the accident risk or the accident costs. This situation results in a number 
of trips made on the road more or less than the optimal number of trips that would 
have happen if users had perceived the true risk rate or the true costs involved in road 
accident. Consequently, in addition to the costs borne by the users of roads, there will 
be an additional accident costs borne by the society equals to that amount of accident 
costs which (for some reasons) users fail to consider or to take account of when 
making a decision of a road trip. 
It follows that, when a rail investment scheme attracts some road users, the society at 
large will benefit. The benefit comes from the savings of accident costs that road 
users (movers to rail) would otherwise have imposed on the society as a result of their 
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misperception of the true road accident costs. Put differently, the transfer of some 
road users to rail will result in some resource costs saved, and that is to be considered 
as a social benefit to the rail investment project in question. 
12.4.4 How to Incorporate the Misperception? 
The process of incorporation of road accident cost misperception into the assessment 
framework of rail schemes requires knowledge of the amount of the costs that are not 
perceived or considered by road users. Discussing and investigating the perceived and 
unperceived road accident costs is shown in details in the following sections. In this 
section, with the help of figure 12.1, an illustration is made to show how this 
misperception of accident costs distorts the travel behaviour and then creates extra 
costs to the society. Then how a rail project may result in savings in the accident 
costs. 
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Figure 12.1 Road accident cost misperception 
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Figure 12.1 shows the case of a rail scheme that leads to a transfer of some road users 
to use the scheme. In (b), d, presents the demand curve for road use before the 
investment in rail takes place. PC is the perceived road accident costs, and RC is the 
resource road accident costs. The difference between RC and PC indicates to the 
amount of accident costs that road users fail to perceive. Before rail investment, road 
users adjust their travel behaviour to the point A, where the costs they perceive is 
equal to the benefit they derive from the trip with a travel volume of OQ1. This 
behaviour will result in an amount of extra resource cost equal to the area RBAP. 
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This area reflects the difference between the total cost of road accidents to the society 
and the total costs borne by the users of roads. 
When the rail scheme takes place, an amount of road trips equal to QIQ2 will move to 
use rail instead. The new demand curve for road use will now be d2, and road users 
adjust their travel behaviour to the point C. The new situation of travel on roads will 
mean that the amount of extra resource cost that borne by the society is reduced to be 
RDCP. In other words, an amount of resource cost saved equal to DBAC. This 
reflects the amount of unperceived cost by those road users who now moved to use 
rail. This amount of cost could be measured mathematically as follows: 
ERCR = (RCR -PCR)(Q, - Q2) (12.1) 
Where: 
ERCR = extra resource cost released as a result of the rail scheme due to the 
misperception of accident cost in road use (£) 
RCR = resource cost of accidents in roads (£/trip or passenger km) 
PCR = user perceived accident costs in roads (£/trip or passenger km) 
Qi-Q2 = movers from road to rail as a result of the rail scheme (trips or 
passenger km) 
It should be noted that in the case example above, figure 12.1, it is assumed that 
accident cost misperception prevails only on road. In reality, rail users may as well 
fail to perceive the full cost of the potential accidents in railways. In such a case, it is 
also relevant to correct for the misperceived rail accident costs. In fact, the intention 
of the study is to consider the issue of misperception with regard to rail accidents, as 
well as the road accidents. This will be demonstrated in a latter sections of this 
chapter. 
12.4.5 What are the Perceived and unperceived Costs of Road Accidents? 
A motor vehicle accident on the road would probably inflict all or some of the 
following costs to the society: 
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1. User casualties 
This include driver of the vehicle and other occupants. An accident may result in 
users killed, seriously injured or slightly injured. In 1992,2882,36375,219664 road 
users were killed, seriously injured, and slightly injured respectively in the United 
Kingdom. Those killed or injured of course inflict a social cost to the society. The 
cost will be a function of so many factors such as the age group and the level of 
injury. The cost of those killed or injured will be discussed latter. 
2. Pedestrian casualties 
When a road accident involves pedestrians, the result may be people killed, seriously 
injured or slightly injured. In 1992, about 1347 pedestrians were killed in road 
accidents in the UK, while the number of pedestrians seriously and slightly injured 
amounted 12837 and 37391 respectively. 
3. Cyclist casualties 
The number of pedal cycle casualties for 1992 are 204 killed, 3787 serious injury, and 
20764 slight injuries. 
4. Policing and administration costs of dealing with and sorting out 
accidents. 
5. Cost of the potential damage to buildings or any other property when 
accidents involve damages and injuries at the same time. 
6. Damage costs in damage only accidents 
The key question now is, which of these costs is considered in the user's decision of 
making a road trip and which is borne by the community. The answer to this question 
is not a straight-forward one. Fowkes et al (1990) in a study about track and external 
costs of road transport produced some figures of the percentage of accident costs 
borne by the user based on information produced in the Highway Economic Note 
(HEN 1). These figures are shown in table 12.1 
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Table 12.1. Percentage of accident costs borne by road user 
Type of accident Cost element 
lost output medical pain and police damage 
costs suffering costs to property 
Fatal 50 0 20 0 100 
Serious 50 0 80 0 100 
Slight 50 0 100 0 100 
Damage only 100 
Source : Fowkes et al (1990) 
The figures in table 12.1 suggest that users bear the whole cost of the property 
damage, while the whole costs of medical treatment and police costs are borne by the 
community. In the case of lost output, road users bear half of the cost, while for pain 
and suffering costs the percentage born by the user vary from 20% for fatal causality 
to 100% for the slight injury. 
The dividends of accident costs between user and the community in table 12.1 does 
not allow for different types of casualties. In other words, it suggests that half of the 
output lost and some percentage of suffering and pain are borne by the road user 
regardless of the type of casualty, user casualty or pedestrian, cyclist casualty. The 
user, in his decision of making a road trip, may consider the full risk and the full cost 
of himself or others with him in the vehicle, being killed or injured on a road 
accident, but he probably does not do the same for a pedestrian or cyclist casualty. In 
this case the dividends in table 12.1 may not be taken to indicate the magnitude of 
accident cost perception by the user of the road. 
The following sections illustrate and discuss the dividends of perceived and 
unperceived road accident costs pursued by the study in order to work out and 
estimate the resource and perceived road accident costs. The results of the estimation 
are disaggregated by road type alternatives, and will be presented and discussed in 
latter sections of this chapter. 
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12.4.5.1 Perceived Costs 
When a road user decides to make a trip on the road, he probably has two worries, 
these are: 
1. His vehicle being damaged, if he is involved in an accident 
2. Himself and his dependants (people with him in the vehicle) being killed or 
injured, if he is involved in a road accident 
Assuming that the user has a full knowledge of the accident rate and risk on the road 
he uses, these in fact would be the determinants of his decision. Based on that, the 
perceived accident costs by the user would be the user casualty costs and the damage 
costs (including damage only accidents). 
1. User casualty costs 
As mentioned above, a person when deciding to travel by road, will consider the full 
risk of being injured or killed, provided he is fully aware of the accident rate or risk 
on the road. The person's perception may depend on his age, sex, job, wealth, his 
own personality and character etc. When a motorist is accompanied by other 
travelling with him, those dependants will probably perceive the full risk of being 
involved in an accident. 
2. Costs of Vehicle Damage 
Provided that all vehicle users insure against accidents, this costs are probably 
perceived through insurance payments. But an argument might be raised that the 
whole idea and purpose of insurance is mainly to avoid paying the full cost of what is 
insured against. In this case, a person might not perceive the full cost of damage to 
his vehicle, and the difference between the total damage cost and what he pays for 
insurance will be unperceived. 
On the other hand, a user knows that his insurance premiums are an increasing 
function of the number of accidents he probably involved in. In addition, the person 
may consider the disappointment of having his decent car damaged or probably 
loosing it, beside the inconvenience of waiting few weeks for his car to be mended. 
This all support the study assumption that motorists may perceive the full damage 
cost. 
228 
12.4.5.2 The Unperceived Costs of Road Accidents? 
The unperceived accident costs assumed by the study are: 
1. Police and administration costs 
2. Pedestrian casualty costs 
3. Cyclist casualty costs 
In discussing the external road accident costs, Pearce (1993) stated that: 
"Evidence regarding whether there exists a link between the accident rate per PCU 
kilometre and traffic flow is ambiguous. There are however two definite external costs 
of accidents. In the first place it is clear that the costs of clearing up the aftermath of 
an accident is a cost not borne directly by the motorist and neither is the cost of his 
medical treatment. Secondly, the deaths and injuries of pedestrians and cyclists is 
external since it is not borne by the motorists responsible. " 
Based on this argument Pearce considered the external costs of road accident to 
amount to between £4.7 and £7.5 billion in 1991. This comprises the value of deaths 
and injuries to pedestrians and cyclists. 
As can be seen the nature of accident externalities identified by Pearce is that it is 
costs not borne by the motorist directly, and then not considered in his decision of 
making a road trip. This is consistent with the study dividends of accident costs 
between users and the community summarised in table 11.2 below 
1. Police and Administration Costs 
For a person travelling on the road one should not expect him to concern himself with 
the resultant policing and administration costs of his road accident. These costs will be 
fully borne by the state. 
2. Pedestrian Casualty Costs 
Road travellers, in their decision of travel, probably do not concern themselves with a 
possibility of killing or injuring a pedestrian on the road. Even if they may have much 
sympathy and sorry afterwards for those who injured or killed, the travel decision 
may hardly bear any attention to the pedestrian casualties. 
In addition, insurance companies do not, whoever, charge for the full costs of 
accidents to pedestrians, and it is logically so difficult to compensate a pedestrian who 
has been killed or injured in an accident. So the hazard to pedestrians and then the 
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costs are not reflected in the insurance payments, and then are not perceived by the 
road users. 
3. Cyclist Casualty Costs 
This group of costs have the same characteristics as with pedestrian casualty costs. 
Cyclist casualty costs will also fall outside the traveller decision function, and they 
could be considered fully unperceived. 
12.4.6 Conclusions 
Based on the above discussion, the study dividends of road accident perception are 
summarised in table 12.2. 
Table 12.2 Study dividends of road accident cost perception 
User Perceived costs Costs unperceived 
" User casualty costs " Pedestrian casualty costs 
" Damage to property costs " Police and administration 
" Damage only accidents costs " Cyclist casualty costs 
The dividends on table 12.2 are based on the following assumptions: 
1. That road travellers are well aware of the true accident risk of different modes 
of transport. 
2. The perception of the risk is the same for everybody. 
3. The accuracy of accident data. In other words, a full reporting of road accident 
data is made. 
However an argument might be raised about the magnitude of the validity of these 
assumptions. For example, one may expect that the perception of a person who never 
been involved in a road accident, despite having travelled by the road all of his life, 
different from a traveller who has been involved in one or two road accidents. In this 
case the outlined assumptions above will not hold. 
In addition, the reporting of road accidents may not be fully guaranteed. According to 
TEST (1991), cited from Davis (1989), road accidents in the UK are under-reported. 
Adams (1987), stated that, an examination of hospital data for the number of road 
accidents, revealed that approximately 30% of accident victims are not reported to the 
police. The findings of Ploweden and Hillman (1984) are that all cases of road fatality 
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were fully reported, but only 18 % of serious road casualties treated in hospital were 
reported. The degree of under reporting differed by road type and user and was most 
noticeable for cyclists, where 70 % of the cases were not reported (Adams 1987). 
12.5 Railway Accident Cost Misperception 
For the purpose of a comprehensive social appraisal framework for rail investment 
schemes, which is the main purpose and concern of this research, the misperception 
prevails in railway accident costs is also relevant to that comprehensive framework. 
The study considers also railway accident cost misperception in order to work out and 
estimate the difference between resource and perceived rail accident costs, and then to 
work out the correction factor to be incorporated in the appraisal framework along 
side with the correction factor for road accident cost misperception. The following 
sections outlines the reason of incorporating rail cost misperception, and the dividends 
pursued by the study in identifying the perceived and non-perceived rail accident 
costs. 
12.5.1 Why Incorporating Rail Accident Cost Misperception? 
For similar reason and explanation made in sections 12.4.3 and 12.4.4, the 
misperception of railway accident cost is relevant to be incorporated when assessing 
rail investment schemes on social basis. Figure 12.2 is similar to figure 12.1, the only 
difference is that in figure 12.2, it is assumed that accident cost misperception prevails 
in rail as well as in road. 
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Figure 12.2 Accident cost misperception in both road and rail 
As can be seen in figure 12.2 (a), PC1 and RC1 are the perceived and resource rail 
accident costs before the investment. For after the investment in rail, this is 
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represented by PC2 and RC2. Before the investment takes place in rail, the area 
R1KLP1 ( also equal to the area R2VZP2) represents the extra resource costs of rail 
accidents that is born by the society and not reflected upon or perceived by the rail 
users. When rail gets improved this extra resource cost borne by the society is 
increased to be R2XYP2, comprising the old area R2VZP2 and an extra area equal to 
VXYZ. This extra area is the result of the new users of rail service (movers) g1Q2, 
and represents the unperceived accident costs of those movers. So it is an extra 
resource cost used as a result of the scheme, which has to be included in the cost side 
of the appraisal framework of rail schemes. Mathematically, this extra resource cost 
could be measured as follows: 
ERCU = (RCr - PCr)(g2 - q, ) (12.2) 
Where: 
ERCU = extra resource cost used as a result of the rail scheme due to the 
misperception of accident cost in railways (£) 
RCr = resource cost of accidents in railways (f/trip or passenger km) 
PCr = user perceived accident costs in railways (f/trip or passenger km) 
q2-ql = movers from road to rail as a result of the rail scheme (trips or 
passenger km) 
12.5.2 Perceived and Unperceived Rail Accident Costs 
Rail accident costs could be divided into the three following groups of costs: 
First: The costs of passenger casualties, people killed or injured. 
Second: Damage costs to the railway operator as a result of train or vehicle 
movement accidents. 
Third : The costs of rail staff casualties, people killed or injured. 
Rail travellers would not concern themselves with the second and the third group of 
costs when deciding to travel by rail. So it may be safely to assume that the damage 
cost of rail accidents and the injuries to railway staff are not perceived by the rail 
user. 
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It is the first group of costs that concerns the rail passenger. Passengers probably 
adjust their use of rail service according to the potential rate of passenger casualty, 
and the costs involved (the cost of being injured or killed). 
12.6 Valuation of the Accident Costs 
Since 1968, road accident savings based on a human capital approach developed by 
Dawson at the Transport Research Laboratory (DTp 1992). In 1988 the valuation of 
fatal casualty was revised and has since been based on a Willingness To Pay (WTP) 
approach. This places a value on the avoidance of fatal injuries by estimating what 
people would be willing to pay for a decrease in the risk of a fatal accident. The WTP 
approach is consistent with the underlying principles of cost benefit analysis in that 
decisions should reflect the preferences and attitude to accident risk of individuals to 
be affected by them. 
In addition the Department of Transport (DTp) has set a program of research to 
review the valuation of non-fatal casualties and accidents (DTp 1992). 
The major research studies commissioned were Hopkin and O'Reilly, 1993; Ives et al 
1993; and Jones-Lee et al, 1993. The values derived from the WTP study undertaken 
by Jones-Lee and Loomes have been adapted by the DTp. Table 11.3 gives the 
revised costs per casualty for 1993. 
Table 12.3 Average cost per casualty and per accident in 1993 (£) 
Accident Type Cost per casualty 
" Fatal 744057 
" Serious 84262 
" Slight 6540 
Source; DTp (1993) 
The figures in table 12.3 gives the average costs of casualty for each accident type. 
This costs are of three components: 
1. loss of productivity to the economy 
2. human costs that reflect people's pain, suffering and grief 
3. related medical costs 
These figures are used by the current study to estimate the casualty costs to users, 
pedestrians and cyclists. Values of damage to property costs and police and 
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administration costs used by the Department of transport and provided in its road 
appraisal manual (COBA) by different types of roads and accident. These figures are 
updated by inflation and growth in GDP and used by this study to identify the 
accident related costs. The updated values for 1993 are shown in table 12.4 
disaggregated by road and accident type. 
Table 12.4 Values of accident cost components by road class and accident type in 
1993 values and prices (£s) 
Accident type Police and 
administration 
Damage to property 
Urban Rural Motorway 
" Fatal accident 577.00 1583.4 5112.5 4562.3 
" Serious accident 465.23 1704.2 4562.3 4441.6 
" Slight accident 335.47 1489.5 3072.9 3408.3 
This table is updated from the DTp 1981 
For damage only accidents, the figures provided by the department of Transport and 
that used in this study for 1993 are £940,1380, and 1330 for built up roads, non-built 
up roads and motorways respectively (DTp, 1993) 
It should be noted that the values placed on human lives are developed to be used in 
quantifying the costs of road accident casualties. No comparable figures are available 
for railways. The current study assumed that the cost per casualty is the same for rail. 
However, given the possibility of variations in the definition of accidents and the level 
of injury between road and rail, probably more research need to be commissioned to 
place a value for rail accident casualties. 
12.7 Road Accident Costs 
Based on the study dividends of perceived and unperceived accident costs and using 
the average cost per casualty and other accident costs, resource and perceived costs of 
road accidents are estimated for 1993. The cost is disaggregated by road types as 
shown in table 12.5. 
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Table 12.5 Resource and perceived road accident costs in 1993 (£) 
Road type Resource cost Perceived cost Unperceived cost 
Billions p/pcu km Billions p/pcu km Billions p/pcu km 
1. Motorway 0.415 0.572 0.41 0.57 0.002 0.003 
2. Major urban central 0.998 6.003 0.49 2.94 0.51 3.06 
3. Major urban non-central 2.535 3.809 1.74 2.62 0.79 1.19 
4. Single carriageway 1.472 2.082 1.41 1.99 0.06 0.09 
5. Dual carriageway 1.197 2.020 1.17 1.97 0.03 0.05 
6. Minor urban central 0.946 6.016 0.47 2.97 0.48 3.04 
7. Minor urban non-central 3.191 3.382 2.42 2.57 0.77 0.82 
8. Minor rural single 1.313 2.783 0.94 2.00 0.37 0.79 
9. Total all roads 12.06 2.73 9.04 2.04 3.02 0.68 
As can be seen from table 12.5, motorways have the lowest accident cost, followed 
by other rural roads. Urban roads have the highest cost per pcu km. This is explained 
by the fact that the number of pedestrian and cyclist casualties attributed to urban 
roads are much more than that for rural roads and no pedestrians or cyclist casualties 
attributed to motorways. In addition to that, for each accident on urban roads, there 
are 6.4 damage only accident, while this figure is 4.5 for rural roads and motorways. 
The results also show that for major rural roads and motorways, only between 1 to 
4% of accident cost is unperceived by users. On the other hand, about 24 to more 
than 50% of accident cost is unperceived in urban roads. 
12.8 Rail Accident Costs 
Based on the number of rail passenger and staff casualties in 1993 (DTp 1994), the 
estimated perceived and unperceived cost of rail accidents are shown in table 12.6. 
Table 12.6 Resource and perceived rail accident costs for 1993 (f) 
Passenger Freight 
Total Perceived unperceived Total Perceived unperceived 
Billions 0.139 0.081 0.058 0.006 0 0.006 
pence/pass km 0.371 0.215 0.155 
pence/tone km 0.042 0 0.042 
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The figures in table 12.6 above refer to rail passenger and staff casualty costs. All 
passenger casualties are allocated to the passenger sector. 90% of staff casualties are 
allocated to the rail passenger sector, the rest 10% is allocated to rail freight sector. 
This dividend is according to the total train km of passenger and freight in 1993. The 
perceived and unperceived accident costs are estimated per passenger and tonne km 
based on the total number or rail passenger and tonne km in 1993. As can be seen, 
about 40% of rail passenger casualty cost is not perceived by passengers. On the other 
hand, all freight related casualty cost is unperceived. This is explained by the fact that 
all freight related cost is staff casualties, and the study considers rail staff casualty 
cost to be outside the user decision of travelling by rail. 
It is worth mentioning that although road accident costs include the damage to 
vehicles and property, rail accident costs do not. This is due to the difficulty of 
quantifying the damage cost of rail accidents. In addition, the damage cost depends 
upon the accident type and varies from one accident to another. There are no figures 
available for the value of rail accident damage comparable to that for road accidents. 
However, in the context of this study's aim of estimating the unperceived rail accident 
cost, the absence of rail accident damage cost does not disturb the comparison. This is 
because the damage cost of rail accidents are perceived fully by the operator, and a 
passenger or tonne km transfer from road to rail would not have any implications with 
respect to the damage cost of a rail accident. 
12.9 Chapter Summary 
The chapter is concerned with the safety benefits of rail investment schemes. It 
outlined that unlike congestion, noise and air pollution, accidents do not necessary 
generate any externality. However, accident risk and cost present a case of cost 
misperception, that need to be corrected for in a comprehensive framework of 
appraisal for rail schemes. The chapter discuses how the misperception can be 
incorporated in the assessment process of rail schemes. This is followed by identifying 
the perceived and unperceived accident costs for road and rail users. The cost of user 
casualties, damage to property, and damage only accidents are assumed to be 
perceived by road users. On the other hand, the cost of pedestrian and cyclists 
casualties and police and administration are assumed to fall outside the users' decision 
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in making a road trip. Rail passenger casualty costs are assumed to be fully perceived 
by rail users, while casualty cost to rail staff are assumed to be unperceived. The 
valuation of accident cost for both road and rail are based on the Department of 
Transport figures used in assessing road schemes. Resource and perceived cost are 
estimated for both road and rail. The cost is disaggregatd by road type and for rail by 
passenger and freight transport. The results show that per pcu km, urban roads have 
much higher accident cost compared with motorways and other rural roads. 
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Chapter 13 
Findings. Implications and Conclusions 
13.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the research findings and identifies the implications of these 
findings for welfare losses and investment bias. It starts by presenting the aims and 
objectives identified for the study. Then discusses the achievements of the study in the 
light of the identified purpose and objectives. After that, the main findings are 
summarised and discussed. Finally the chapter demonstrates the implications of the 
study findings for welfare losses and investment bias and discusses the policy options 
that can be used to alleviate these implications. This is followed by some suggestions 
for further research. 
13.2 The Idea and Problem of the Study 
The idea of this research study is derived from the long ongoing debate about the 
criteria of allocating investment funds between transport modes, and in particular 
between road and rail. 
An important issue for transport policy is whether more investment should be devoted 
to road schemes and less to rail schemes and vice versa. This raises the problem of 
comparing the investment returns of the two modes. The fact that road and rail 
investment schemes are currently assessed on a different basis (road schemes are 
assessed on a cost benefit basis, while rail schemes are generally justified financially, 
though cost benefit sometimes used) has lead many to think of the possibility of 
unfairness and bias in allocating investment funds between the two modes, and then a 
chance of resource missallocation and welfare losses might exist. 
This issue was considered by the Leitch Committee in 1977 (DTp, 1977) which 
recommended a single framework of appraisal which it considered would allow 
greater comparability between road and rail investment appraisals by incorporating 
wider issues relevant to the overall decisions of resource allocation. Leitch 
recommendations have long been supported by many. Based on some empirical 
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research, Nash and Preston (1991) have concluded that the use of purely financial 
criteria for most rail schemes threaten to distort decision-making and that a move to a 
comprehensive cost benefit analysis for all rail investment schemes is required. 
This study is a step in the direction of examining to what extent the unfairness and 
bias and their implications for welfare losses might exist. In addition, to explore how 
rail investment schemes can be assessed on a basis comparable with that used for road 
investment schemes. 
13.3 The Purpose of the Study 
As identified in the introductory chapter, the purpose of this research is to develop a 
methodology for assessing the investment in railways that could be consistent with the 
Cost Benefit technique used in assessing road investment projects. The methodology 
developed identifies, on a social basis, the benefits of rail investment schemes and the 
method by which this benefits may be incorporated in a comprehensive social 
appraisal framework. 
13.4 The Objectives of the Study 
In achieving the research purpose outlined above, a set of objectives are identified, 
these are: 
13.4.1 Main Objectives 
1. Identify different appraisal techniques used for assessing the investment in 
transport sector, in particular cost benefit analysis and financial analysis. In 
addition, a detailed comparison between the two techniques and implications of 
resource allocation. 
2. Identify the difference between cost benefit analysis and financial analysis in the 
case of rail investment. 
3. Demonstrate and examine the factors that influence the difference or divergence 
between the returns on the investment of the two methods of appraisal. 
4. Identify the means by which the difference between the returns may be 
incorporated into the framework of appraisal. 
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13.4.2 Sub-objectives 
In addition to the main objectives, the following sub-objectives are targeted to achieve 
some of the identified main objectives. 
1. Identify user benefits of rail investment (consumer surplus), and examine to 
what extent it does exist and investigate how pricing policy and cost and demand 
elasticity may affect its existence and magnitude. 
2. Identify and quantify non-user benefits of rail investment schemes as a function 
of the road alternative. These benefits are: 
" Congestion time benefits 
" Noise Benefits 
" Air pollution benefits 
" Accident benefits 
" Vehicle operating cost benefits 
Non-user benefits of rail schemes are quantified at the margin. In other words, the 
process of identifying these benefits considers the implications of mode switching by 
quantifying the Marginal Social Cost (MSC) of road and rail travel. The value of 
MSC (identified as the cost that the society scarifies for an extra passenger km) may 
vary form one road type to another one due to the variations of travel characteristics 
between different types of roads, and then the implications for congestion delays and 
environmental impacts will vary from one type of road to another one. Hence, the 
study identifies the value of MSC as a function of road type. Eight types of road are 
identified for the study. These are: 
" Motorways 
" Major urban central roads 
" Major urban non-central roads 
" Rural single carriageways 
" Rural dual carriageways 
" Minor urban central roads 
" Minor urban non-central roads 
" Minor rural single roads 
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These 8 types of road present the UK entire road network. 
13.5 Achievements and Findings of the Study 
13.5.1 Appraisal Techniques: Theory, Practice and Implications of Resource 
Allocation 
1. The study identified theoretically the main methods of assessing transport 
investment to be Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and Financial Analysis (FA). The 
detailed comparison between the two techniques (chapter 2) shows that FA is 
concerned only with the financial effects of schemes in terms of extra net revenue 
occurring to the agency carrying out the scheme concerned. On the other hand, CBA 
technique is concerned with a larger framework, all transport users or society as a 
whole. This has three important consequences; 
First as far as the FA is concerned, the issue of resource cost adjustments is 
irrelevant. In other words, FA accepts prices as it is regardless whether it reflects a 
real resource cost or not. So pricing distortions or distortions from the misperception 
of cost or benefit items are all irrelevant issues under the FA appraisal framework. 
Second, there are elements of consumer benefit which a CBA would include but a FA 
would not, e. g. those areas of consumer surplus which, because of the relative crudity 
of most pricing policies, the financially based organisation cannot tap. Third, when 
there are effects external to the transport sector, these will in principle enter into CBA 
but not into FA. 
2. On theoretical basis, and assuming no externalities, the study has shown that 
cost benefit returns may exceed the financial returns of an investment. The divergence 
between the cost benefit and financial returns is a function of demand and cost 
elasticity. 
3. The study examined the interaction between evaluation techniques and pricing 
policy. The main findings are: 
" For the same pricing policy there is a divergence between financial and cost 
benefit returns. The type of pricing policy operated has a significant impact on the 
magnitude of that divergence. 
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" There is a divergence between financial rates of return measured under different 
assumptions of pricing policy. Similarly, different pricing policies will bring 
different CBA returns. 
These two findings lead to the conclusion that investment balance between road and 
rail can be distorted not only by using different methods of appraisal but also by the 
inconsistency of pricing policy applied for the two modes. 
4. Examining the current practice of assessing investment in transport modes 
(chapter 3) shows the following: 
" Road schemes are mainly justified on a pragmatic cost benefit technique. The 
form of cost benefit analysis applied to road schemes measures in money terms the 
capital cost of the scheme and the benefits that accrue in the form of time saved, 
accident saved and operating costs saved. Neither the environmental impacts nor 
the developmental benefits of road projects are quantified in money terms under 
the current practice of road appraisal. The impacts on the environment, such as 
noise and air pollution are descriptively incorporated, and the investment decision 
is dominated by the three quantified types of benefits. 
" Rail schemes are usually assessed on a financial basis. The only benefits of 
projects are the net revenue to be gained by the rail operator. Schemes are 
required to earn 8% financial rate of return. 
" Neither road nor rail appraisal practice incorporates all the implications of mode 
switching. In other words, both CBA for road and FA for rail do not incorporate 
the potential benefits of the scheme assessed for non-users as a result of mode 
switching. This is seen as a major defect in the current appraisal practice. This is 
because of the fact that the extra social costs (congestion, noise, accident and air 
pollution) of road travel are much higher than that for railways as shown in 
chapters 7-12 of this study. The conclusion is if rail appraisal method incorporates 
the benefits to road users as a result of mode switching, this would improve 
investment returns for rail schemes which means more rail investment would be 
justified. 
5. The study (chapter 4) shows that the existing mix of appraisal techniques for 
road and rail has some potential implications; these are: 
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0 Given the fact that cost benefit returns are likely to be higher than financial returns 
for an investment, rail investments are subject to a time delay. This delay is a 
function of the difference between cost benefit and financial returns. The time lag 
of rail investments dynamically result in affecting the total capital investment in 
road and rail, leading to a relatively higher levels of investment in road and lower 
levels of investment in rail than it should be. In turn, this misallocation of 
investment resources results in losses in welfare to the economy as a whole. 
9 Given that the rail service is subject to a downward sloping cost curve (as 
discussed in chapter 4), the encouragement of road investment and discouragement 
of rail investment caused by the use of different appraisal method for both modes 
depresses the relative competitiveness of rail compared with road. In other words, 
a rise in rail travel costs and a deterioration of rail travel demand will be 
inevitable. This in turn worsens the profitability of rail investments leading again 
to a discouragement of rail investment. 
To bring a sustainable balance between road and rail investment, the study discusses 
some options that are put forward as a solution. These options include applying 
financial analysis for both modes or using different discount rates for road and rail 
investment. Each of the alternative solutions has its shortcomings which are discussed 
in chapter 4. The most appealing option that brings the consistency between the two 
modes is the use of the same appraisal technique for both road and rail. From the 
welfare viewpoint, this technique has to be a social cost benefit analysis as suggested 
in this study. Other options and their applicability are discussed in this chapter. 
13.5.2 Previous Work 
1. Reviewing the literature (chapter 5) shows that the problem of comparability 
between investment returns measured on different basis had been considered as early 
as 1960. This was followed by an attempt to establish a single rate of exchange 
between the cost benefit and financial returns which was deemed to be unachievable. 
2. Examination of some of rail investment studies where both financial and cost 
benefit analysis were carried out (as discussed in chapter 5) shows the following: 
" The task of cost benefit evaluation in these studies covers both user and non-user 
benefits of the scheme concerned. The measured non-user benefits are road 
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congestion benefits, vehicle operating cost benefits and road accident savings. In 
all of the studies reviewed, the incorporation of environmental impacts were 
absent. However, the current study approach of identifying rail scheme benefits 
incorporates and quantify the environmental impacts (noise and air pollution) at 
the margin. 
" In all of the studies the issue of users' perception was not considered. This is seen 
to be relevant for both accidents and vehicle operating costs. On a social basis, the 
relevant costs and benefits of an investment are to be measured on the basis of 
their resource values. In consequence the distortion of users' misperception to cost 
and benefit items have to be corrected for. Hence, the current study incorporates 
users' perception of these two items when measuring the Marginal Social Cost of 
road and rail travel. 
" In all studies, the results of the evaluation process showed cost benefit returns 
higher than the financial returns. However, the difference between the cost benefit 
and financial returns varies from one case to another. This is quiet consistent with 
the discussion and conclusions of chapter 2, that economic returns are likely to be 
above the financial returns of an investment and one can not establish a priori 
about the difference between the two types of return. 
13.5.3 The Study Appraisal Framework and the Approach of Measuring Non-user 
Benefits of Rail Schemes 
1. The study appraisal framework (as detailed in chapter 6) identified rail scheme 
impacts under four elements. These are: 
" Operator impacts (financial benefits to the operator) 
" Impacts on rail users (user benefits) 
" Impacts on non-users (non-user benefits) 
" Other impacts on other bodies in the society (tax adjustments) 
2. Non-user benefits concerned and quantified by the study are road congestion 
time benefits, noise, air pollution, accidents and vehicle operating costs. The first 
three are considered to be externalities (either external benefits or external costs to rail 
schemes), while the last two are dealt with as cases of cost misperception. 
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3. Non-user benefits are measured as a function of the road alternative, where the 
results are disaggregated by 8 types of road identified for the study and shown above. 
4. The measurement process of non-user benefits incorporates the variations of 
traffic over time and place. The process incorporates four traffic distributions. These 
are: 
" Traffic variation during the day (24 hour distribution) 
" Traffic variation during the week (7 days distribution) 
" Traffic variation during the year (12 month distribution) 
" Traffic variation from location to another on the road network (a sample 
distribution of 22-24 sites on the network is used) 
Incorporating the variations in traffic over time and place results in a more accurate 
and precise measurement of the extra social costs of road transport, and then the based 
economic instruments regarding the correction for or the internalising of these extra 
social costs would be accurate. 
13.5.4 Non-user Benefits by Road Class 
a) Road Externalities 
As stated above congestion time, noise and air pollution are considered by the study to 
be externalities and measured at the margin (as detailed in chapters 7-10). The 
following table summarises the results. 
Table 13.1 Externalities of road transport by road class for 1993 (pence/pcu km) 
Road Type Congestion 
time 
Noise Air 
pollution 
Total 
1. Motorways 2.68 0.011 0.73 3.42 
2. Major urban central roads 27.30 0.846 1.31 29.45 
3. Major urban non-central roads 5.01 1.253 1.06 7.32 
4. Rural single carriageways 1.52 0.138 0.70 2.35 
5. Rural dual carriageways 0.18 0.076 0.72 0.98 
6. Minor urban central roads 7.55 0.00 2.16 9.70 
7. Minor urban non-central roads 1.21 0.00 1.12 2.33 
8. Minor rural single roads 0.32 0.00 0.51 0.83 
" Average all roads 3.04 0.254 0.87 4.16 
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As can be seen from table 13.1, urban roads have higher externalities per pcu km 
compared with rural roads, with an average total externality of 4.16 pence per pcu km 
for all roads. 
2. Road User Cost Misperception 
The following table summarises the misperception of road user cost measured by the 
study (as detailed in chapters 11 and 12). 
Table 13.2 Road user cost misperception by road class for 1993 
Road Type Unperceived costs (pence/pcu km) 
Accidents Vehicle Depreciation Total 
operating cost of private cars 
1. Motorways 0.003 1.05 7.88 8.93 
2. Major urban central roads 3.06 1.43 8.69 13.18 
3. Major urban non-central roads 1.19 1.49 8.18 10.86 
4. Rural single carriageways 0.09 1.45 8.28 9.82 
5. Rural dual carriageways 0.05 1.06 8.18 9.29 
6. Minor urban central roads 3.04 1.61 8.80 13.45 
7. Minor urban non-central roads 0.82 1.79 8.59 11.20 
8. Minor rural single roads 0.79 1.63 8.49 10.91 
0 Average all roads 0.68 1.43 8.31 10.42 
As table 13.2 shows, total unperceived road user costs are dominated by the 
depreciation of private cars. An average of 8.3 pence per pcu km is unperceived by 
road users in terms of the cost of depreciation to their private cars. In addition, for 
each pcu km about 1.4 pence is unperceived by road users. This reflects the non-fuel 
car vehicle operating costs for non-working trips after correcting for fuel tax. On the 
other hand, road users fail to perceive 0.68 pence per pcu km as an accident costs. 
This amount is more than 4 times as much in cases of urban roads in central areas. 
13.5.5 Non User Benefits by Unit of Output 
The figures in tables 13.1 and 13.2 are used to estimate non-user benefits per passenger 
km. Separate values are estimated for car and bus, based on an average vehicle 
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occupancy of 1.2,1.86 and 13.2 passengers for working car, non-working car and 
passenger service vehicle (buses and coaches) respectively. These are the vehicle 
occupancies used in the COBA program for assessing road scheme benefits (DTp 1981). 
Table 13.3 presents the results. 
Table 13.3 Extra social cost of road transport by unit of output and road class for 1993 
Road type pence/passe n er km 
Car Bus and coach 
1. Motorways 9.06 -0.13 
2. Major urban central roads 25.80 3.34 
3. Major urban non-central roads 12.01 0.58 
4. Rural single carriageways 8.64 -0.19 
5. Rural dual carriageways 7.67 -0.39 
6. Minor urban central roads 14.75 1.19 
7. Minor urban non-central roads 9.27 -0.04 
8. Minor rural single roads 8.25 -0.24 
0 Average all roads 10.02 0.19 
As can be seen from table 13.3, an extra cost on average of 10.02 pence per car 
passenger km is either imposed on the society (in a form of time delays, noise and air 
pollution) or unperceived by users (in a form accident and vehicle operating costs). This 
extra cost varies from one road type to another one reflecting the characteristics of 
traffic and speed on each type of road. In general, urban roads have higher social costs 
than motorways and rural roads. On the other hand, a bus passenger km imposes an 
extra social cost on average of only 0.19 pence. This also varies between road types. As 
can be seen from table 13.3 column 3, the extra social cost of buses on rural roads is 
negative. That means, bus travellers on rural roads have a marginal social cost lower than 
the marginal private cost of travel. This is due to that buses on rural roads have lower 
externalities (congestion, noise and air pollution) compared with urban roads, and then 
the tax on fuel is more than outweigh these externalities leading to a marginal social cost 
lower than the marginal private cost for buses on rural roads. In fact this conclusion is 
consistent with a similar conclusions pointed out by Tyson (1972) suggesting that the 
marginal social cost of bus travel is below the marginal private cost. 
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Figure 13.1 Extra social cost of road transport by unit of output and road class 
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13.5.6 Rail Externalities and Cost Misperception 
Table 13.4 summarises the externalities and cost misperception estimated for railways. 
Table 13.4 Rail externalities and unperceived cost by unit of output for 1993 
Externalities Unperceived 
cost 
Total 
Noise air pollution Accidents 
Pence/passenger km 0.052 0.27 0.155 0.477 
Pence/tonne km 0.016 0.063 0.042 0.121 
As can be noticed the extra social cost of car travel per passenger km is much higher 
than that of rail and bus travel. On average a car passenger km has an extra social cost 
of more than 20 times as that of rail and more than 40 times that of buses. Given that 
public transport share in passenger km is only 12% (Houghton 1994), that obviously 
mean most of passenger journeys in the UK are by private car with the highest extra 
social costs. This in turn means welfare losses to the society, unless an economic 
instrument or any form of policy is used to correct for these extra social costs of car 
travel. 
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13.6 Implication and Solutions 
Having shown the study findings, the turn now is to demonstrate the implications of 
these findings and the options that might contribute towards an elimination of these 
implications. Three main implications are identified and discussed. These are: 
1. Welfare loss 
2. Rail share 
3. Investment bias 
Three options are examined and discussed. These are: 
1. Pricing policy 
2. Public transport subsidies 
3. Appraisal methods 
Before discussing the applicability and suitability of these options towards the elimination 
of the three implications outlined above, an examination of the three undesirable 
implications is carried out. 
13.6.1 Undesirable Implications 
1. Welfare Losses 
The results shown in table 13.3 indicate that the society scarifies an extra cost on average 
of 10.02 pence for a car passenger km, while if this passenger km travels by rail or bus, 
the extra cost to the society are only 0.477 and 0.19 pence respectively. Obviously, this 
means welfare losses to the society. The aim here is to use the study results to estimate 
the amount of welfare losses to the society. 
Assuming that the balance between road and rail travel can be brought in by a form of 
operating subsidy for railways. The subsidy has to make over and match exactly the 
difference between the extra costs to the society of a passenger km by road and rail. The 
study results suggest that a subsidy of 9.5 pence is to be paid for railway. However, 
considering that the cost per passenger km for rail Inter-City is 7.5 pence (British Rail 
1994), the study assumed a subsidy of 3.8p per passenger km. This represents the 
difference between the extra social cost by road and rail excluding the misperception of 
the depreciation of private cars. The amount of welfare gains will depend on the shape 
and the elasticity of rail travel demand curve. The estimates of welfare gains as a result of 
3.8p operating subsidy for the Inter-City railways are made for two cases of rail demand 
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curve. These are linear and non-linear demand curve. The following equations show the 
two rail demand functions used. 
D=a+ bf (13.1) 
D= of a (13.2) 
Where: 
D= rail travel demand (passenger km/period of time) 
a, b a= constants 
f= rail fare (£/passenger km) 
The elasticity of demand in both cases are assumed to be -0.8. This is the mode choice 
elasticity measured for inter-city rail travel (Nash et al 1992). The increase in rail demand 
is estimated to be 4.9 and 9.1 billions passenger km for the two cases of demand curves 
respectively. In other words, rail travel demand increases by 40% and 75% for the two 
cases of demand curves. It is assumed that the new rail demand is all from road (since the 
elasticity used does not allow for trip generation impacts) and 70% of movers are car 
users and the rest are bus users. The results are shown in the following table. 
Table 13.5 Welfare gains as a result of a subsidy to Inter-City railways 
Road type £ Millions 
Linear demand curve Non-linear demand curve 
1. Motorways 286.1 532.9 
2. Major urban central roads 912.5 1699.8 
3. Major urban non-central roads 397.9 741.2 
4. Rural single carriageways 270.9 504.6 
5. Rural dual carriageways 234.4 436.6 
6. Minor urban central roads 501.1 933.4 
7. Minor urban non-central roads 294.5 548.5 
8. Minor rural single roads 256.6 478.0 
0 Average all roads 323.7 602.9 
As table 13.5 shows, welfare gains as a result of 3.8p subsidy to railways are £323.7 
millions, and this amount is nearly doubled in case of non-linear demand curve for rail. 
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The amount of welfare gains are higher when the road alternative is urban one. This is 
due to the higher marginal social cost of urban roads compared with rural roads. In fact, 
one may argue that, the new demand for rail travel as a result of operating subsidy would 
be transferred from a mix of road types. Hence, to be very specific of the amount of 
welfare gain, one has to identify exactly the types of roads from which the new rail 
travellers transfer. This will need a knowledge of roads that are used as a substitute to 
rail inter-city travel. 
2. Rail Share 
As shown in section 13.6.1, when a subsidy of 3.8 pence/passenger km is paid to rail, 
an estimated extra 4.9 or 9.1 billions passenger km would transfer from road to rail. 
In other words, rail travel demand increases by 40% and 75% for the two demand 
curve shapes. That is to say that rail share in passenger transport is far less than it 
should be if road and rail travellers are charged the full marginal social cost of their 
trips, or any other form of policy options used to correct for the difference between 
the extra social cost of road and rail travel. 
3. Investment Bias 
The study results indicates that on a social basis, rail investment schemes yield a 
significant social benefits in a form of time delays, pollution, noise, accidents and 
vehicle operating costs. Hence, the economic return of rail schemes is likely to be 
above the financial return. The implications are, as discussed in chapter 4, rail 
investments that are assessed only on financial basis are subject to time delay (or 
probably not made at all), and then dynamically, the result will be relatively lower 
levels of investment in rail. 
To elaborate in this point, the study results are used to re-estimate the Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) for one case study of rail investment. This is the electrification of the 
line from Birmingham to Paddington via Oxford. The project was assessed on both 
financial and cost benefit basis in 1984 (DTp 1984), and the results were discussed in 
chapter 5. 
The evaluation results of the scheme are given in a form of Net Present Value of costs 
and benefits. This is used by the current study to estimate the financial and cost 
benefit IRR. Based on the evaluation results of 1984, the financial and cost benefit 
rates of return are estimated to be 6% and 7% respectively. However, based on the 
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current study results of rail investment non-user benefits, the value of the cost benefit 
rate of return is estimated to be 9%. 
This case study shows that, cost benefit rate of return is 1.5 times the financial rate of 
return. However, in general this cannot be taken as a rule. The divergence between 
cost benefit and financial IRR may vary from case to another, depending on the type 
of investment (pure expansion, replacement, cost reducing investment, etc. ) and the 
extent to which it is attracting travellers off the road. Whether the investment affects 
the quality of service or not is another important determinant of the divergence. So, 
one cannot have a priori of the exchange rate between economic and financial IRR. 
However, the study results suggest that, for rail investment that attracts travellers off 
the road, the economic return is above the financial return. Then, if this is not 
corrected for, the use of financial assessment for rail schemes will lead to under- 
investment in railways. 
13.6.2 What Can be Done? 
Having illustrated the implications of the study results, it is the turn to discuss the 
options that are put forward to bring a sustainable balance between road and rail travel 
and investment. Three main options are discussed. These are: 
1. Pricing (Charging the Full Marginal Social Cost of Travel) 
From the economic theory point of view, pricing probably is the first best and optimal 
solution for internalising the extra social costs of travel. Based on the study results, on 
average car users are to be charged a levy of 10.02 pence per passenger km, and a tax 
of 0.191 pence is to be added to the bus or coach fare per passenger km. This amount 
of tax would vary from one type of road to another. For example car users on central 
urban areas would be charged 25.8 pence per passenger km, while users of dual 
carriageways, single carriageways and motorways would be charged between 7 to 9 
pence per passenger km. Bus and coach travellers on rural roads would not be charged 
since their marginal private cost is just equal or even higher than the marginal social 
cost. However bus users on urban areas would be charged between 0.5 and 3.3 pence 
per passenger km depending on the type of the road. On the other hand, rail users are 
to be charged an extra 0.477 pence per passenger km. This in fact, if applied 
correctly, will eliminate the undesirable implications discussed above. In other words, 
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a sustainable balance between private and public transport will be maintained, and the 
loss of welfare indicated by table 13.5 will be avoided. However, as discussed in 
chapter 4, applying such amount of extra charges might not be easy and another 
options are needed. This is because the imposition of such charges can only generate a 
social welfare gain if similar pricing policies in all other sectors of the economy 
(marginal cost pricing). If this is not the case, any welfare gain in the transport field 
may be more than offset by losses elsewhere in the economy. If those wishing to 
remain on roads pay the congestion charge by withdrawing expenditure from sectors 
where prices are above marginal costs, this will lead to an excessive 
underconsumption of the goods in such sectors. Similarly, those deciding to forego 
road motoring may spend the money saved on goods produced in a sector where 
prices are below marginal cost, leading to overproduction of these goods. Only if 
marginal cost pricing is universal in the economy is it certain that the imposition of 
such charges will lead to an aggregate national welfare gain and maintain the balance 
between private and public transport. 
The second problem of charging travellers according to the marginal social cost of 
their trips is the difficulty of applying such charges in practice. In addition, as 
discussed on chapter 4, roads have been long considered as a public good that is 
accessible without any charges or restrictions. These issues are usually restricts the 
pricing option to be used as a solution to bring the balance between private and public 
transport. 
2. Public Transport Subsidies 
Again the balance between road and rail travel can be brought into through a form of 
subsidy to railways. As discussed above, if the misperception of depreciation of 
private cars is to be included, an average subsidy of 9.5 pence approximately per 
passenger km is to be paid to railways. However, given the average cost per 
passenger km (inter-city) of 7.5 pence per passenger km, this seems inapplicable 
(unless rail travel is made free). Hence, excluding depreciation misperception of 
private cars, the subsidy would be 3.8 pence per rail passenger km. The form of 
subsidy employed will affect its impact. A direct service subsidy may be employed to 
keep fares down or to reduce them, but this does not guarantee any improvements to 
the service provided. On the other hand, if the subsidy is made in a form of capital 
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grants, this will have less effect on fares than direct subsidies, but will encourage the 
use of newer and better equipment and then an improved rail service may therefore be 
expected. 
Two traditional criticisms of subsidy are raised. First is where the funds to finance the 
optimal subsidy are to be raised. If the scheme is to be self-financing from within the 
transport sector, by some form of tax (e. g. petrol duty), this will probably distort 
private transport costs, and then the welfare implications of that distortion have to be 
considered to assess the ultimate welfare implications of subsidy. On the other hand, 
if the finance is to be collected outside the transport sector, this might mean a welfare 
losses in other parts of the economy which have to be brought into the calculation. 
The second criticism of subsidy is its impact on the internal efficiency of railways (the 
amount of resources used to produce given output level). Some argue (Pryke 1977) 
that subsidy system will seriously damage the incentive to efficient operation, by 
leading the operator to assume that he will always get support whatever financial 
difficulties he faces. However, there are some generally agreed conditions that are 
necessary for a subsidy to be given with a minimum damage to the internal efficiency 
(Nash 1982). First the amount of the subsidy is to be stipulated in advance. Second 
the objectives with respect to which subsidy is to be used should be made clear and 
easily to be monitored. 
3. Investment Appraisal Methods 
The possibility of getting the balance between road and rail investment is by assessing 
the investment in both modes on a comprehensive social basis as suggested in this 
study. This will achieve the correct balance of investment between the two modes. 
However, the impact on rail travel share would probably be minimal. In other words, 
an increase in rail investment may mean better service but will not automatically lead 
to an increase in rail travel share. Hence, the amount of welfare loss discussed in 
section 13.6.1 will not be avoided. 
Given the current organisational structure of railways (profit maximisation), using 
cost benefit analysis for assessing investment schemes might not be possible. Section 
56 Grant may be used for rail schemes. However, the Department of Transport 
guidelines for Section 56 only consider the schemes of £5m and over, beside the 
evaluation method itself does not include benefits to rail users assuming that this type 
255 
of benefits is fully recouped through fare box. As discussed in chapter 5, in most of 
the cases reviewed, user benefits of the schemes evaluated were very significant, and 
then the full economic benefits of rail schemes may be underestimated under Section 
56 evaluation method. 
4. Creating a Sustainable Transport Policy 
Two main conclusions may be drawn from the above argument. These are: 
a) Public and private transport differ in attractiveness and convenience, and the 
differing basis on which users pay towards the costs of public and private transport 
have an important distorting effect on decisions about which mode to use. The relative 
private costs of additional journeys therefore favour car use against buses and rail. A 
smaller proportion of journeys will therefore be made by public transport, (in 1993 
only 12% of passenger km is moved by public transport (Houghton 1994)) than if 
decisions were based on the actual additional resource costs of alternative modes of 
travel. The term resource cost reefers to both private and society costs of the marginal 
trip. 
b) The use of inconsistent appraisal methods of private and public transport 
investment distorts the investment balance between them. 
The three options discussed above (pricing, subsidy and appraisal methods) have their 
shortcomings in achieving the balance between private and public transport investment 
and travel. 
So restoring that balance between private and public transport investment and travel 
will need a package of instruments that insure an integrated transport policy that 
minimise the need for transport and increase the proportions of journeys made 
by environmentally friendly modes. This may be achieved by a set of targets to be 
put forward, such as increasing public transport share from 12% to 20% for example 
in a given period of time, reduce the proportion of urban journeys undertaken by car 
to a certain level, maintaining a certain level of noise and air pollution and 
maintaining a certain level of investment in public transport modes. The instruments 
to be used are to be tailored to suit the targets and to be easily monitored. This may 
include increase in fuel prices with the exception of public transport, parking charges, 
operating and grant support to rail and bus, command and control tolls for 
maintaining a certain level of noise and air pollution, introducing bus lanes and 
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priority in urban areas, make more resource available for new light rail systems, and 
provide safe pedestrians and cyclists routes. 
13.7 Further Improvements 
13.7.1 Value of Time 
The measurement of the marginal congestion time externality in this study is based on 
the value of time used by the Department of Transport in planning road maintenance 
and construction. While the variations in traffic flows with time and place (throughout 
the day, the week, the year and the location on the network) are incorporated and 
allowed to affect the value of Marginal Congestion Time Externality that vary with 
time and place, the value of time is assumed to be the same for all times and places. 
People may value the time differently from hour to another throughout the day, from 
day to another throughout the week, and month to another throughout the year. In 
addition, the value of time may differ from region to another within the country. Then 
more research is needed to explore whether there is a significant relationship between 
the value people place on the time and the time of day, week, year, and place. 
The consideration of varying the value of time with time and place may have a 
significant impact on the value of marginal congestion time externality. 
13.7.2 Congestion Disbenefits of Railways 
By attracting motorists off the roads, rail investment schemes create an area of 
congestion benefits equal to the number of movers times the marginal congestion cost 
externality of the road. 
However, those movers may affect travel conditions in railways. In other words, if 
rail is subject to congested and crowded conditions, travel conditions will be worsened 
as a result of any transfer of passengers from road. Then the congestion impacts of 
road movers on rail travel conditions need to be incorporated in a full assessment of 
rail investment benefits and costs. One might expect that the congestion impacts of 
road movers on rail travel to vary from a rail service to another (regional, or inter- 
city) and from place to another throughout the rail network. In addition, these impacts 
may vary according the time of day, week, year. Hence, a full considerations of the 
possible impacts of passengers transfer (from road to rail) on rail congestion need to 
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be explored and investigated as well as incorporated in the assessment process of rail 
schemes.. 
13.7.3 Rail User Benefits 
The study identifies the benefits of a rail investment scheme to fall in three categories, 
these are: 
1) Net revenue to rail operator 
2) Benefits to rail users 
3) Benefits to non-users 
The current practice of rail investment appraisal (financial appraisal) only considers 
the benefits of the investment to be the first category (net revenue to operator), 
assuming that the second category (user benefits) is recouped through the fare box and 
then is recouped as net revenue to the project. The study shows that, this is not always 
the case, unless perfect price discrimination is possible. Then rail users may enjoy 
some benefits as a result of the investment (consumer surplus). 
The study showed that on the theoretical background, there will be a divergence 
between the economic benefits (measured as net revenue plus user benefits) and the 
financial benefits (net revenue) of an investment. The divergence is found to be a 
function of demand elasticity. However, more research is needed to explore and 
quantify this divergence practically. This would be by exploring practically the 
relationship between economic and financial benefits and investigating whether an 
exchange rate can be found between them. 
13.7.4 Accident Benefits and Perception 
In measuring non-user benefits of rail schemes with respect to accident costs, the 
study considered accident costs to be a case of misperception that need to be corrected 
for in a comprehensive social assessment for rail schemes. 
The study distinguishes between those costs of accidents that are perceived and not 
perceived by road and rail users. Then a calculation is made for estimating the 
correction to be made, and disaggregated by road types. 
For road accidents, the costs of damage to vehicles and buildings, and user casualty 
costs are considered to be perceived, while pedestrians and cyclist casualties and 
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police and administration costs are considered to fall outside the user decision of 
making a road trip. 
More research is needed to explore the issue of accident cost perception. In particular, 
investigating the extent and magnitude of perceiving the costs of casualties. The study 
considered user casualties to be fully perceived by users. However one may argue that 
if this is correct for the driver, it might not be for the accompanied passengers. Also 
the study considered cyclist and pedestrians casualties are not perceived at all by road 
motorists. One may argue that this will vary between motorists themselves and the 
issue then need to be investigated more empirically. The same may be said about the 
cost of vehicle damage. This is assumed in the study to be fully perceived by 
motorists. However, assuming that motorists insure their cars, one may argue that 
damage costs only perceived as an insurance payments and then the full cost of 
damage is not perceived, especially the whole idea of insurance is to avoid the burden 
of the full cost of an accident. In this case, vehicle damage is only partly perceived by 
road users. Furthermore, some may argue that motorists may consider insurance 
payments as a fixed cost and may not affect their decision of making a road trip. In 
such a case, the cost of damage to vehicles is not at all perceived. 
In conclusion, the issue of accident perception need to be explored and investigated in 
order to place a value judgements of the true perception of accidents. 
13.7.5 Traffic Noise and Property Value 
In measuring the noise cost of both road and rail, the study used the figure 0.4 percent 
to indicate the reduction in house value for a unit increase in noise level (Ley). This is 
the most recent figure used to indicate the impact of noise on the value of properties 
The calculations are based on the assumption of a straight line relationship between 
house prices and noise level. 
More research is needed for identifying the relationship between house value and 
noise levels. A consideration of any other form of relationship (non-linear forms) is 
required. In addition, further work is required to investigate the value of the elasticity 
of house prices with respect to noise levels. In particular, an investigation of whether 
the value of the elasticity is changing with the level of noise would be useful. Also 
259 
whether the depreciation of house values would vary across the regions within the 
country, and between urban residential and rural areas. 
13.7.6 Developmental Benefits 
In principle the development and land use effects of rail schemes should be 
incorporated into the comprehensive social appraisal of that schemes. However, the 
degree to which transport schemes in general and rail projects in particular may 
promote economic development remains controversial (Hall and Hass-Klau 1985). A 
case example, where investment was justified mainly on the basis of developmental 
benefits is the London Docklands Light Railway scheme (Clarke and Cotton 1983). 
These benefits do seem to have occurred (Nash and Preston 1991). 
Developmental benefits of rail schemes may vary according to the type of the project 
(new railway line, replacement investment, cost cutting investment etc. ) and on the 
nature of the scheme area (very developed, undeveloped, industrial area, residential 
area). The issue of developmental benefits of rail schemes becomes more crucial in 
developing countries, where schemes may lead to industrial or agricultural 
developments or even reallocation of activities. 
Whether rail schemes may have marginal developmental benefits is a case of further 
research. This may be explored through "after studies" as an assessment of the scheme 
contributions in developing the area of potential scheme impacts. 
13.8 Attached Areas of Further Research 
13.8.1 How to Correct for the Distortion? 
The study shows that the current practice of assessing road and rail investment (the 
first being based on cost benefit analysis, while the second is commercially assessed) 
creates a chance of misallocation of resource funds and then missing opportunities for 
railways. This in turn is translated into welfare losses to the society. 
The measurement of non-user benefits of rail investment schemes shows that there is a 
considerable amount of benefits to non-users emerging from rail schemes. In turn if 
rail schemes are to be assessed on a social basis, these benefits ought to be 
incorporated in the appraisal framework. 
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In order to avoid the distortion created by applying different investment criteria to 
road and rail, and to bring the balance between the road and rail travel and 
investment, two routes can be followed: 
1. Assessing investment schemes for both modes on the same basis. This can be 
achieved by using cost benefit analysis for both modes. Then non-user benefits 
measured in the study can be used as a basis for applying a comprehensive cost 
benefit analysis to rail schemes. As discussed above this may only achieve the 
balance between road and rail investment, but does not automatically mean an 
increase to rail share or avoiding the loss in welfare. 
2. Given the organisational structure of railways, applying a comprehensive cost 
benefit appraisal to rail projects might not be possible. The alternative is to use 
some other policy options to correct for the distortion of using different appraisal 
methods. The study results can be used as a basis of designing and making over 
the difference between the financial and the social returns. The policies to be used 
have to be designed to match exactly the difference, and more research is required 
to test and examine some administrative options. As suggested above, a 
consideration and examination of the suitability of using grants and subsidies as an 
administrative toll would be very relevant and useful. In addition, more research 
in identifying and testing other options would be interesting. 
13.8.2 Rail Privatisation 
With rail privatisation in due course, the amount of investment in railways is a crucial 
issue. The implications of privatisation on assessing and allocating investment funds 
for railways is a further area of research. 
If rail privatisation is to establish and enforce the commercial incentive for railways, 
this would mean that investment fund would be justified on a commercial basis. In 
this case, the reset for some policy options to correct for the distortion become crucial 
and the two area of research can then be looked at jointly. 
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Appendix 1 
The following are the BASIC computer program developed for the measurement of 
non-user benefits of rail schemes. The program has been used in the measurement of 
marginal congestion cost, noise cost and vehicle operating cost misperception. 
1. Flowchart of the Program 
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e: Road type (1 to 8) 
Impute: Traffic Characteristics 
/ Imput: Traffic distributions 
f January to December (12 month distribution) 
f Monday to Sunday (7 days distribution) 
f 24 hour distribution 
t 22 location point on the network 
Speed-fl 
formula 
Eloise levefe 
L 10 formula 
formula 
hourly flow per lane and hourly average speed 
Output: marginal time cost externality (MCTE) 
Output: L 10 (1 hour) 
Output: VOC perceived and resource 
Next location 
Next hour 
Next day 
Next month 
Next road 
2. Program 
1 open"distmc. out" for append as #10 : open"dissp. out" for append as #11 
2 print #10, " MCC distribution " 
3 k=1: rem"motorways program" 
8 cls: locate 1,10 
10 dim veh (29,24) 
11 open"mway. out" for append as #1 
12 print #1, "AMTC h/veh. km AMCC p/veh. km ASP noise level" 
13 locate 4,1 
14 cis: print; k 
15 print" cou veh/h speed Tvehcles MTC TMTC" 
16 locate 8,1 
17 print " MCC TMCC" 
18 Rem"enter road length and vehicle km traveled" 
20 VKT =72.5*1000000000 : RL = 3.1 * 1000: VY = VKT / RL: AM = VY 
/12 
30 DIM MI(12), WI(7), HI(24), LI(20) 
35 REM"enter monthly distribution" 
40FORi=1TO12 
50 READ MI(i) 
60 NEXT i 
70 DATA 90,87,98,98,101,103,111,112,106,108,95,91 
75 REM"enter weekly distribution" 
80 FOR i=1 TO 7 
90 READ WI(i) 
100 NEXT i 
110 DATA 101.3,102.3,103.8,102.4,116.3,85.2,88.6 
115 REM"enter huorly distribution" 
120FORi= 1TO24 
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130 READ HI(i) 
140 NEXT i 
150 DATA 16.2,9.15,7.4,7.85,11.2,27.5,71.15,164.5,195.6,155.8,144.75 
,1 42.35,136.2,139.2,146.6,157.75,184,199.8 , 165.7,113.5 , 77.8,54.75, 
39.95,28 
151 REM"enter location distribution" 
152 FOR i=1 TO 20 
153 READ LI(i) 
154 NEXT i 
155 DATA 
19.5,30.1,40.7,49.2,55.6,62,68.3,74.7,81.1,87.5,94.4,102.7,110.9,119.1,127.3,135 
. 5,150.4,168,188.6,234.6 
156 rem"flows per hour" 
157 TMTC=O : Tvehl=0: Tveh2=0 : cou=0 : TMCC=O : TSP=O : D1=0 : D2=0 
: D3=0: D4=0: D5=0: D6=0: D7=0: D8=0: D9=0 : D10=0 
158 R1=0 : R2=0 : R3=0 : R4=0: R5=0: R6=0: n1=0: n2=0: n3=0 : Tdba=O 
: Tuc=O: TuI=O: Tuo=0: Tup=0 
160 for m= 1 to 12 : for y= 1 to 7 : for h= 1 to 24 : for 1= 1 to 20 
167 veh= (vkt*MI(m)*wi(y)*hi(h)*li(l))/(100000000*365*24*RL*5) 
168 rem"speed now slope definition" 
169 if veh =< 1200 then 170 else 171 
170 S=6/1000 : goto 179 
171 S=27/1000 
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179 rem"speed an marginal time congestion cost calculations" 
180 v =104-20/10+ 8/4-S*veh 
181 TSP=TSP+v*veh 
185 MTC=(S*veh)/v"2 
190 TMTC=TMTC+MTC*veh*v 
195 Tvehl=Tvehl+veh : Tveh2=Tveh2+veh*v 
196 
MCC = MTC* (1.3162) * (1.0195) * (. 824*468.8+ . 088*859+ . 076*622.5+ . 011 *3213. 
7) 
197 TMCC=TMCC+MCC*veh*v 
198 cou=cou+1 
199 locate 5,1 
200 print, cou ;: print using"######. ##"; veh, v;: print" ";: print 
using"##########. ##"; Tveh;: print" ";: print using"##. ######"; MTC;: print" 
;: print using"#######. ####"; TMTC ;: print using"###. ##"; n1, n2, n3 
201 if MCC < =. 4 then 202 else 203 
202 D1=D1+veh : goto 221 
203 if MCC < =. 6 then 204 else 205 
204 D2=D2+veh : goto 221 
205 if MCC < =8 then 206 else 207 
206 D3=D3+veh : goto 221 
207 if MCC < =1 then 208 else 209 
208 D4=D4+veh : goto 221 
209 if MCC < =1.2 then 210 else 211 
210 D5=D5+veh : goto 221 
211 if MCC < =1.4 then 212 else 213 
212 D6=D6+veh : goto 221 
213 if MCC < =1.6 then 214 else 215 
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214 D7=D7+veh: goto 221 
215 if MCC < =1.8 then 216 else 217 
216 D8=D8+veh : goto 221 
217 if MCC < =2 then 218 else 219 
218 D9=D9+veh : goto 221 
219 if MCC >2 then 220 
220 D10=D10+veh : goto 221 : locate 17,1 
:p ri nt; D 1, D2, D3, D4, D 5, D6, D7, D 8, D9, D 10 
221 Rem"noise level calculations" 
222 dba=10*log10(veh*5)+33*log10(v+40+500/v)+ 10*1og10(1+5*0.145/v)-27.6 
223 Tdba = Tdba+ dba 
224 rem"unpercieved VOC" 
225 uc=(4.893-. 461*. 15)+(51.781-24.019*. 15)/v+(. 000114-. 000059*. 15)*v"2- 
(1.383-1.383*. 15+ (72.554-72.554*. 15)/v+ (. 000177-. 000177*. 15)*v"2)*. 86-(5.744- 
1.196*. 15+ (118.716-63.087*. 15)/v+ (. 000209-. 000154*. 15) *v ^ 2) *. 14 
226 ul=0.718*. 85-1.616*. 85+ (30.760*. 85-69.372*. 85)/v+ (. 000079*. 85- 
. 000178*. 85)*v"2 
227 uo=2.832-5.966+(35.695-84.240)/v+(. 000157-. 000371)*v"2 
228 up=2.832-6.683+(45.688-107.799)/v+(. 000134-. 000317)*v^2 
229 Tuc=Tuc+uc*veh*v : Tu1=Tul+u1*veh*v : Tuo=Tuo+uo*veh*v 
: Tup=Tup+up*veh*v 
245 locate 9,1 
250 print using"##########. ####"; MCC; TMCC 
251 if v< =60 then 252 else 253 
252 R1=R1+veh : goto 262 
253 if v< =70 then 254 else 255 
254 R2=R2+veh : goto 262 
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255 if v=< 80 then 256 else 257 
256 R3=R3+veh: goto 262 
257 if v< =90 then 258 else 259 
258 R4 = R4+ veh : goto 262 
259 if v<= 100 then 260 else 261 
260 R5 = R5 + veh : goto 262 
261 if v>100 then R6=R6+veh 
262 if veh < 1200 then 266 else 263 
263 if veh =1200 then 267 else 264 
264 if veh > 1200 then 268 
266 n1=nl+veh*v : goto 269 
267 n2=n2+veh*v: goto 269 
268 n3=n3+veh*v : goto 269 
269 n=nl+n2+n3 
275 next: next: next: next 
276 print" average MTC (H/veh. km) Average MCC(p/veh. km) average 
speed km/h" 
277 AMTC=TMTC/Tveh2 : AMCC=TMCC/Tveh2 : ASP=TSP/Tvehl 
:A dba = Tdb a/40320 :c= Tu c/Tv eh2 : 1=Tut/Tveh2 :o= Tu o/Tveh2 :p= Tu p/Tveh2 
278 print using"###. ####"; AMTC; AMCC; ASP 
279 print#l, "mway": write #1, AMTC, AMCC, ASP, Adba, c, l, o, p 
280 print#10, "mway": write #10, Dl, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7, D8, D9 , D10 
281 print#11, "mway": write #11, R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 
290 end : stop 
279 
